The Impact of Ukraine: Seismic Shifts and Aftershocks

Charles Maier, Leverett Saltonstall Research Professor of History at Harvard University and resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies.

From his perspective as a historian, Charles Maier takes a sober view of Russia’s ongoing aggression, viewing the current war as the “acceleration of a rather long, depressing period” of regional conflicts, rather than an aberration. “The apparently calm era that we had until recently is coming to an end,” he said, citing “scenes of violence throughout the world.”

The current conflict has many precedents, said Maier. Throughout history, “there are periods when Russia has crushed independence movements on its periphery, sometimes taking advantage of social and ethnic divisions. He cited the January Uprising of 1863, when Poland unsuccessfully revolted against Russian control. “Western Europe looked on sadly, and it was suppressed,” he concluded. In 1939-40 the Soviets moved against Poland, Finland, and reincorporated the Baltic states and installed satellite regimes in Eastern Europe after 1945. “Russia itself, regardless of regime, oscillates through eras of reform and 'Westernization' and autocracy.”

"This is not just a European story. It is a story about the global balance of power."

What has been unusual for Europe as a whole, the historian continued, has been the previous 75 years without interstate war. “Western Europe has enjoyed an extraordinary era,” Maier said. “This is the first war of conquest involving territory in Europe since 1939. For more than a decade it has also been a period of democratic development for Ukraine, which confirmed its aspirations for European alignment with the Maidan Revolution. The issue of NATO gave Putin his pretext for trying to suppress Ukraine’s overall independence.”

Ultimately, said Maier, the repercussions of the current war may reconfigure global dynamics. While expressing dismay at what he called “a tragic situation,” Maier noted that unless there’s an “outright Ukrainian victory,” Russia may force a settlement through attrition. However, he added, “the real winner of this war may well be China.”

“Russia will be smaller than it was after this war, and it will be more in the shadow of China,” he said. In a way, he pointed out, “China’s letting Russia do its European work for it. This is not just a European story. It is a story about the global balance of power.”

Considering the Russian invasion from a foreign policy and security standpoint, Mai’a Cross sees “an acceleration,” rather than a shift, in the European Union’s defense policy. “The EU has had a goal of forming a defense union for decades,” she pointed out. “It's really in the last 10 years that the EU has been able to make more significant progress with an explicit agreement to create a defense union.”

“What's happened in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is essentially an acceleration towards the common goals of the EU and of European integration as many barriers to security integration for Europe have fallen aside in reaction to Russian aggression."

That progress has been slow, Cross explained, because there appeared to be little reason for haste. “When there’s not a period of crisis, EU member states have had the luxury of deviating on how they view their common foreign policy and their common security and defense,” she said. “But now, with a massive crisis right on their border, you see the EU nations setting aside smaller differences in order to speak with one voice.”

“What's happened in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is essentially an acceleration towards the common goals of the EU and of European integration as many barriers to security integration for Europe have fallen aside in reaction to Russian aggression,” she said.

One shift, Cross has noted, is Germany’s defense policy and signals of a “willingness to be militarized.” This new acceptance of a martial position, especially in the wake of Brexit, is leading to “a Franco-German partnership leading the EU’s defenses,” she said.

For Danilo Mandić, who studies forced migration, the impact of the Ukrainian crisis can be seen in its numbers. “Globally, just the sheer volume is quite significant,” he said. “I've studied every refugee crisis since World War II, and we have never seen between four and five million refugees in a matter of two months.”

"I believe one of the global consequences is going to be the realization that we have to pay a lot more attention to civilians in war zones, IDPs included."

Refugees, he clarifies, refers to people who have crossed an international border, such as the millions who have left Ukraine for neighboring states, such as Poland, Romania, or Moldova. A larger, but often overlooked migration involves those who have left their homes and home cities, but not the country. “There are another 15 million people displaced internally — IDPs, or internally displaced people — inside Ukraine,” he said.

Many of these people had already been displaced by earlier conflicts in Ukraine, having fled the ongoing violence in the eastern Donbas region and the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. A large number of these, displaced within Ukraine, have already been victims of discrimination in the labor and housing market. “In many ways, IDPs are much more vulnerable than refugees,” said Mandić. Stuck inside a country under attack, often dealing with housing insecurity, “IDPs are in much more danger, especially now,” he pointed out. “An airstrike can hit you anywhere.”

Despite these horrors, Mandić is grateful for the increased public attention on displaced people. “In this age of the internet, when we are all watching the images of the bombed-out buildings and mutilated bodies, I believe one of the global consequences is going to be the realization that we have to pay a lot more attention to civilians in war zones, IDPs included,” he said.

“I hope there is a reorientation towards the real victims of conflicts, like the IDPs inside the conflict zones, moving around from one danger to another.”

Mandić did, however, express concern for the months ahead. “We are still in the early onset of the war,” he noted, warning of issue (or compassion) fatigue. “In about six months, the war is going to disappear from the headlines. It’s going to be much more difficult to fundraise. It’s going to be more difficult to get students on the Harvard campus interested. That’s what typically happens with these wars: They continue, sometimes for years, but the attention goes away. And sometimes it’s the case that precisely when the attention goes away, that’s when the humanitarian needs are most urgent.”

A comparative political economist, Peter Hall sees the war in Ukraine bringing about “a fundamental reorientation of public policy and the European economy.”

The economic ties that were forged with Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union were supposed to promote interdependence, said Hall. “The strategy of integrating Russia into the European economy was a plausible one, and it was also very convenient for European business,” he pointed out.

“Although the immediate effect of the invasion has been to increase support for current European governments, in the longer term those governments may find themselves in difficulty.”

While these economic ties were supposed to guarantee peace, they also boosted European industry, which prospered on the back of Russian energy. One result is that “Europe is now highly dependent on Russia for its supplies of energy.”

He cited Germany as an example. “Germany gets more than half of its natural gas, more than a third of its oil, and half of its hard coal from Russia.” Because the German economy is based on manufacturing, “energy is enormously important,” he said. “Not only for its households, but for its economic success.”

Now, in its efforts to sanction Russia and divest from Russian energy, “all of Western Europe is having to diversify its supplies of energy,” he said. Doing so quickly, during a crisis, is extremely difficult. “The paradox is that in times of prosperity the costs are lower, but the incentive to reorient the economy is also low. In times of crisis the incentive is high, but the costs of doing so are particularly high.”

Adding to their economic burdens, he pointed out, that EU member states are finding they must allocate resources to defense. “The European strategy for some decades has been to produce butter rather than guns,” he said. “Defense spending has been considerably lower in Europe than it is in the United States.

“Suddenly the war has produced a reversal,” he said. “Germany, for instance, is planning to increase its defense budget to more than 2% of gross domestic product, which it hasn’t done for at least three decades.”

The repercussions will be substantial. “The European economy was already suffering from the supply chain problems that afflict the rest of the world,” said Hall. “But the war is dramatically reducing projected rates of growth. The costs of coping with the energy crisis, in particular, are putting real pressure on the budgets of European governments, which in many cases were already overextended. There’s a real prospect that it may throw the European economy or some of the European economies into recession.”

Looking ahead, Hall sees political repercussions as well. “Although the immediate effect of the invasion has been to increase support for current European governments, in the longer term those governments may find themselves in difficulty,” he said.

When looking at the crisis in Ukraine, Ruxandra Paul, whose research interests include international migration, focuses on the vulnerability of those fleeing the country. She notes how the decision by the Ukrainian government to prevent most men from leaving the country has had “huge ramifications.” Foremost, she points out, this policy has resulted in an overwhelming number of refugees being women or children.

“Along with this new understanding of these migratory patterns will be increased discussion of sharing responsibility and sharing costs and sharing the burden.”

Officials are aware of this challenge, said Paul. Because of the skewing of the refugee population “a lot of the policies that different governments have advanced have been developed with additional care and attention,” she said. As an example, she cites a British initiative that allows UK citizens to host and be compensated for accommodating Ukrainians refugees in their homes.

“There has been great response from the British population, with much more interest in hosting refugees than the government was anticipating,” she said.

However, she points out, this apparent generosity hides some dangers. “Human rights organizations have expressed concern about the ability of British authorities to vet so many of the potential hosts,” she said. “There are concerns about trafficking,” she said, noting that many of those being hosted “are highly vulnerable individuals.

“With the demand for host families and the interest at this level, it would be very easy for the government to miss some red flags that would identify some potential hosts as problematic — or, at least, as people that should not be in the position of hosting families, especially if the stay is an extended one.”

She expressed the hope that one positive result of this wave of refugees may well be a renewed focus on the issue. “Along with this new understanding of these migratory patterns will be increased discussion of sharing responsibility and sharing costs and sharing the burden.” Ultimately, Paul said, “there are a lot of important questions for European policy makers and for EU institutions to tackle.”