The popularization of unpopular ideas:
Social crosspressures and immigration attitudes in Sweden

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Abstract: How do ideas that are broadly unpopular in a society spread among citizens? To answer this question we examine the development of anti-immigrant sentiment over time in Sweden. Sweden is known as one of the most tolerant countries in the world. Yet in the past decade Swedish attitudes toward immigrants have hardened, and a radical right party has gained supporters and legislative seats. We leverage a panel study of adolescent Swedes and members of their social networks to establish the factors that prompt individuals to shift their attitudes about immigrants. We find that when a respondent’s friends disagree on the subject of immigrants, she becomes less tolerant of immigrants over time (and more likely to support the radical right). This influence is most significant for those whose parents are particularly pro-immigrant. We also find the effect of friend discordance to be strongest when one’s friends supply information by suggesting politically relevant websites to the respondent and when friends routinely discuss politics online. These insights align with existing accounts of the powerful role interpersonal contexts play in shaping citizen attitudes. Yet in contrast with the dominant view that politically diverse social ties can bolster the health of a democratic system, our results suggest a rather bleak narrative in which exposure to crosspressures weakens key liberal democratic values.

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How do ideas that are generally frowned upon in a society increase in popularity? Minority opinions, we know, are subject to social and psychological pressures that stymie their growth. Yet in certain circumstances, grow they do. We seek to understand how sidelined viewpoints can spread among citizens. We are also interested in explaining why unpopular ideas are adopted by certain individuals and not by others. As such, we devote our attention to processes that operate at the micro level of analysis and that are functions of people’s intimate social lives.¹

Specifically, we focus on anti-immigrant sentiment in Sweden, a country defined internationally by its high level of tolerance for newcomers. We point to a few key pieces of evidence to support the characterization of Sweden as highly tolerant. First, Sweden has had one of the highest asylum claim acceptance rates in Europe for decades (Hatton 2004, Toshkov and de Haan 2013).² Second, Sweden is continually identified as the most favorable country for migrants in Europe, if not the world, due to its generous and successful immigrant integration policies.³ Third, public opinion data demonstrate Sweden’s high level of openness to immigrants as compared to other advanced democracies.⁴ And fourth, tolerance toward immigrants and openness to diversity

¹ To the extent that minority viewpoints are subject to direct attention in the social context literature, the focus is mainly on how they are able to survive given social pressures toward conformity and interpersonal persuasion mechanisms (Finifter 1972, Huckfeldt et al. 2004, Huckfeldt and Mendez 2008). We ask, instead, how minority opinions become increasingly popular.
² Hatton (2004) shows that Sweden had the second-highest asylum claim acceptance rate and the second lowest rejection rate (after Denmark) from 1995-1999 in the EU 15. And though acceptance rates have declined since Hatton’s study, Toshkov and de Haan (2013) find that Sweden, along with only a few other European countries, accepts more than its “fair share” of asylum seekers (per GDP, population size, etc.).
³ Sweden is considered a shining example in the areas of immigrant rights, paths to citizenship, anti-discrimination protections, and educational opportunities (MIPEX 2015, see also Norrington 2015). Intensive policy analysis from 2010-2014 by Migrant Integration Policy Index shows that Sweden is the best country for immigrants among 38 immigrant-receiving countries.
⁴ Published work emphasizes Sweden’s high levels of social, political and immigrant-related tolerance (Weldon 2006, Kehrberg 2007). One study notes: “Sweden seems to be the most pro-immigrant country across the board” based on public opinion figures (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007: 411). See also Figure A1 in the appendix for Swedish support of asylum seekers from the 2002 and 2014 European Social Survey (ESS 2002, 2014). Additional ESS data from 2014 show that Swedes are the
are a point of pride for many Swedes. Two insightful analyses of Swedish identity underscore this point. Schuster writes of Sweden, “…the role of conscience to the world, emphasizing humanitarian and moral responsibility to asylum seekers and refugees, is central to the self-image of that state” (2000: 119-120). And Heinö (2009: 311) points out that anti-nationalism makes up a part of the national identity in Sweden.

Yet in recent years, attitudes toward newcomers to Sweden have soured among some (Eger 2010). One report finds, for instance, that the percentage of Swedes who think bringing in more refugees is a very good idea or a good idea has declined from over sixty percent in 1990 to forty percent in 2015 (Oscarsson and Bergström 2016: 50). Rising support for the Sweden Democrats, a radical right party with a hardline immigration platform, further signals this shift in ideas about

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most likely people in Europe to be open to migrants from poorer countries and least likely to think it important that immigrants be Christian. Furthermore, 74 percent of Swedish respondents state that it is “extremely unimportant” that immigrants be white (using pweights and dweight to estimate). The next highest percentage making this claim is 62 percent from Switzerland. The country sample is 20 countries from Western and Eastern Europe. Swedes are also the least likely to say that immigrants take out more in taxes than they put in. Swedish citizens show themselves repeatedly to be open to immigrants compared to citizens of other advanced democracies.

She also points out that asylum seekers in Sweden have access to legal aid while in many countries they would not (Schuster 2000).

Heinö further states: “the Swedish political elite for several decades has been strongly anti-nationalist, embracing multiculturalist ideals instead” (298). Yet he is cautious to not exaggerate the prevalence of such ethics among Swedes: “I have argued above that while anti-nationalism to some extent constitutes a part of contemporary national identity in Sweden, that does not mean that there is a case for describing Swedish identity as de-nationalised…Anti-nationalism could be seen as an inverted type of nationalism. Claiming that we, by representing the values of, for example, equality, tolerance and liberalism, and, by being anti-racist and anti-nationalist, are a society that should constitute a good example, is also a nationalist practice. This is logical, given that the substance of nationalism is variable. Without doubt, these values have increasingly come to act as unifying signifiers in Swedish discourse on nationality. Common values are, however, by definition excluding towards those who do not share the same values (311)” (Heinö 2009).

The percentage who think bringing in more refugees is a very bad idea or a bad idea increased from seventeen percent to 37 percent over these years. Since 2010 (when our survey begins), the percentage of people on the negative side has increased approximately seven percentage points (from about thirty percent to 37 percent). And the percentage of the population who are undecided has not changed noticeably from 1990 to 2015 (Oscarsson and Bergström 2016).
foreign-born groups in Sweden.⁸ These developments are important to understand in and of themselves; they also serve as a prime example of unpopular ideas rising in political status. As such, we consider these trends to be critically important for making sense of large-scale socio-cultural change.

Because we investigate the societal normalization of a particular viewpoint, individuals’ social contexts are immediately relevant to our analysis. Existing research points us in the direction of people’s everyday lives and routine contacts with others to understand attitude shifts. Friends, colleagues, neighbors, and family members directly and indirectly shape our views of society and our political attitudes. This “social logic” of politics sets the stage for exploring interpersonal influence (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948, Zuckerman 2005). Social pressure can be a prime source of stability in political orientations, but it can also prompt attitudinal adjustments (Fitzgerald 2011). Such change may be a function of disagreement within social networks; cross-pressures from people in our social circles who disagree about political issues can lead some to alter their views (Fitton 1973). It is this specific dynamic that interests us the most. Does political discord in one’s social life have implications for views on immigrants? This is a critical question that has not been investigated in the research on immigration attitudes, perhaps because the requisite combination of the necessary data resources and an ideal context for inquiry had not yet presented itself. It is this very combination of resources and context that we leverage for our analysis.

We study adolescents in Sweden who participated in a panel survey covering the years 2010 (when they were thirteen or fourteen years old) through 2014 (when they were first eligible to vote

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⁸ The Sweden Democrats (SD) received less than three percent of the vote in 2006, under six percent of the vote in 2010, nearly thirteen percent of the vote in 2014, and over 17 percent in 2018. Rydgren and van der Meiden (2019) argue that the SD’s rise is not based on declining support for immigration in Sweden, but instead on the politicization of the immigration issue from 1990-2015.
in a national election). Respondents answered questions annually on their views of immigrants, enabling us to track their attitudinal development. A snowball design also yielded first-hand information on the immigration attitudes of respondents’ friends. And household surveys supply information on how parents think about immigrants as well. As such, the Swedish Political Socialization Panel (SPSP) survey, from the YeS group at Örebro University, provides unparalleled insight into the development of immigration attitudes and the relevant social inputs to this process.

With respect to context, as noted above Sweden provides the ideal arena for examining the spread of immigration ideas that are unpopular in the broad societal sense. Propitiously, the study on which we draw was conducted during years of significant change in the politics of immigration, providing researchers a front-row seat to major societal developments. The study is also specific to a particular city in Sweden: Örebro. By focusing on one country and one city in that country, we avoid the analytical complications of several large- and medium-scale factors at different levels of aggregation that might influence individuals’ views. All these features of the study allow us to develop a theoretically and empirically based account of hardening immigration sentiments over time.

To preview the results of our analysis: we find that individuals whose friends disagree on a range of matters associated with immigrants are particularly likely to become less tolerant of immigrants over time. It is not simply being friends with one or more people who have negative ideas about immigrants that shapes one’s views; it is those in a situation of inter-friend discord on the

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9 One advantage of studying young people is their relative willingness to discuss controversial topics as compared to older individuals (Noelle-Neumann 1974: 47).
10 This study was made possible by access to data from the Political Socialization Program, a longitudinal research program at YeS (Youth & Society) at Örebro University, Sweden. Professors Erik Amnå, Mats Ekström, Margaret Kerr and Håkan Stattin were responsible for the planning, implementation, and financing of the collection of data. Grants from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond supported data collection.
subject who are moved in this negative direction. These same individuals were particularly likely to support the Sweden Democrats in the 2014 general election as well. To enrich our account, we investigate the conditions under which this relationship is enhanced and weakened. Through interaction models we find that those whose friends refer them to specific websites for information about political issues and those who spend time online discussing politics with their friends are the ones on whom discordant friends have the strongest effect. A final analytical step reveals that inter-friend discord has the most powerful anti-immigrant effects on individuals whose parents view immigration very positively. We interpret this to substantiate our idea about the “minority” status of anti-immigrant views: in contexts where a particular idea is unpopular, discord in one’s immediate peer environment can broaden its popularity.

Social networks, political behavior and democracy

Social ties among citizens are understood to be good for democratic societies. They supply many externalities that enrich and stabilize our lives. For instance, engagement with others improves mental and physical health, lowers crime rates, boosts environmental sustainability and multiplies employment opportunities (Callois and Aubert 2007, Cotterill and Taylor 2001, Kawachi and Berkman 2001, Hirschfield and Bowers 1997, Granovetter 1973). Social connections can also prevent people from feeling adrift and alone, diminishing the allure of anti-democratic ideas (Arendt 1973, Kornhauser 1960, Falter and Schumann 1988, Van der Brug and Fennema 2007, Billiet and Witte 1995, Coffé et al. 2007, Fitzgerald 2018). Having close friends is a particularly important type of social link in preventing political extremism (Vanhoutte and Hooghe 2013, Rydgren 2009). Social engagement also has specific attitudinal implications that align with basic values of democracy, such as egalitarianism, social trust and tolerance (Cigler and Joslyn 2002, Li et al. 2005, Keele 2007,
Putnam 1993, Brehm and Rahn 1997). Altogether, a significant amount of research points to the positive implications of a socially connected citizenry.

Alternatively, other studies identify a darker side to social ties that is not so compatible with democracy. For instance, a “downbeat” version of social capital theory emphasizes its exclusionary implications (Putnam 2000) and its potential for engendering inegalitarian values and prejudice (Portes and Landolt 1996, Maloney et al. 2000, Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). Social networks have been shown to transmit ideas and ideologies that conflict with liberal democratic values. Some of the most important work in this area focused on the role of social ties in the collapse of democracy in Weimar Germany. Considerable evidence points to the role of a hyper-networked citizenry in spreading and popularizing Nazi ideas (Voth et al. 2013, Berman 1997, Allen 1965). Totalitarianism, more generally, is at least in part rooted in an absence of open exchange of opinions in society (Arendt 1968).

In considering the plurality of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes that can stem from social engagement, it seems that a necessary ingredient for pro-democratic social engagement is diversity. Surely, Putnam makes this point in bifurcating social capital into “bridging” versions that link people across social groups of various kinds and “bonding” varieties that are homogeneous, the former being better for democracy (Putnam 2000, 2007). Furthermore, Allen’s seminal study of National Socialism’s rise in a single German town underscores the role of homogeneity in people’s social circles. Social networks were not diverse in terms of political ideology, ethnicity and religion, and this bred paranoia and distrust among Nordheim’s residents. Allport’s (1954) research on the development of tolerance and the importance of ethnic diversity in social relationships underscores the value of heterogeneous networks (see also Wölfer et al. 2016).

While these dark-side accounts of social networks cast a shadow over the notion of a socially engaged citizenry serving as the bulwark of democracy, they also offer diversity as a solution. If
people’s networks are diverse enough on a range of dimensions, the negative implications of social engagement are diminished. With respect to political diversity, much theoretical and empirical work on opinion formation and interpersonal influence supports this prescription. Scholars in the deliberative democracy tradition underscore the societal benefits of open and diverse political dialogue. Unfettered exchange of competing ideas is expected to equip citizens with the tools to effectively evaluate alternative solutions to public problems and to hold government accountable (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Moreover, statistically-based analyses find that political discord in ones’ interpersonal arena can promote political engagement (Leighley 1990, Nir 2005, Pattie and Johnston 2009, Fitzgerald and Curtis 2012, Quintellier et al. 2012) and that exposure to divergent points of view leads to a more knowledgeable, reflective citizenry (Sokhey and McClurg 2012, McPhee 1963, Ahn, Huckfeldt and Ryan 2010, Fishkin 1991, Sokhey and Djupe 2011) and to more moderate political attitudes (Kreisberg 1949).\textsuperscript{11} In particular, there is evidence that interpersonal disagreement in an individual’s social circle supplies political information (Huckfeldt et al. 2004, Lyons et al. 2016) and alters media patterns (Scacco and Peacock 2014). These behavioral studies highlight the positive implications for democracy when people are exposed to contrasting political positions (see also Mutz and Martin 2001, Delli Carpini et al. 2004).

Motivated by these findings, we ask whether exposure to diversity of opinions on immigration has these same pro-democratic implications. If political cross-pressures are good for democracy, then they should promote values such as tolerance for minority groups and demands for equal rights for immigrants. This should be especially likely in an environment like Sweden where the norms of tolerance are well developed and pervasive. Pressures to conform to social norms and

\textsuperscript{11} Research also shows that political discord prompts some people to retreat from politics (Mutz 2002, 2006; Rogowski 2014) largely due to the social cross-pressures rooted in disagreement (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948, Kreisberg 1949). Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague (2004) report mixed findings.
the majority opinion should be expected to play a role here as well. Social conformity among members of social groups is well documented in political (McPhee 1963, Sinclair 2012) and non-political arenas (Asch 1956, Milgram 1974, Cialdini 2001, Cialdini and Goldstien 2004), alike. Dominant social norms supply a valuable script for individuals who are subject to differing opinions in their networks. Therefore, when faced with contrasting viewpoints, we would expect Swedes to revert to and defend the dominant, normative script in society, and perhaps dig in to defend immigrants. This optimistic expectation that a pro-tolerance boost stems from discord in one’s social environment calls for empirical evaluation.

Such a test is especially important because there is reason to question whether this expected relationship will bear out. Research on the psychology of small groups shows that while pressures toward conformity are powerful social engines for consensus (Kelley and Volkhart 1952), political conversations often result in greater extremism among participants (Moscovici 1976, Myers and Lamm 1976, Myers 1982, Burnstein 1983, Brauer and Judd 1996, Van Swol 2009). One interpretation of these findings is that minority viewpoints, when presented in contrast with majority viewpoints, are more convincing. Experimental work connects the notion of “group polarization” tendencies—through which the introduction of minority viewpoints pushes individuals to take radical positions—to inter-group intolerance (Paluck 2010). In the same vein, Kuklinski et al. (1991) find that deliberation yields political intolerance, and Gibson (1998) demonstrates that tolerant attitudes are more pliable than intolerant attitudes. These studies point to the role of considering competing opinions in promoting less politically tolerant viewpoints. In light of this collection of

12 See Wood et al. (1994) for a review of this literature. And see also Delli Carpini et al. (2004) who provide a broad review of the public deliberation literature with its favorable and unfavorable implications for democracy.
insights, we must also take seriously the possibility that exposure to divergent views on immigration within one’s social network makes a person less tolerant.

Moreover, the advent of the internet as a site for political communication within social networks, most notably among young people, further motivates our investigation into interpersonal influences. Social media and other online connective formats have become vital for extremist groups seeking to radicalize young people across a wide range of countries (Séraphin et al. 2017). The anti-democratic, intolerant content of many online venues (Hawdon et al. 2017) presents a challenge to those seeking factual information to adjudicate between conflicting viewpoints. Such online messaging, which typically involves false or misleading claims, can interact in powerful ways with face-to-face relationships to racialize internet users (Pauwels and Schils 2016).\textsuperscript{13} We therefore look into the nested dimension of disagreement between peers when face-to-face interaction bleeds into the fraught information environment of the internet.

**Social influence and attitudes toward immigrants**

While our primary interest is in unpacking the influence of discord on the growth of unpopular ideas, we also contribute to the literature on anti-immigrant sentiment. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the people around us influence our views on this subject. Some of the most robust findings show that ethnic diversity in one’s social environment can enhance openness to immigrants and other minorities (Allport 1954, Miklikowska 2017, Wölfer et al. 2016). Yet here we focus on the dynamics of interpersonal persuasion on immigration attitudes— independent of the presence of ethnic diversity in people’s contexts. Existing work assures that there is much to be learned from this approach. For instance, Berg (2009) finds that the composition of interpersonal,  

\textsuperscript{13} Howdon et al. (2016) find that young people are particularly likely to encounter hate-based content online.
core networks (regardless of whether they contain ethnic diversity) can influence attitudes toward immigrants.\textsuperscript{14}

Panel data research provides novel insight into the ways networks shape the development of immigration attitudes over time. Hooghe and Quintelier (2013) find that engaging in certain social environments can reduce young people’s hostility toward out-groups (mainly immigrants) in Belgium. Yet they also find that other social arenas can push people’s attitudes in less tolerant directions,\textsuperscript{15} underscoring the importance of attitudes represented in people’s close social environments.\textsuperscript{16} Data from Sweden tell a similar story. Notably, van Zalk et al. (2013) find that young people’s tolerance levels are influenced over time by their friends’ views on immigration in Sweden. And Miklikowska (2016, 2017) finds that friends’ and parents’ views matter for the development of Swedes’ immigration attitudes.

These studies highlight the importance of the social arena for shaping views on immigrants and out-groups more broadly. Yet the potential influence of discord about immigration among those in one’s social networks represents unexplored empirical terrain. We think it likely that cross-pressures by close acquaintances has potential to influence immigration attitudes. In addition to the works cited above, we draw on evidence that people are particularly unlikely to self-censor in

\textsuperscript{14} Specifically, Berg finds that the education and age of network members as well as the strength of networks can have direct and conditioning effects on immigration attitudes.

\textsuperscript{15} Mondak and Sanders (2005) make a related point. Fitzgerald (2012) finds something similar: frequent participation in only certain kinds of activities (such as helping out friends, relatives and neighbors) can fuel individuals’ concerns about immigration from year to year in Germany. Other kinds of social activities, such as church attendance and routine informal socializing with friends, result in more positive views toward immigrants over time.

\textsuperscript{16} We also know that discussions with family, friends and acquaintances can shape support for populist movements over time. For instance, Vezzoni and Mancosu (2016) find that Italian support for the upstart 5 Star populist movement grows among those who discuss politics in non-cohesive social groups. Similarly, Fitzgerald (2011) finds that Swiss family members who discuss politics together have particularly strong effects on one another’s partisanship, notably with respect to the far right Swiss People’s Party.
intimate social relationships (Dailey and Palomares 2004, Knobloch and Carpenter-Theune 2004) and that political discord is most likely to surface among those in relationships characterized by high levels of closeness (Morey et al. 2012). Given the relative rarity and sensitivity of ant-immigrant views in Sweden, we think that whatever influence there is should be particularly visible in friendship networks.

Data

The data we use come from the Swedish Political Socialization Panel survey, a longitudinal investigation of political development (Amnå, Ekström, Kerr and Stattin 2009). The study is comprised of five annual waves (2010-2014) plus a post-election survey in 2014. It takes place in Örebro, a Swedish city of 137,000 inhabitants. The city is close to the national average on factors such as population density, income level, ethnic diversity, and unemployment (Statistics Sweden, 2010).

For most of our models we utilize two waves of data from cohort 1, which is comprised of respondents who were thirteen and fourteen years-old in 2010 at the time of the first wave of interviews. The main dependent variable and most of the independent variables come from wave

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17 This survey is part of the Youth and Society (YeS) study at Örebro University.
18 Researchers conducted annual assessments in ten middle schools and three of the largest high schools in the city. The schools were selected from a range of neighborhoods to ensure that different ethnic and social backgrounds were represented. The data collection took place during school hours and were administered by trained research assistants. Participants were informed about the types of items in the questionnaire, the approximate amount of time required, and that their participation was voluntary. They were also informed about their rights to decline participation or to withdraw from the study at any time. Parental consent was obtained for adolescents under 18. Each class received a payment for participation of approximately 120 USD to their class fund. Prior to the start of the project, the Regional Research Ethics Committee at Uppsala approved the study and its procedures.
19 There are several benefits to studying adolescents. First, we know that young people are developing their views on social issues during this phase of life (Sears and Brown 2013: 65-70), and so we are able to trace this process up-close. Second, people have relatively well established
2. Each year, researchers asked respondents a series of questions about immigrants, which we integrate into a single index of *Anti-immigrant sentiment* for each respondent for each wave. The survey item reads: “What are your views on people who have moved here from other countries?

1. Our culture gets enriched when people from other countries move here.
2. It happens only too often that immigrants have customs and traditions that do not fit into Swedish society.
3. In the future, Sweden will be a country where there are exciting encounters between people from different parts of the world.
4. Immigrants often come here just to take advantage of the welfare in Sweden.
5. That people move to Sweden is good for the Swedish economy.
6. Immigrants often take jobs away from people who are born in Sweden.
7. We should welcome people who have fled from problems in their own countries.
8. Immigrants should have the same rights as people born in Sweden.”

Respondents choose from the following options for each of these prompts: does not apply at all, does not apply so well, applies quite well, or applies very well.\(^{20}\) We summarize these items into an index and recode this variable (as well as the others used in this study) to run from 0 at the minimum to 1 at the maximum.\(^{21}\) For our main dependent variable we use this index from wave 2.\(^{22}\) Because we are most intensely interested in understanding shifts in immigration attitudes over time, attitudes toward immigrants by age fourteen, so we are gaining insight into meaningful orientations in our study (Hooghe and Wilkenfeld 2008). Third, interpersonal influences on immigration attitudes during adolescence are well-documented (van Zalk et al. 2013), and they are lasting (Wölfer et al. 2016).

\(^{20}\) The resultant index (which reverse-codes the positively worded items above) has an alpha of .77. Factor analysis loads all eight items onto a factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.62 with a second factor excluding the negatively worded prompts that loads at an Eigenvalue of 1.16.\(^{20}\) Together, these are signs of a robust index of immigration attitudes.

\(^{21}\) For cohort 1, the mean for this variable in wave 1 is .41; for wave 2 it is .4. Over time, our young respondents’ tolerance levels on average increase across nearly all components of the index. See Figure A2 in the appendix for this downward trend for the anti-immigrant sentiment index. Figure A3 depicts the downward trend for the eighth item of the survey, which asks whether immigrants should have the same rights as those born in Sweden—a particularly essential democratic viewpoint.

\(^{22}\) Our focus on wave 2 of the survey allows us to do two important things simultaneously that the other waves preclude. We can use a lagged dependent variable and we can include parental attitudes about immigrants. In wave 2, respondents are fourteen and fifteen years old.
we include in our models the same anti-immigration index from wave 1 to account for previous views.

A snowball sampling step of the survey reveals immigration views of respondents’ friends.23 We use these same immigration items asked of friends to establish several things. First, for each of the first two friends identified, we create an anti-immigrant sentiment index, resulting in these two variables: *Friend 1 anti-immigrant sentiment* and *Friend 2 anti-immigrant sentiment*. We also create a variable that simply summarizes these two values: *Friends’ combined anti-immigrant sentiment*. For our main measure of cross-pressures by friends, we use the immigration attitude items to establish the level of disagreement between friends 1 and 2. For each of the eight immigration prompts, we assign a value of 1 if the two friends are on different sides of the divide (friend 1 says “does not apply at all” or “does not apply so well” while friend 2 responds, “applies quite well,” or “applies very well” or vice versa). If they are not on different sides of the divide, then the value assigned is 0. We then add these up so that a respondent’s friends can be on opposite sides of none of the eight items (*Friends’ disagreement on immigration* in this case is 0), or they can be on opposite sides of all eight items (in which disagreement has a value of 8), or they can be somewhere along the discord continuum. As with all variables, we ultimately re-code this to run from 0 to 1 to ease statistical interpretation. On average, friends 1 and 2 disagree on just over three items, but in some instances they disagree on none and in others these friends disagree on all eight immigration items. Finally, we create a variable that is the (absolute) distance between friend 1 and friend 2 on the anti-immigrant sentiment index. We replace the variable of friends’ breadth of disagreement with this measure of disagreement intensity, labeled *Friends’ distance on immigration*, to better understand the nature of

23 Here is the item that asks respondents to identify their friends: “In most schools there are groups of young people who hang around together, and talk and do things together. Write down the first and last names of the people you associate with most at school.”
friend effects. We include this in models in the Appendix (Table A1) and discuss the related findings in our concluding section.

One more variable based on immigration attitudes rounds out this set of factors. Parents are also asked this battery of immigration-related questions. In two-parent households, the parents decide which of them will respond. Unfortunately, since only one parent per household responds to these prompts, parental discord is beyond our empirical grasp. But this still gives us valuable information about the way immigration is thought of in the home environment. As with the other indices, parental anti-immigrant sentiment is simply an additive index from across all eight immigration items.24

Political engagement is an important control variable in our models because prior research—as noted above—shows that discord in one’s interpersonal environment has implications for this particular orientation. Therefore, we construct an index of engagement that accounts for any influence this factor may have in the opinion development process. We integrate questions on political interest, social interest and the level of fun one derives from politics into Political engagement.25 We use this variable from wave 2 in our models as a control.

We also consider the role of socio-economic status (SES) in our models. Because we are interested in attitudes about immigration, and existing work tells us that objective measures of status pale in comparison to subjective/relative measures for explaining intolerance (Pettigrew et al. 2008), we use the following item: “If you compare with others in your class, do you have more or less

24 The mean value for this index for parents in wave 2 is .32 (on a 0 to 1 scale). (We only have cohort 1’s parental attitudes for the first two waves of the survey.) We note that on the whole the respondents in this study reflect Swedish norms of tolerance as expected. For each of the immigration attitudes index components, the percent of respondents who come down on the negative side is rather low—ranging from the low teens to the mid-twenties across index items for all groupings of respondents.  
25 This index has an alpha score of .83; it loads onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.8.
money to buy things?” Response options are: “I have much less money than others in my class, I have a bit less money than others in my class, I have the same amount of money as others in my class, I have a bit more money than others in my class, and I have a lot more money than others in my class.” We label this variable $SES$ in the tables below.\(^{26}\) We also include gender ($Female$) and whether the respondent and his or her parents were born in Sweden in the models as additional controls ($Born$ in Sweden is dichotomous, $Parents$ born in Sweden ranges from 0 (neither), to 1, to 2 (both)). Women on average tend to be less anti-immigrant, according to previous research (McLaren 2003). And we would expect that being born in Sweden and having Swedish-born parents would enhance the potential for anti-immigrant attitudes and voting.\(^{27}\)

In some of the models, we replace the anti-immigrant sentiment dependent variable with a measure of how the respondent plans to vote in 2014. This is a question asked in wave 5 of the survey (in 2014) in advance of the elections. The item reads, “Which party are you likely to vote for in the election this autumn?” There are options for ten parties as well as “don’t know.” If a respondent chose the Sweden Democrats, this variable ($Intention$ to vote Sweden Democrats) is coded as 1. If they did not, it is coded as 0. And while there is no clear lagged version of this dependent variable to include in the models, in earlier waves respondents are questioned the groups and organizations they like. One of the items asks about “Radical-right groups, such as Info 14, the Swedish Resistance Movement, the Party of the Swedes (formerly the National Socialist Front).” Response options are: “Like a lot, don’t like, and don’t know.” This we code as dichotomous

\(^{26}\) Replacing this item with other socio-economic status measures, such as whether the family has enough money to buy certain kinds of goods or whether parents complain about not having enough money, does not alter the results.

\(^{27}\) In alternate versions of these models, we drop respondents who are foreign-born or who have one or more foreign-born parents. The results do not differ substantively, but we chose to keep as many observations in our models as possible for more robust estimates.
variable \((\text{Liked extreme right groups})\) with “don’t know” coded as missing, “don’t like” coded as 0 and “like a lot” coded as 1.\textsuperscript{28}

The final two variables, which we use exclusively for interaction analyses, denote what political communication with friends looks like to the respondent. The first item is worded as follows: “I have friends who… Provide me with information on pages on the Internet where you can read about politics or societal issues.” The response options are, “definitely doesn’t apply, doesn’t apply particularly well, kind of applies, applies quite well, and applies very well.” The second item for interactions reads, “During the last two months have you done any of the following?… Discussed societal or political questions with friends on the internet.” Response options are, “yes several times” (coded 1), “yes now and again” (coded .5), and “no” (coded 0). We interact each of these with the friends’ disagreement measure to unpack how this influence might operate.

Models are OLS regressions for the anti-immigrant sentiment dependent variable. They are logistic regressions where the dependent variable is intention to vote for Sweden Democrats. Each includes a lagged dependent variable so their results should be interpreted as identifying those factors associated with a shift in the dependent variable. Observations are clustered by the schools students attend to address issues of school (and perhaps neighborhood) context in shaping immigration attitudes (van Geel and Vedder 2011, Ha 2010).\textsuperscript{29}

Main results

Table 1 contains three models. The first is what we consider our main model. It examines the effect of friend discord on immigration attitude shifts among respondents. Respondents who

\textsuperscript{28} By including this lag (from either wave 1 or wave 2) we weaken the results of the relevant models somewhat, but this does not alter them substantively.

\textsuperscript{29} In an alternative specification, we control for whether friend 1 or friend 2 was born abroad. We did not find substantive differences in the results.
have friends that are on opposite sides of all eight aspects of immigration asked about in the survey are six percentage points more intolerant of immigrants (on a 0-1 scale) than are respondents whose first two friends do not line up on opposite sides of any of the items. This correlation is robust to controls for the combined measure of friends’ anti-immigrant sentiments as well as a series of controls and a lagged dependent variable. Model 2 demonstrates that including friends’ anti-immigrant scores independently does not alter the results. Model 3 introduces the parental measure of immigration attitudes. None of these alterations to the specification changes the result that discord between friends is associated with more intolerant viewpoints.

Other things to notice from this table are that some friends’ immigrant attitudes (and not simply their level of discord) shape the development of young persons’ immigration attitudes; parents do not have this same effect. Political engagement is negatively related to shifts in immigration views, and in the third model we see some evidence that girls are less likely than boys to become more intolerant over time. Also, the lagged dependent variable in each model has the strongest coefficient, revealing a high level of stability among these teens’ attitudes over time.

We see this first step in the analysis as evidence that friendship discord on immigration promotes intolerance. Yet another way to interpret the main findings from Table 1 is that the cross-pressures of friends on the subject of immigration simply lead to ambivalence toward immigrants. In a highly tolerant social context like that in Sweden, ambivalence can be contrasted with the tolerance boost that most youngsters experience as they are socialized to Swedish norms. To test

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30 When we replace the measure of how many immigration items on which friends 1 and 2 disagree with the measure of how far apart they are on immigration overall, the results in Table 1 do not replicate. Having friends who are polar opposites has no effect on the development of immigration attitudes. See Table A1 in the appendix for these results. We discuss this distinction between breadth and depth of discord in our final section below.

31 The pairwise correlation between the wave 1 and wave 2 indices of respondent anti-immigrant sentiment is .65 for this cohort.
this possibility, we provide in Table 2 parallel models with a different dependent variable. Vote intention to vote for the Sweden Democrats in 2014 (asked about in wave 5) is modeled as a function of the independent variables from wave 2. Since we do not have a lagged dependent variable to use (vote intention was never asked before of these young respondents), we include whether the individual liked extremist groups in wave 2 (when he or she was 14 or 15 years old).

These models show the same results, essentially, as those presented in the first table. Importantly, disagreement between friends (in 2011) is positively associated with stating that one intends to vote for Sweden Democrats (in 2014). Due to the challenge of interpreting logit coefficients, we use Clarify to estimate predicted changes in probability of supporting the Sweden Democrats as the key inter-friend discord variable shifts from its minimum to its maximum. These predicted changes are .13 for Models 1 and 2 and .29 for Model 3 (on a 0 to 1 scale). Regardless of the specification and the sample (note that including parental attitudes reduces the number of observations considerably), the impact of shifting the central predictor from its lowest to its highest value increases the probability of supporting the radical right party by a visible margin. This, we think, undermines the ambivalence interpretation of our findings from Table 1. Anti-immigrant sentiment receives a lasting boost from a social situation in which friends disagree with each other on immigration.\(^{32}\)

**Fine-tuning the narrative**

Through what process or processes might discord between friends promote intolerance on the part of respondents? We interact two measures of what political communication looks like

---

\(^{32}\) In Table 2 we also see that parental anti-immigrant views enhance the likelihood that a teen will support the Sweden Democrats and that socio-economic status has a positive effect as well. Girls are less likely than boys to develop a fondness for extreme right groups.
among friends with the inter-friend disagreement index to generate further insights. The first is a measure of the extent to which interactions with friends are characterized by the sharing of websites that are politically oriented. The second is a measure of whether and how often an individual discusses politics online with their friends. Does inter-friend discord have a stronger effect when one or both of these things happen? The answer to this question appears in Table 3. Per the first model, we see that when friends share political websites with the respondent, the inter-friend disagreement effects are strongest. The second model shows that when respondents discuss politics with their friends online, the discord about immigration between friends has the most potent effects.

We next graph these interactive results to facilitate their interpretation. In Figure 1 we see that in friendship circles where information about online political content is given to the respondent, he or she is more sensitive to the discord between friends. In other words, for those whose friendships contexts are characterized by information resource transfer that is specifically internet-oriented, attitudes shift in the anti-immigrant direction. Figure 2 demonstrates that discussing politics online with one’s friends several times enhances the anti-immigrant effects of friendship disagreement. From this pair of results we see that friendship discord influences opinion—at least

31 We also investigated the possibility that discord between friends makes their viewpoints more visible to the respondent. Interacting the disagreement measure with factors such as frequency of discussion and perceived knowledge of friends’ views does not yield significant (or near-significant) results.

32 These two online communication variables correlate with each other at .27 (sig. .000). Neither correlates significantly with the inter-friend disagreement measure, and neither correlates with the sum of friends’ anti-immigrant indices.

33 In contrast to these statistically significant interaction effects, a range of other interaction variables do not hold explanatory value. For instance, we interacted the following variables with the friends’ disagreement variable and found no effects: I have friends who… talk about politics in a way that makes them fun and interesting, talk about things that happen in the world that makes me curious, tell me about the news they have heard on TV or read about, give me information about different activities or organizations. During the last two months have you done any of the following: linked news to my friends, signed an online petition, visited a political website, discussed societal issues with people I don’t know, organized an online protest or boycott, participated in an internet-based protest.
in part—through internet communication. Talking about politics with friends online forges the connection between politics and internet use. By sharing political websites, friends direct the attention and information-seeking of the respondent (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948) identify a parallel communication dynamic—though of course without the online dimension). To further illuminate this process, information on websites recommended (and visited) and other details of online communication among friends would be ideal. Without this, we draw on existing scholarship and contextual observations related to Sweden to consider why and how inter-friend discord when combined with online communication yields greater intolerance.

We integrate into our statistical analysis the notion that anti-immigrant sentiment is of minority status and broadly shunned in Swedish society. Thus, we posit that the direction of influence identified here—that discord between friends promotes intolerance—is associated with the unpopular nature of intolerance in Swedish society. When friends generate cross-pressures on an individual, the “underdog” wins out. Looking at the results this way sheds light on the nexus between interpersonal dynamics and the broader social backdrop. However, it is difficult to evaluate this analytical space given that our data are from only one country and indeed only one city in that country. We are unable to vary the context that makes intolerance such an unpopular cultural viewpoint. Fortunately, individuals live in a series of nested contexts that can be leveraged to understand how majority vs. minority ideas stack up against each other.

To this end we present one more interactive model. The context of interest is the family household, characterized by parental views on immigration. If we are correct in thinking that it is the unpopularity of intolerance that enhances its likelihood of winning out over tolerance when

---

36 We think it likely that the virtual aspect of friends’ discussions likely diminishes the social cost of disagreeing face to face, thereby keeping individuals from avoiding the topic of immigration altogether.
friends disagree, then this effect should be strongest for respondents who live in very tolerant homes. Families in which parents are generally open to immigrants and immigration approximate Swedish society in the aggregate. In households where immigrants are judged harshly, the exposure to cross-pressures among friends should not have the same negative effects on tolerance.

Table 3, Model 3 presents the statistical results of interest and Figure 3 plots out the interaction effects. The interaction between parental anti-immigrant sentiment and friends’ disagreement on immigration is negative and significant. Parental views that are in line with anti-immigrant friends diminish (and almost negate) the push toward intolerance that stems from disagreeing friends. And for those whose parents are especially tolerant of immigrants, the impact of inter-friend discord is highest. To be more precise, per Figure 3, the effect of friends’ disagreement is only statistically insignificant for individuals whose parents are at the highest end of the anti-immigrant scale. Conversely, respondents whose parents strongly disagree with all of the anti-immigrant prompts are boosted twenty percentage points in their anti-immigrant sentiment when they have friends who disagree most broadly on the subject. We interpret this as support for our contention that intolerance wins out when friends disagree—at least in part—because this is such an unpopular position in society.

Discussion

History demonstrates that large-scale ideational change within mass publics can occur. In particular, attitudes toward specific minority groups have undergone significant changes in different societies at different times. Yet rarely do we have an opportunity to see how such a process unfolds. It is especially difficult to observe the growth of an unpopular viewpoint because such ideas are subject to silencing pressures from the broader society. We consider Sweden and its rising tide of
anti-immigrant sentiment to be an important context for examining such a process: in recent years, ideas about immigrants that are normatively shunned have blossomed.

Here, we find that discord among young people’s friends fuels the development of anti-immigrant attitudes; when an individual is cross-pressured by friends, her views head in the unpopular direction. We also find that these effects have implications for later vote choice, and we see that they are most striking when an individual’s home environment is positively disposed toward immigrants. In some ways these results answer questions about the growth of minority viewpoints, directing our attention to citizens’ connections with friends and the discord among those friends to understand how certain ideas are spread within a society. But they also raise questions about the direction of these effects: why does discord result in less favorable opinions of immigrants?

Per our analytical framework, when one’s friends disagree about immigration, she is subjected in her intimate social environment to discord between a very popular and familiar position in Sweden and a very unpopular and unfamiliar position in Sweden. As a result, she leverages online resources and communication channels to sort out the majority vs. minority ideas contest.37 So the discord puts the respondent into an inconsistent information environment, and the result is less tolerance.38

37 Based on the results presented above, this would not be the response to just having friends who dislike immigrants—the discord between or among friends is key for this effect to work. Also, both components of each interaction (between friend disagreement and provision of websites and between friend disagreement and participation in online political discussion with friends) are important here only in interaction. Simply adding the internet content variable or the online discussion variables to the models without the interactions does not yield significant predictive results. And interacting website provision or online discussion with friend 1’s (and then friend 2’s) anti-immigrant sentiment does not prove significant, either.

38 Theories of motivated reasoning and affective intelligence (Taber and Lodge 2006, Marcus et al. 2011, Petersen et al. 2013) might suggest that when prompted to collect information (in this case prompted by the discord between friends), an individual will pay closer attention to information that confirms his or her prior views. We interacted the friends’ disagreement variable with the respondent’s lagged anti-immigrant sentiment to test this idea. We find no evidence of a motivated effect on the respondent’s tolerance levels.
Notably, we find that it is the breadth rather than the intensity of disagreement between friends that matters for a respondent’s attitudes (see appendix Table A1). Having two close friends on divergent sides of the immigrant-attitudinal spectrum is not associated with shifts in respondents’ immigration attitudes. Prior research suggests that a high level of polarization between friends may squelch issue engagement rather than invigorate it (Mutz 2006). We think this important since so much research focuses on the political extremes and intense polarization found in large-scale social aggregates today. Within intimate social circles, instead, political disagreement need not be severe to be influential. What we can see from our study is a relatively subtle carving out of tolerant values from the inside of people’s social lives. Yet as these subtle shifts compound, dramatic social changes can result and progressively undermine liberal democratic social consensus.

The online nature of the communication with friends provides an opportunity to theorize further on how these processes of influence unfold. While research cited above leads us to surmise that minority information is particularly influential, complementary work suggests that certain websites shift citizens’ estimations of how (un)popular anti-immigrant opinions are in Sweden (Zerback and Fawzi 2017). Individuals who previously believed intolerant views to be extremely uncommon, and therefore not viable attitudinal options for themselves, may encounter online information that gives the impression of more widespread anti-immigrant sentiment than expected.39

As we reflect on our study, we consider Noelle-Neumann’s classic and powerful theory of public opinion formation. She hypothesizes that this process begins when “individuals form a picture of the distribution of opinion in their social environment and the trend of opinion” (1974:

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39 This account comports with models of communication that find online information-seeking to play a strong intermediary role in linking interpersonal deliberation experience to behavioral outcomes (Lee, Shah and McLeod 2013).
This perceived distribution then informs a person’s views on key public matters. Notably, they will shy away from opinions that they perceive to be deeply unpopular. We think it likely that the combination of peer cross-pressures and the internet can shift a person’s “picture of the distribution of opinion” in an anti-immigrant direction. Perhaps Noelle-Neumann’s theorized “spiral of silence” kept anti-immigrant sentiment at bay in Sweden for many years. If so, our study suggests that engaging with discordant friends on the subject can kick off a process that ultimately diminishes the perceived social risks of intolerant viewpoints, allowing these ideas to grow.

40 She also writes, “…social conventions, customs and norms are included, along with political questions, among the ‘situations’ and ‘proposals of significance’ with which a large number of people express agreement or disagreement in their public lives. If public opinion arises from an interaction of individuals with their social environments, we should find at work the processes which Asch…and Milgram…have confirmed experimentally. To the individual, not isolating himself is more important than his own judgment. This appears to be a condition of life in human society; if it were otherwise, sufficient integration could not be achieved” (Noelle-Neumann 1974: 43).

41 We cannot say for certain that older people are subject to the same kinds of influence we identify here. But even if these effects are specific to young people’s attitudinal development we note that young citizens have been found to influence their parents’ attitudes about immigrants (Miklikowska 2016) and about extreme right parties (Fitzgerald 2011). Even a conservative interpretation of our findings stands to have significant ripple effects in society.
Tables and figures

Table 1

Predicting shifts in anti-immigrant sentiment
OLS regression models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
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Observations clustered by school. Cohort 1.

Table 2

Predicting intention to vote Sweden Democrats in 2014
Logit models

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<td>S.E.</td>
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<td>2.75 (.41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friend 2: anti-immigrant sentiment</td>
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Observations clustered by school. Cohort 1.
Table 3

Predicting shifts in anti-immigrant sentiment: interaction effects
OLS regression models

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<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>Friends discuss X friends’ disagreement</td>
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Observations clustered by school. Cohort 1.

Figure 1

Effect of friends’ disagreement about immigrants on shifts in R’s anti-immigrant sentiment depending on friends providing info/websites

Estimates generated using lincom in Stata 13.
Figure 2

Effect of friends’ disagreement about immigrants on shifts in R’s anti-immigrant sentiment depending on discussing politics online with friends

Estimates generated using lincom in Stata 13.

Figure 3

Effect of friends’ disagreement on R’s anti-immigrant sentiment depending on parental anti-immigrant sentiment

Estimates generated using lincom in Stata 13.
Appendix

Figure A1

Allow many of different ethnicity/race to immigrate
European Social Survey: 2002 & 2014

Design- and population-weighted percentages, ESS1-2002, ed.6.4, ESS7-2014, ed.2.0

Figure A2

Anti-immigrant sentiment index for full cohort 1 (means)

N=300, Scale runs from 0 to 1.
Figure A3

Immigrants should not have equal rights
cohort 1 panel born Sweden

N=300, Scale runs from 0 to 1.

Table A1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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<td>Coeff.</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>(.04)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friends' distance on immigration</td>
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<td>(.00)</td>
<td>.764</td>
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<td>(.00)</td>
<td>.914</td>
<td>-.0008</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>.777</td>
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<td>Friends' combined anti-immigrant sentiment</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>.076</td>
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<td>Friend 1: anti-immigrant sentiment</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>.018</td>
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<td>Friend 2: anti-immigrant sentiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parental anti-immigrant sentiment</td>
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<td>(.04)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
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<td>Political engagement</td>
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<td>.961</td>
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<td>-.006</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
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<td>(.02)</td>
<td>.911</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
<td>.872</td>
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<td>.888</td>
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<td>.970</td>
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Observations clustered by school. Cohort 1.
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