Albana Shehaj is a research fellow at the University of Michigan from where she also holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Methodology. Her research focuses broadly on comparative and international political economy with an emphasis on distributive politics, democratization, International Organizations, and the interactions between voters and political elites.
At the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Shehaj will work on her book manuscript, Purchasing Power: Distributive Politics and Corruption in New Democracies. The book engages with diverse methods to examine electoral strategies and political survival using fiscal resources. It examines: (1) The types of funds and distributive strategies that corrupt governing parties use to counter an electoral backlash; and (2) The impact that fiscal inflows originating from International Organizations have on patterns of accountability, political survival, and the democratic trajectories of recipient transitioning states.
This information is accurate for the time period that the visiting scholar is affiliated with CES.
Research Fellow, University of Michigan
CES Visiting Scholar 2019-2021, Harvard University
Purchasing Power: Distributive Politics and Corruption in New Democracies
Shehaj, Albana. “Investing in FDI: How and Why Do the Western Balkans Differ?” Tirana Observatory, November 5, 2020. https://tiranaobservatory.com/2020/11/05/investing-in-fdi-how-and-why-do-the-western-balkans-differ-albana-shehaj/.
Shehaj, Albana. The perils of succor: The European Union's financial role in the Western Balkans during COVID‐19. Eur Policy Anal. 2020; 6: 264– 276. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1102
What drives recent changes in the landscape of foreign direct investments (FDI) in Western Balkan states and what are the socioeconomic implications of such changes? The emerging economies of the Western Balkan countries (WB6) of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Montenegro, North Macedonia (NM), Kosovo, and Serbia have much to benefit from foreign direct investment (FDI).