Mark Roe is David Berg Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. He teaches and writes on corporate finance, corporate governance, and corporate bankruptcy, often from a comparative law and politics perspective. His work that would be most relevant to political scientists with a comparative politics focus includes Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (2003), Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (1994), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance Systems (co-editor, 2004), Comparative Corporate Governance (co-editor, 1998), “Legal Origins and Modern Stock Markets” in Harvard Law Review (2005), and “Political Determinants of Corporate Governance” in Stanford Law Review (2000). Recent work on corporate law, finance, and bankruptcy includes the two co-authored pieces, “Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws” in the Journal of Financial Economics (2009) and “Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy” in Michigan Law Review (2010), and “The Derivatives Players’ Payments Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator” in Stanford Law Review (2011), and a series of articles on the political economy of American corporate lawmaking, whose most recent piece in the series is “The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and its Political Economy” in the Harvard Business Law Review (2012). Roe writes a bimonthly column for Project Syndicate, often about European corporate and financial events; the column generally appears in European business media.