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The conventional wisdom in the study of international state-building holds that such interventions trigger a backlash among the population in the host state that causes state-building efforts to fail. But this need not be the case. When the political preferences of the state-builder and the incumbent government diverge less than the preferences of the government and a credible domestic political opposition, the state-builder can avoid triggering a backlash that undermines state-building efforts. Melissa Lee will discuss a study, co-authored with Masanori Kikuchi and William G. Nomikos, which examines this proposition in the context of the U.S. occupation of Japan (1945-1952) through an analysis of legislative speeches in the Japanese Diet.
** Please note: This event was originally scheduled to take place on October 28, 2024 and has been rescheduled for March 31, 2025. **
This event is organized by the Seminar on European Development in a Historical Perspective. It is co-sponsored by the Democracy and Its Critics Initiative led by CES Director Daniel Ziblatt to focus on both the history and contemporary shape of democracy in Europe.
