Political corruption constitutes a peril for transitioning democracies, harming economic growth and democratic consolidation. Yet, despite norms of democratic accountability, voters fail to vote out corrupt parties consistently, even while protesting against the pervasiveness of political corruption. Albana Shehaj assesses the drivers of variation in patterns of electoral backlash against corruption.
She presents a theory of "corruption compensation" whereby, to preempt electoral backlash, corrupt incumbents strategically target higher shares of government resources to regions where corruption perceptions are higher and voters likelier to have heightened demand for accountability. Using original data from the transitioning democracy of Albania, she empirically tests and finds support for the presented hypotheses.
The New Research on Europe Seminar serves as a weekly forum in which CES Visiting Scholars present their work. Scholars present their work in a form accessible to scholars working in fields other than their own. Papers may be circulated in advance, although this is not required.
The seminar encourages discussions across disciplinary as well as national boundaries. After each presentation, there is ample time for critique and discussion, followed by the CES Friday Lunch. This seminar is open to the public.