The third panel of the conference will include the following presentations:
Andrew O’Donohue – Limiting Majority Control over Law and Courts
Paul Tucker – Majority Rule and Conditions for Legitimate Independent Agencies
Michael Zürn – The Epistemisation of the Political and the Politicization of the Epistemic
This panel examines how majorities are constrained in order to ensure that policy decisions are informed by expertise and technical knowledge. The rise of populism and anti-elitism has led some to question the legitimacy of technocratic governance, but certain policy areas – such as economic regulation, environmental policy, and public health – require specialized knowledge. Speakers will explore whether mechanisms like technocratic agencies, independent central banks, or expert commissions help safeguard democratic interests or if they foster technocracy, potentially eroding public trust in democratic institutions. Speakers will also address how such constraints might exacerbate political polarization or contribute to democratic dysfunction when they are seen as undemocratic.
When are constraints on majorities justifiable from a democratic point of view? Which institutions are, and which, not? And what are the consequences of different types of constraints on majorities for the stability and resilience of democracy?
This conference brings together European and American political scientists, legal scholars, and political theorists in a series of panels to discuss the consequences of majority-constraining institutions on democracy. For a full conference program, see here.
