Nationalism in Contemporary Nation States

Imagined Political and Cultural Community across 44 countries

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Abstract:

This article describes how the inhabitants of contemporary nation states think about nationhood along Kohn's classic distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism. The article establishes a conceptual framework that facilitates the interpretation of the two-dimensional structure found in this and previous empirical studies of public attitudes. The article uses three rounds of ISSP data on national identity, which enables analyses across 44 countries and across two decades. The article applies MCA-analyses, as the first in the field. The article finds congruence between public criteria for being national and measures of national proudness, national belonging, attitudes to foreign mass media content and attitudes towards migration and migrations. The congruence supports the established two dimensional conceptual framework. The article finds evidence that Kohn's classic distinction, if applied in a two-dimensional manner, is (still) relevant. In the north Western European countries, republican stories of nationhood (still) dominate, whereas national conservative stories (still) dominate in Eastern Europe. However, the study also finds a number of deviant cases and countries with an overweight of national liberals, e.g. the US, and an overweight of de-constructivists, e.g. Japan, that are not well captured by Kohn's original framework.

Keyword: *Nationalism, stories of nationhood, Hans Kohn, civic, ethnic, ISSP*

Introduction

The history of the world's many nation states is long, complex and troublesome. Some of the pivotal moments were the peace of Westphalia in 1648 that settled some of borders of the states that would turn into nation states, the American and French revolution that challenged the monarchy, and the established of new borders and new countries after the Congress of Vienna, the First and Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. The history of nationalism, understood in a social constructivist manner as the stories of nationhood, peoplehood and imagined communities (e.g. Anderson, 1991; R. M. Smith, 2003) that formed in these states, are as complex. However, in order to establish an overview many scholars adhere to Kohn's classic distinction between a "civic" or "Western" nationalism and an "ethnic" or "Eastern" nationalism (Kohn, 1961[1944]). Kohn distinction has roots in Meineke's (1970[1907]) distinction between "staatsnation" (state nation) and "kulturnation" (culture nation). Arnason argues that *"In the whole literature on nation and nationalism, it would be hard to find a more seminal work than Hans Kohn's 'Idea of Nationalism'. Its influence on the approaches and arguments of later scholars in the field has been much greater than commonly acknowledge"* (Arnason, 2006: 46). Kohn basic argument was that in Western Europe (his examples were France, the UK, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the US) the borders of the state where settled prior to the rise of nationalism, which created a strong focus on the political dimension of nationhood. In contrast the borders in Eastern Europe were settled after the rise of nationalism, which created a strong focus on the ethnic/cultural dimension of nationhood. The US was a somewhat deviant case where state and nation borders were established simultaneously. The terms "Western" and "Eastern" were both used to denote the geographic locations of the various ideas of the nation (Kohn drew the line between the area west of the Rhine and the areas east of the Rhine) and to denote two different ideal typically ways of constructing the stories of nationhood (against which stories about nationhood around the world can be measured).

In the wider public mythology about nation state building Kohn's distinction is often associated with the historical experiences of the US, France and Germany. The American declaration of independence in 1776 and the French revolution in 1789 are used as examples of national constructions around a political community; a "staatsnation". The republic established by the French revolution emphasised a political community where everybody that adhered to the slogan of "liberty, equality and fraternity" were imagined to be French. The American revolution had the same political emphasis, e.g. canonised by Tocqueville in "De la démocratie en Amerique" (1835/1840), though the actual "civicness" of the US can be discussed (see Kaufmann, 1999 for the argument that the US in reality was an "ethnic" nation state until recently). Kohn has sometimes being accused of seeing this "Western nationalism" as the "good" kind of nationalism. The unification of Germany in 1871 is often used as an example of nation constructed around a cultural community; a "kulturnation". As the borders were unclear and no democracy was installed, the new ideas of nationalism emphasised the shared cultural content of the "German" principalities (see

Brubaker, 1992 for a detailed comparison of French and German nationalism). Kohn's has sometimes been accused of seeing this as the "non-Western" "evil" kind of nationalism.

The seminal work of Kohn has been followed by an important literature about the conceptual and empirical soundness of the distinction between "civic/Western" and "ethnic/Eastern" nationalism (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008; Hjerm, 2003; Janmaat, 2006; Jones & Smith, 2001a; Jones & Smith, 2001b; Kaufmann, 1999; Kuzio, 2002a; Kymlicka, 2000; Nielsen, 1996; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Shulman, 2002). The article will contribute to this standing debate by describing how the inhabitants of 44 contemporary nation states think about nationhood along the classic lines of cultural and political community. Besides the conceptual discussions, where the article contributes with a simple two-dimensional conceptual framework, there is a need to empirically study how contemporary citizens think about nationhood. The main question is whether the classic distinction is (still) relevant and where (contemporary) nation states are positioned. Despite the intense theoretical academic debate about Kohn's distinction, the empirical research in this field is limited. Kymlicka argued in 2000 that the presupposed *"gulf between East and West has ... so far inhibited genuine comparative empirical work"* (Kymlicka, 2000: 183). Since then a number of empirical studies have qualified the debate about the ethnic-civic-distinction but no consensus about the usefulness of the distinction is found (see below). The articles will contribute to this literature. Furthermore, there is a need to study the stability of the stories of nationhood, which is made possibility by new data material. It is often argued that some of the most "political" (or civic) nation states, those formed around a democratic political community, as a reaction to the increased inflow of migrants in Western Europe and failed integration, witness a move towards what below will be labelled conservative nationalism. The rise of Front National in France is a point in case (e.g. Betz, 1993). It has also been argued that some of the most "cultural" (or ethnic) nation states, those formed around common cultural content, in the process of establishing democracies after the fall of the Soviet Union, witness a move towards what below will be labelled republicanism (e.g. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008; Kuzio, 2002b; Shulman, 2002). While there is a large literature on public attitudes toward migration and migrants, especially in Western Europe, little is known about changes in these more fundamental stories of nationhood.

The political and cultural dimension of nationalism: The case for a two dimensional solution

Kohn's distinction between "civil" and "ethnic" is at the surface simple and convincing but still contains a number of pitfalls. Firstly, it can be discussed whether a nation states has a single story of nationhood or rather has a number of competing stories of nationhood. The obvious answer is that Kohn – and the users of Kohn's distinction – refers to the dominant story of nationhood, whether measured by legislation, elite discourses or public attitudes. Nevertheless, conceptually it is an important moderation that there is likely to be competing stories of nationhood within nation states. It is difficult to weight legislation or elite discourses against each other. Some pieces of legislation, e.g. the rights of "ethnic" Germans migrated many generations ago (the so-called "deutche

Volkszugehörige") to claim citizenship in Germany (in practice until 1993) points to the ethnic dimension of nationhood, whereas the German democratic federal constitution of 1949 clearly points to the political dimension of nationhood (see Helbling & Vink, 2013 for a special issue on the trouble with grouping countries based on policies towards migrants). This article will quantitatively study public attitudes where there are well-established simple techniques to report the "average position" of a given country, by aggregating the answers of the individual respondents. However, in the interpretations the coexisting of conflicting stories of nationhood will be kept in mind, especially when it comes to what below will be labelled de-constructivism.

Secondly, the use of the term "ethnic" is problematic. The problem is this "ethnic" is not easily defined and Kymlicka (2000) rightly argues that the nationhood stories typically are formed around broader cultural markers, i.e. often it is shared norms, values and customs and not common ancestors that is believed to be crucial. And if common ancestors are believed to be crucial, it is typically because it is seen as the best guarantee for maintaining common values and norms. Thus, conceptually it is difficult to keep cultural and ethnic markers apart, which makes Meincke's old "kulturnation" term more precise than Kohn's "ethnic" term (Kymlicka seems to prefer a mix by using the term "ethnocultural" in the 2000 article. This article uses the term "cultural community". The article also replaces the "civic" term with the term "political community" as it is believed to be more precise and do not have the same connotation of something necessarily being "good".

Thirdly, it has been discussed whether it would be more useful to place countries on a continuum from "civic/political" at the one end to "ethnic/cultural" at the other end instead of applying Kohn's dichotomy. Those in favour of a continuum often cite Anthony Smith for the argument in his seminal 1991 book that "… *every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized"* (A. D. Smith, 1991:13). Another possibility, pursued by this article, is to treat the "political" and "cultural" as two different dimensions on which nation states can score high or low. Anthony Smith e.g. argues in his 2000 book that "*No nation, no nationalism, can be seen as purely the one or the other, even if at certain moments one or other of these elements predominate in the ensemble of components in national identity"* (A. D. Smith, 2000:20). Thus, one can argue that the "political" and "cultural" should not be treated as mutual exclusive phenomenon. This is implicit the position taken in quantitative studies that find a two-dimensional factor solution in survey data (Janmaat, 2006; Jones & Smith, 2001a; Jones & Smith, 2001b; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010) though these studies rarely conceptualize what it means to be high/high or low/low on the two dimensions (see below). This article argues that by treating the cultural and political as two distinct dimensions, also conceptually, one derives at four theoretical positions that ease interpretation of empirical results, see Figure 1.

In the upper left quadrant, one finds the classic republican ideas often associated with the thinking of Rousseau (1718-1778) and Kohn't notion of "civic" (and not "ethnic"). The basic idea is that the nation is formed around a political community and not a cultural community. In

contemporary thinking, Habermas (1997) is a prominent defender of this republican position. In relation to the reunification of East and West Germany, Habermas (1997) e.g. argued that a common national identity should be structured around "verfassungspatriotismus" (constitutional patriotism) and not around imagined shared cultural content. In relation to the current debate about immigration, especially in Western Europe, the classic republican idea is that migrants should assimilate to the national (democratic) political community but not to a national cultural community.

Figure 1. Two dimensions of national perception and four classic positions

High importance of national
political community

"Republicanism"   "National liberalism"

Low importance of national   High importance of national
cultural community   cultural community

"De-constructionism"

"National conservatism"

Low importance of national
political community

Source: Larsen 2016

In the lower right quadrant, one finds the classic national conservatism associated with the thinking of Herder (1744-1818) and Kohn's notion of "ethnic" (and not "civic"). Herder claimed, in opposition to the French revolution and the inclusion of German speaking territories in the French republic, that a nation should be formed around a common cultural community (or "Volkgeist") and not a political community. Herder himself travelled the Germany speaking regions and published letters and collected folk songs that demonstrated and promoted the shared cultural content. For national conservatives the nation is not an imagined community, it is a historical given cultural community. Therefore immigration, especially from cultural more distant areas, is easily seen as a challenge for upholding a nation. This is the basic national conservative idea that many contemporary so-called new right wing parties share (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997) . What to do with

already present immigrations is not easily answered within national conservatism. One solution is full cultural assimilation but the classic answer is segregation.

In the upper right quadrant, one finds what can be labelled national liberalism often associated with the thinking of Mazzini (1805-1872) and his fight for a united Italian nation state. As many of the "Italian" regions were "occupied" by the Austrian Kingdom, Mazzini promoted the idea that due to a shared cultural content, the Italians had a right to establish their own political community. Thus, when empires fall apart, e.g. the Soviet Union, the typically pattern is that groups of people underline that they have a shared culture content and therefor has a right to establish a political community as well. This belief in giving "nations" the right to democracy is the prevalent standard in the contemporary international order. In 1945, 51 nation states were represented in the UN. In 2014, it was 193 nation states. The position is defended by contemporary thinkers such as e.g. Miller (1993) who argues that national communities should both have a cultural and political element. Within national liberal thinking, migration flows are not seen as problematic as in the thinking of national conservatives. But still there is a shared cultural content that needs to be maintained. Within national liberalism migrants are both believed to be assimilated to the national political and cultural community (often with a distinction between a private and public culture). Kymlicka, and other critics of Kohn's idea of "pure" civic nationalism, argues that in real existing nation building projects the "civic" creeds are always followed but strong cultural assimilation, especially through language learning in the school systems (Kymlicka, 2000). According to Kymlicka, the US is a classic example of this simultaneous presence of both a "political" and "cultural" dimension in the nation building project. The American idea of a "melting pot" is sometimes accused of fundamentally underpinning cultural assimilation of migrants (often with Canada as the neighbouring contrasting, more multicultural, case).

Finally, there is the lower left quadrant that largely has been left unnoticed in the conceptual debates about nation building. However, nationalism, in any form, has always had its critics. Following the logic of Figure 1, this position neither finds the national cultural or the national political community of much importance. Such a deconstruction of the national has its roots in socialism, which basically saw the bourgeois nation states, and their liberal democracies, as tools to control the emerging working classes. Though the idea of a world revolution and the unification of working class across countries does not have much influence anymore a critical perspective on nationalism can been found in various contemporary versions. There are still nation states such as e.g. Spain, Israel and Turkey were large shares of the population question the borders or the very existence of the current nation state. There are also nations, typically countries with recent negative experiences with a dominance of national conservative ideas, where sizeable proportions of the public have a critical stand toward the very idea of nationalism. In relation to immigration, the deconstruction of nationalism is pushed forward by what can be labelled radical multiculturalists (Böss, 2006). The radical multiculturalists reject the basic idea of the nation state that some people have a special privilege to a certain territory. They also question the idea of a national cultural and political community. Parekh (2002) e.g. sees liberal democracy as a Western value that oppress

authentic local cultures, which e.g. leads him to take a critical stands towards the national liberal multicultural thinking of Kymlicka. This maintenance of authentic cultures bears a resemblance to the segregation suggested by hard core national conservatives. The article uses the term "de-constructivism" as the uniting factor in this quadrant.

Fifthly, and most profoundly, Kohn provided a historical account connected to the geopolitical realities of the 18th and 19th century that might not be valid in the 20th or 21th century. Thus, one of the main arguments has been than countries once grouped as "ethnic" might over time turn more "civic" (Kuzio, 2002b). Germany is a point in case. The archetypical "kulturnation" seems on many parameters to have become a "statenation". The same transformation could have happened in Kohn's other archetypical Eastern nation that installed liberal democracies after the break down of the Soviet Union. Using the ISSP data material from 1995, including 15 countries, Shulman (2002) concluded that the covered Eastern European countries were much more "civic" than expected. Schulman did not have data over time and did warn about making firm conclusion based on a single cross-cut. But the available empirical evidence led to the argument that the Eastern countries might have overcome their "ethnic" nationalism of the past. Such a development would support the "optimistic" argument that modernization, i.e. economic development and democratization, has a capacity to replace "ethnic" with "civic" nationalism.

Data and method

The most comprehensive data set on national identity is the ISSP-module (International Social Survey Program) fielded in 23 nation states in 1995, 33 in 2003 and 33 in 2013. In each nation state a representative sample of adult (18 years old and above) have been asked a common set of standard items in a postal survey. The article makes use of this full data set except South Africa in 2013 (due to a difference in response category of the used items) and the sample of Palestinian citizens in Israel (due their exclusion from citizenship in practise). Thus the Israeli sample only contains the Jewish population. Furthermore, in all countries the article only describes the national perceptions of respondents where both parents of the respondents had citizenship in the given country. Thus, it is a description of how "the natives" imagine the national community. The ISSP data are not suitable to describe the national perceptions of "migrants". All in all the ISSP data provide 88 national samples including in all 104,605 respondents (see online appendix Table A2 for sample sizes). 14 countries conducted the national identity model in all three waves, 16 countries conducted two waves and 14 countries conducted one wave. Thus, in all 44 countries are covered. The ISSP is not a random sample of countries around the world. There is an overweight of European countries, which is of importance for the inferred that can be made from the data material. However, the European countries are of special interest as they were the point of departure for Kohn's historical work and the strand of literature that followed.

The ISSP-data on national identity is little explored. It is both caused by the study of nationalism being dominated by historians, who rarely work on survey data, and by the fact that the few studies using the data seem to be somewhat inconclusive. Most studies, this one included, use the seven ISSP-items were respondents are asked what it means to be truly American, Russian, Dutch etc. The question had the following introduction "Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is…". The respondent was then asked about:

1) to have been born in [country].

2) to have [country] citizenship.

3) to have lived in [country] for most of one's life.

4) to be able to speak [country language].

5) to be a [dominant religion].

6) to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws.

7) to feel [country nationality].

Part of the inconclusiveness of the previous studies is caused by a confusion about which of these items respectively measure "political community / civic / Western" and "cultural community /ethnic / Eastern". One solution is to choose indicators deductively. Schulman (2002) e.g. choose "born" (1), "citizenship" (2), "lived" (3), "laws" (6) and "feel" (7) to reflect "civic" and "language" (4) and "religion" (5) to reflect "ethnic". Another approach is to inductively look for dimensions in the responses of citizens, in previous studies typically by means of (rotated) factor analyses. Here previous studies of the 1995 data derives at a two dimensional solution, where "born" (1), citizenship" (2), "lived"(3) and "religion" (5) form the first dimension and laws" (6), "feel" (7) and "language" (4) forms the second dimension (Jones & Smith, 2001a; Jones & Smith, 2001b). Previous studies of the 2003 data derives at a similar solution for the second dimension and a close to similar solution for the first dimension (though "citizenship" is left out of the first dimension and an additional item added in 2003 about ancestry was included) (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010: 589). The interpretation of these dimensions differs. Reeskens and Hooghe use the label "ethnic" (dimension 1) and "civic" (dimension 2) whereas Jones & Smith argue that the dimensions cut across the "civic-ethnic" divide (they especially find it problematic to include "language" in "civic" and "citizenship" in "ethnic"). Thus, in a review Janmart rightly argue that *"a number of items… could have been interpreted differently by the respondents, which makes it difficult to assign meaning to underlying dimensions in the data"* (Janmaat, 2006:58). Furthermore, the interpretation

is (perceived to be) trouble by the fact that it has proved difficult to find a (negative) relationship between the "ethnic-dimension" and attitudes to migration/migrants and a (positive) relationship between the "civic-dimension" and these attitudes (Janmaat, 2006). It has also proved difficult to link proudness measures, also measured in the ISSP-survey, to xenophobic attitudes (Hjerm, 2003). All in all this leaves an uncertain about the interpretation, which e.g. leads Ceobanu & Escandell (2008) to replace the ethnic-civic distinction with four alternative dimensions and Jannmaat (2006) to supplement the ISSP data with Eurobarometer data.

This article uses multiple correspondence analyses, MCA, to describe the dimensions in the national perceptions of the respondents, as the first in the field. The so-called active variables are the seven items listed above. The respondents could answer the seven questions using the following categories "very important", "fairly important", "not very important", "not important at all" and "can't choose". The answers are recoded into "very/fairly important" (marked by a "+" in Figure 2) and "not very/not all important" (marked by – in Figure 2). This grouping was done in order to avoid categories with few answers, which is a problem for MCA analyses. "Can't choose" are treated as missing (list wise deleted). The share answering "very/fairly important" in each country sample is found in online appendix Table A1. The article uses the MCA COREM procedure in SPAD (version 7.3), which is developed to describe dimensions in categorical variables in large datasets. The dimensional space derived from the included active variables is found in Figure 1. The eigenvalue of the first dimension is 0.34 (x-axis) and the eigenvalue of the second is 0.15 (y-axis). As in previous studies a two-dimensional solution is preferred. "Born" (1) and "lived" (3) deliver the highest contribution (cumulated contribution at 20.3 for each) to the formation of the first dimension (later interpreted as the "cultural community dimension"). "Law" (6) delivers the highest contrition (45.5) to the formation of the second dimension (later interpreted as the "political community dimension). Thus, the MCA-analysis largely replicates what is found with other techniques in previous studies. However, one of the advantages of MCA is the possibility to easily add so-called supplementary variables. These variables do not actively shape the "space" but the position of the answer categories ease the interpretation of the dimensions. The added additional variables are importance of family background (items added in 2003), feeling of national belonging, feeling of proudness about the nation, attitudes to the size of migration, attitudes to whether migrants should assimilate and preference for given priority to national programs and films in TV, se online appendix Table A3 for exact wording of the included supplementary variables. Another advantage of MCA is that the visible plots ease interpretation, especially for the "high"/"high" and "low/low" quadrants largely neglected in previous empirical research. The interpretation of the derived MCA space is conducted in section four.

Figure 2: Two dimensional solution. Position of active categories.

The next step is to describe where the inhabitants of a given country (on average) are positioned in this two-dimensional space. This will firstly be done for the latest available year (section 5), covering 44 countries. Secondly, the time trajectory for each of the countries that have conducted two or three rounds of the ISSP will be described (section 6). The estimated exact position of each country can be found in online appendix Table A2. The main methodological weakness of this setup is that survey items might not have the same meaning across time and across countries. This is a standard problem for all comparative survey research that cannot be solved and therefore simply needs to be acknowledged. The overview comparative data can provide comes at the costs of many lost country details. An additional problem is whether the underlying dimensions are the same

across countries and across time. The solution in Figure 2 is an "average" based on the full data material, which neglects the potential presence of deviant countries and deviant time points. A single of the previous studies did empirically study the assumption of homogeneity of dimensions in the 2003 data (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Using confirmatory factor analysis it found a presence of somewhat deviant cases (religion e.g. having larger impact on the "ethnic" dimension in Israel). In contrast to confirmatory factor analysis, the MCA analysis does not have tests for homogeneity in dimensions. However, the two dimensional solutions for each sample have been inspected and they largely conform to the "average solution" found in Figure 2. The article describes the full sample of 44 countries instead of deleting (somewhat) deviant cases. The aim is to provide a first overview, using the MCA-techniques and the full sample of ISSP-countries, well aware that more detailed studies are needed to unravel the underlying national complexity.

The current relevance of the four national constructions

The MCA diagram shown in Figure 2 does resemble the conceptual framework outlined in Figure 1. The national conservatives find it important to belong to the dominant religion in the country, to have been born in the country and to have lived most of one's life in the country in order to be "really" French, American, Turkish etc. The republicans distinguish themselves by taking more less the opposite position. They find it unimportant to have been born in the country, to have lived most of one's life in the country and to belong to the dominant religion. They also find citizenship less important but the answer is located at the border between "republicans" and "de-constructivists". The national liberals distinguish themselves by finding it important that one respect the law, speak the language, and feel national. Finding citizenship important is located at the border between national liberals and national conservatives. Finally, the de-constructionists distinguish themselves by not finding it unimportant to be able to speak the language or feel national. These "average" positions give conceptual meaning but will be further explored by means of the "average" position of the answer categories of the supplementary variables (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Two dimensional solution. Position of supplementary variables

Figure 3 shows how those given a particular answer, e.g. those answering "very proud" of their national identity, on average are located in the established space shown in Figure 2 (axes values are changed in order to make the figure more readable). As expected those answering "very proud" of the national identity is located in the national conservative quadrant. Those in the national conservative quadrant also tend to answer that migration should be "decreased a lot". They also tend to agree in the statement that national television should give preference to national films and programs. Finally, they find it important to have a family background in the nation in order to be a real national. The national liberals' tend to answer that they feel "very close" to the country and that migration should "decrease a little". They also distinguish themselves by answering that "it is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society". Thus, the national liberal emphasis on assimilation goes hand in hand with a preference for not receiving more migrants than the nation can successfully assimilate to both the cultural and political community, i.e. the amount that can become real nationals by coming to speak the language, feel national and feel close to the nation.

The republicans tend to answer that they are "somewhat" proud of the nation (not "very proud" as the national conservatives) and feel "close" to the national (not "very close" as that national liberals). As expected the republicans tend to disagree with the statement that national TV stations should give priority to national programs. They find family background to be unimportant

for being a real national. Finally, the republicans answer, on average, that immigration should "remain the same" or "increase a little". As the imagined necessary assimilation is not as profound as the one imagined by national liberals, the republicans are not as worried about the amount of migrants. Finally, the de-constructionists distinguish themselves by being "not proud at all" or "not very proud" of their nationality. Many also answer that they do not feel "close at all" or "not very close" to the nation. They also distinguish themselves by answering that migration should be "increased a lot" and that it is better for a society "if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions" (in contrast to the position of the national liberals). Thus, one can indeed find empirical evidence of a de-constructivist position.

These patterns in the answers of the 104,605 respondents indicate that the four nationhood constructions outlined in Figure 1 are relevant in contemporary nation states, at least on average. They also demonstrate the present of a fairly coherent logic behind the criteria for being a real national and and the feeling of belonging, the feeling of proudness, the attitudes to national TV, the attitudes to the size of migration and the attitudes to the assimilation of migrations, which has been difficult to establish in order empirical studies. The MCA-analysis is developed to find and understand such segments and operate with an underlying assumption of non-linearity (e.g. Le Roux & Rouanet, 2004). Segments scoring low on the political dimension might be against migration (as expected by previous research). This is correct for the national conservatives. However, they might also be those most in favour of migration. This is the case of the de-constructivists. Thus, the absence of a linear relationship between the "civic" dimension and xenophobic attitudes is only to be expected. The same is the case for those scoring low or high on the political dimension. Thus, one can question the assumption of linearity in (simple) regression techniques, which would MCA a better methodological choice.

The current country position and the four classic national constructions

In all the sampled countries there will be republicans, national conservatives, national liberals and de-constructivists (as well as combinations and variations that this framework is not sensitive towards). However, if there is merit in the long line of nationalism research using Kohn's framework, one should expect country differences. Figure 4 shows the (average) position of the country in the latest available sample and do indeed indicate large country differences. In the republican quadrant one largely find the Northern European countries. As expected from the historical account, France is found in the republican quadrant. France, however, is by 2013 not the country with the most republican public. The two nation states with the most clear-cut republican publics are Sweden (2013) and the Netherlands (2003). In accordance with Kohn's framework, one also finds Denmark (2013), Switzerland (2013) and Belgium (2013) in the republican quadrant. In conflict with Kohn's framework, Germany (2013), Estonia (2013) and Slovenia (2013) and Taiwan (2013) are also found in this quadrant. Norway (2013), Finland (2013) and Iceland (2013) are

Western countries but their borders were settled late in history. Thus, one could also perceive these cases as deviant.

In accordance with Kohn's distinction one finds most of the none-Western countries in the national conservative quadrant. East European countries such as Poland (2003), Slovakia (2013), Bulgaria (2003), Hungary (2013), Czech republic (2013), Lithuania (2013) together with neighbouring Russia (2013) and Georgia (2013) are located here. So is Austria (2003) and Italy (1995), which Kohn also grouped as "Eastern". In accordance with Kohn one also finds countries with late settled state borders such as the Philippines (2013), Venezuela (2003), India (2013), Turkey (2013), Mexico (2013), Uruguay (2003), Chile (2003), South Korea 2013) and South Africa (2003) in the national conservative quadrant. The latter, South Africa, is positioned as the country with the most clear-cut national conservative public in the sample. The only country in the quadrant in conflict with Kohn's distinction is New Zealand (2003). However, New Zealand is positioned close to the middle (which indicate a fairly equal distribution of republicans, national liberals, national conservatives and de-constructivists in the country) and closest to the national liberal quadrant.

Figure 4: Latest available position of country in two dimensional solution. N=44.

Finally, one finds the positions of countries that cannot easily be handled by Kohn's dichotomy. In the national liberal quadrant one finds the settler societies such as Australia (2003), the US (2013) and Canada (2003) together with Portugal (2013) and Latvia (2013). UK is located the border between the national conservative and national liberal quadrant. There is not a single country where national liberalism clearly dominates. The location near the centre indicates that most of these countries have large groups adhering to one of the other three national constructions. Nevertheless, it fits the historical account that the national liberal emphasis on assimilation could be strongest in settler societies. Thus, Kymlicka is not only right that in practice strong cultural assimilation can be found in settler societies with civic creeds. This study demonstrates that in some cases, the US included, it is also a prevalent idea in the stories of nationhood that a cultural and political community co-exist. The de-constructivist quadrant can neither be handled by Kohn's dichotomy. However, in Ireland (2013), Israel (2013), Croatia (2013), Spain (2013) and Japan (2013) there is an overweight of de-constructivists, e.g. the group that neither find the cultural nor the political community important for being a "real" national. Ireland stands out as the country with the most de-constructivist public. In Israel, Croatia, Japan and Ireland this could be understood as reaction to the national conservative forces that have been a play in all three countries. As for Spain, it is a well-known case of a country with large segments preferring the Spanish nation state to be dissolved (see further interpretation below).

The changes in country position and the four classic national constructions

Whether this country pattern proves Kohn's classic distinction to be right or wrong is difficult to determine. On the one hand Figure 4 demonstrates that Kohn distinction still has some predictive power. On the other hand, Figure 4 also demonstrates that, as predicted by Kuzio (2002), countries are not simply locked into a given position. Contemporary Germans can clearly not serve as the standard example of a national conservative public. Furthermore, even a perfect fit between Kohn's dichotomy and the current position of countries does not verify the historical stability implied by those who use Kohn's framework. One cannot make long historical comparisons based on the ISSP data but the development in country trajectories from 1995 to 2013 (Figure 5) and from 1995 to 2003 or from 2003 to 2013 (Figure 6) give an indication of the stability in the public perception of nationhood as well as an indication of current trends.

Figure 5. Country trajectories from 1995 to 2013. N= 15 (end point marked full)

TW-Taiwan, HR-Croatia, CZ-Czech Republic, 'DK-Denmark, EE-Estonia, FI-Finland, FR-France, GE-Georgia, DE-Germany, HU-Hungary, IS-Iceland, IN-India, IE-Ireland, IL-Israel, JP-Japan, KR-Korea (South), LV-Latvia, LT-Lithuania, MX-Mexico, BE13-Belgium, NO-Norway, PH-Philippines, PT-Portugal, RU-Russia, SK-Slovak Republic, SI-Slovenia, ES-Spain, SE-Sweden, CH-Switzerland, TR-Turkey, GB-Great Britain, US-United States, I- Italy, AU Australia, PL Poland, BG Bulgaria, CA Canada, NL Netherlands, NZ New Zealand, AT Austria, CL Chile, VE Venezuela, ZA South Africa, UY Uruguay.

Of the 13 countries located in the republican quadrant in Figure 4, the ISSP data enables us to track 10 across time. Three of the four countries we can track from 1995 to 2013, Sweden, Norway and Germany were placed in the quadrant in all three waves; Norway and German with very similar position whereas Sweden became even more republican. Slovenia was located directly at the border between the republican and national liberal quadrant in 1995 and moves towards republicanism (see Figure 5). Five of the six countries in the republican quadrant in Figure 4 that can be traced over two waves were also earlier positioned in this quadrant. That goes for the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Switzerland and Finland. Thus, despite the rise of new-right wing parties in many of these countries it has not changed the "average" public perception of nationhood; e.g. in Denmark where the public on average has become more republican despite the a highly successful new-right party, "Danish People's Party" (for a detailed account see Larsen, 2016). Finally, Taiwan entered the republican quadrant from a position at the border of the de-constructivist quadrant (see Figure 6).

Of the 21 countries located in the national conservative quadrant in Figure 4 the ISSP data enables us to trace 11 cases back in time. Of the six countries that can be traced from 1995 to 2013 only the Philippines were found in the quadrant in 1995. Russia derived from a de-constructivist position in 1995. The same did Hungary; but whit a national liberal position in 2003. The Czech and Slovak republics arrived from a republican position; the latter with an overweight of de-constructivists in 2003. Thus, the data do indicate a movement (back) towards national conservatism in some of the Eastern countries. The UK experienced a movement towards national liberalism (see Figure 5). For the five countries that can be traced over two waves Bulgaria and Poland had in both samples an overweight of national conservatism; Poland with a move towards even more national conservatism. New Zealand arrived from a republican position in 1993 and Austria derived from a national liberal position. Thus, these two countries experienced a move towards national conservatism. Finally, South Korea arrived from a position at the border of de-constructivism (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Country trajectories from 1995 to 2003 and between 2003 to 2013. N=15 (end point marked full)

See Figure 5 for country labels.

The five countries located in the national liberal quadrant in Figure 4 can all be traced back in time. Only the US was found in this quadrant in all three samples. Thus, the US is the most clear-cut example of having a public with a national liberal dominance in the nationhood story. Latvia was in the quadrant in 1995 but not in 2003. Australia (2003) and Canada (1995) arrived from a position in the republican quadrant in in 1995. Especially, the change in the public attitudes of the Canadians is remarkable. In 1995, Canada had on overweight of republicans, which positioned the country together with the Netherlands and Sweden; the three countries that have experimented the most with so-called "multicultural policies"(Koopmans, 2005). This Canadian retreat from republicanism (not multiculturalism), at least in public opinion, is underpinned by national studies. Wong & Guo describe how the Canadian multicultural policies of the 1990s were "civic" whereas those of the

2000s were more "integrative" (2015:4). Finally Portugal (2013) arrived from a position in the national conservative quadrant (2003).

Of the five countries located in the de-constructivist quadrant in Figure 4, four can be traced back in time. Japan and Ireland does in all three waves have an overweight of de-constructivists; but the latter with a change towards more de-constructivism. Spain (2013) is located closer to the middle, i.e. the overweight of de-constructivists is not as pronounced. Furthermore, in 1995 and 2003 Spain was positioned in the national conservative quadrant (see Figure 5). The overweight of de-constructivists is more pronounced in Israel (2013) that also arrived from a position in the national conservative quadrant. Kohn's framework and previous study do not provide much guidance for interpretation of the de-constructivist quadrant. However, the struggle about Northern Ireland and the normalization that followed after the peace-agreement in 1998 could be a candidate for explaining the Irish move away from national conservatism. The formation of Kadima by Ariel Sharon, in order to support the Gaza-disengagement plan, could be a candidate to explain the Israeli move away from national conservatism. The stable overweight of de-constructivists in Japan could be seen as the most puzzling finding of the study. Japan is an extremely ethnic homogeneous country with a long intellectual tradition for studying, and promoting, the authentic Japanese culture, the so-called "nihonjinron"(Befu, 2001; Burgess, 2007; Yoshino, 1992). However, this salient national conservatism has also generated a stable opposition to idea of an authentic Japanese culture, including a strong none-nationalist communist party. Thus, by comparative standards Japan also host a large segment with a critical stand towards the very idea of nationalism.

The competing stories of nationhood

The largest pitfall in the application of Kohn's framework is probably the tendency to neglect the within country-variation in stories of nationhood. Despite the acknowledgement of the problem, one could argue that the analysis above has committed the same sin. In order to overcome this problem, this last section will demonstrate the variation within four of the countries, which according to the analyses above stand out as some of the most stable respectively republican, national liberal, national conservative or de-constructivist countries. The chosen countries are Sweden (2013), the US (2013), Japan (2013) and Bulgaria (1995). The latter is chosen due to lack of voting information in the other national conservative countries such as the Philippines, Poland and Bulgaria in 2003. The selection of these four countries could be called a best case for none-variation. The amount of variation is shown by the average position of the voters of major parties (four percent or above in the last general election, based on the sample), see Figure 7.

Figure 7. Position of voters of major parties within Sweden (2013), the US (2013), Japan (2013) and Bulgaria (1995)

Figure 7 demonstrates that variations in stories of nationhood can be found in these best cases for none-variation. The American two-party system does not allow for much variation but still there was a difference in the average positioning of the Democratic voters (voted for Obama in 2012) and the Republican voters (voted for Romney). Both voter groups do on average find the political community important but the Republican voters find the cultural community of higher importance than the Democratic voters. The multiparty system in the other three countries allow for more variation. The voters of all Swedes parties (2010 election) tend to be republican, except the voters

of the new right wing party "Sweden Democrats". The voters of the latter party might seem national conservative by Swedish standards but by international standards they are national liberals. Nevertheless, even among the voters of the main stream Swedish political parties there is variation in the average position in the space. The voters of the Green party and the Left party are more republican than the voters of the Swedish Christian democratic party. The same kind of within country-variation can be found in Japan (2012 election) and Bulgaria (election 1995). In Japan, the tension was between the de-constructivist voters of the communist party, the more republican voters of the Democratic party and the more national conservative voters of the Restoration party and New Komito. In Bulgaria, the tension was between the national conservative voters of the Bulgarian communist party and the more republican voter of the Movement for rights and Freedoms.

Conclusion

The study found the classic distinction between "civic/Western/political" and "ethnic/Eastern/cultural" to be of relevance for how inhabitants of contemporary nation states think about nationhood. But in accordance with the few previous empirical studies, this study also found a two-dimensional structure in the responses. Thus, the "civic/Western/political" and the "ethnic/Eastern/cultural" are to be studied as two different dimensions and not as mutual exclusive ideas (either conceptualised as a dichotomy or as a continuum). The study advanced this line of reasoning by establishing a conceptual framework that eased the interpretation of countries scoring high/high, labelled national liberalism, or low/low, labelled de-constructivism, on the two dimensions. By means of MCA-techniques the study also facilitated a better interpretation of the two dimensions. By means of supplementary variables the study demonstrated congruence between the stories of nationhood (measured by means of questions about what it means to be a "real" national), national proudness, national belonging, attitude to mass media content and attitudes to migration. Finally, the study contributed to the existing empirical literature by including the last round of the ISSP data on national identity, which makes it possible to include more countries and more country trajectories.

   In terms of the position of the individual countries, the study did found Kohn's old geographic distinction between "Western" and "Eastern" to have some merit. Most of the Northern European countries were located in the republican quadrant, including three of the countries, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, which Kohn used as examples of civic nations. And most of the Eastern European countries were in the latest available data located in the national conservative quadrant. However, the continuity between the ideas of nationalism around the establishment of the nation states in the 18th and 19th century, studied by Kohn, and contemporary public thinking about nationhood should not be overstated. The location of Germany, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Estonia, Slovenia and Taiwan in the republican quadrant would be an anomaly in a rigid application of Kohn's framework. Furthermore, the position of the US and other countries in the national liberal quadrant, and the position of Japan other countries in the de-constructivist quadrant, poses a challenge to Kohn original framework.

The stability of the stories of nationhood is largely an unexplored theme though it is crucial for the application of Kohn's framework. If stories of nationhood are stable across centuries, one should predict Kohn's framework to have predictive power today. If there are not stable across centuries, one should not expect much predict power. With three rounds of ISSP-data we have new possibilities to study stability and change. The study found that most of Northern European countries, Germany included, were stably located in the republican quadrant. Thus, despite the inflow of migrants and the rise of new right parties, the stories of nationhood largely remained stable. The study found the stories of nationhood in Eastern European countries to be much less stable. Poland and Bulgaria were stably located in the national conservative quadrant but Russia, Hungary and Slovakia "arrived" in this quadrant, while Slovenia became more republican. The obvious interpretation is that the democratisation of the Eastern European countries of the 1990s created a window of opportunity to install new stories of nationhood in this region of the world (Kuzio, 2002a). Judged by the ISSP 1995 data, and partly by the 2003 data, these countries were indeed somewhat "civic" (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008; Shulman, 2002) but judged by the 2013 they are not. Whether this is a stable return to national conservative stories of nationhood or a temporary transition period remain to be seen. Finally, there are countries such as Slovenia and Latvia that were stably located in the republican or national liberal quadrant. The settler societies, were neither stably located in the national liberal quadrant, with US as the exception. One interpretation is that in settler societies such as Australia and especially Canada have conscious ongoing discussion about national identity with a potential to change the basic stories of nationhood.

The study found that the less "modernized" non-European / non Anglo-Saxon countries, e.g. the Philippines, Chile and Venezuela, largely were positioned in the national conservative quadrant. This could support the idea of modernization being able to turn national conservatism into republicanism or national liberalism. The Taiwanese move to republicanism could be a point in case. However, the South Korean move to national conservatism points in another direction. The same does the stable position of the highest modernized Asian country, Japan, in the de-constructivist quadrant. Japan seems to be stuck in a national discussion for or against the existence of the authentic culture, a fight between de-constructivists and national conservatives, whereas the celebration of democracy never has come to define national belonging. The German experience was not replicated in Japan. Thus, overall the study indicates that there is no simple relationship between modernization and stories of nationhood. However, the study neither supports the argument that only states established before or simultaneously with the rise of nationalism are able to build stories of nationhood based on shared political community. Fundamental regime changes, such as the collapse of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, do provide a window of opportunity for creating what Kohn would label "civic" nations.

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Online appendix:

Table A1: Share answering that the criteria is "very important" or "fairly important for being a real national (active variables in MCA-analyses)

	…to have been born in [country]	… to have [country] citizenship	… to have lived in [country] for most of one's life	… to be able to speak [country language]	… to be a [dominant religion]	… to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws	… to feel [country nationality]
AT03 Austria	81	93	80	92	56	88	91
AT95 Austria	75	92	81	93	56	92	93
AU03 Australia	71	91	72	92	37	91	95
AU95 Australia	64	91	66	90	33	95	95
BE13-Belgium	74	87	80	87	18	89	84
BG03 Bulgaria	90	89	89	95	77	91	99
BG95 Bulgaria	88	89	82	90	72	87	96
CA03 Canada	82	96	83	93	54	97	92
CA95 Canada	52	88	55	79	26	93	86
CH03 Switzerland	58	82	68	93	41	96	78
CH13-Switzerland	61	84	73	96	32	96	88
CL03 Chile	90	92	91	87	54	91	96
CZ03 Czech Republic	79	87	83	93	28	80	90
CZ13-Czech Republic	85	91	82	96	29	82	90
CZ95 Czech Republic	71	83	81	95	22	85	93
DE13-Germany	60	84	70	94	25	93	77
DK03 Denmark	69	85	73	97	33	96	90
DK13-Denmark	61	84	69	95	25	96	90
EE13-Estonia	54	82	61	96	14	91	97
ES03 Spain	89	89	88	84	44	92	89
ES13-Spain	79	82	82	91	35	79	82
ES95 Spain	78	83	83	82	47	88	89
FI03 Finland	70	85	65	86	24	88	87
FI13-Finland	60	80	61	85	22	94	84
FR03 France	63	86	71	95	18	96	93
FR13-France	67	90	72	97	19	98	94
GB03 Great Britain	76	88	74	91	35	87	80
GB13-Great Britain	82	90	83	97	32	89	83
GB95 Great Britain	80	88	77	89	36	88	80
GE03 Germany	64	82	69	94	29	89	76
GE13-Georgia	69	81	82	93	80	87	95
GE95 Germany	54	81	66	89	30	91	76
HR13-Croatia	64	79	65	84	56	72	83
HU03 Hungary	72	78	77	96	43	86	97
HU13-Hungary	82	88	84	95	46	83	96
HU95 Hungary	69	76	76	97	36	64	99

I95 Italy	78	83	85	86	53	88	92
IE03 Ireland	87	93	79	39	59	80	89
IE13-Ireland	85	90	76	37	33	76	86
IE95 Ireland	87	93	83	43	55	88	96
IL03 Israel	67	84	83	89	83	85	89
IL13-Israel	57	76	78	77	70	80	81
IN13-India	94	95	77	63	62	89	89
IS13-Iceland	59	92	66	94	28	89	93
JP03 Japan	77	87	74	78	25	68	88
JP13-Japan	70	87	68	76	21	72	87
JP95 Japan	69	84	69	71	27	72	89
KR03 Korea (South)	81	88	69	88	41	78	92
KR13-Korea (South)	82	90	71	87	46	83	93
LT13-Lithuania	79	92	81	96	59	81	90
LV03 Latvia	76	80	81	91	25	84	91
LV13-Latvia	78	85	86	92	27	86	92
LV95 Latvia	74	81	82	91	38	94	97
MX13-Mexico	85	87	84	84	58	80	88
NL03 Netherlands	50	83	57	98	13	94	84
NL95 Netherlands	53	78	60	96	8	85	83
NO03 Norway	67	91	73	97	21	97	86
NO13-Norway	64	92	73	98	22	98	90
NO95 Norway	64	90	72	96	22	97	91
NZ03 New Zealand	87	92	81	92	38	87	93
NZ95 New Zealand	76	87	74	88	30	89	91
PH03 Philippines	96	96	90	96	85	91	97
PH13-Philippines	96	96	93	95	86	90	96
PH95 Philippines	96	96	92	93	83	89	95
PL03 Poland	88	91	83	95	75	82	97
PL95 Poland	82	88	83	92	53	86	97
PT03 Portugal	92	93	89	95	66	92	94
PT13-Portugal	81	91	82	96	37	90	95
RU03 Russia	85	87	85	84	59	83	92
RU13-Russia	88	90	87	88	74	86	91
RU95 Russia	72	80	80	82	40	86	94
SE03 Sweden	51	85	57	96	18	97	85
SE13-Sweden	42	82	48	94	10	97	81
SE95 Sweden	54	87	63	96	18	99	88
SI13-Slovenia	58	76	63	89	23	80	85
SI95 Slovenia	72	84	77	95	35	87	92
SK03 Slovakia	59	70	64	86	50	67	74
SK13-Slovak Republic	86	91	85	96	54	77	90
SK95 Slovakia	66	86	77	93	27	88	95
TR13-Turkey	85	89	82	87	89	86	79

TW03 Taiwan	66	80	74	59	26	92	92
TW13-Taiwan	62	80	73	73	19	91	96
US03 United States	80	97	83	97	68	96	94
US13-United States	69	94	70	93	45	93	86
US95 United States	71	94	74	93	55	93	87
UY03 Uruguay	89	88	90	86	29	87	97
VE03 Venezuela	97	97	98	96	72	93	99
ZA03 South Africa	92	94	87	89	79	80	88

Table A2: Sample sizes and average position in two dimensional MCA-space

	n	Position first dimension	Position second dimension
AT03 Austria	860	0.2	0.11
AT95 Austria	908	0.21	-0.05
AU03 Australia	1471	0.03	-0.23
AU95 Australia	1706	-0.06	-0.4
BE13-Belgium	1651	-0.12	-0.07
BG03 Bulgaria	1043	0.48	0.17
BG95 Bulgaria	1081	0.31	0.24
CA03 Canada	898	0.31	-0.07
CA95 Canada	1117	-0.41	-0.37
CH03 Switzerland	789	-0.24	-0.29
CH13-Switzerland	797	-0.09	-0.43
CL03 Chile	1471	0.36	0.18
CZ03 Czech Republic	1119	0.02	0.1
CZ13-Czech Republic	1797	0.11	0.08
CZ95 Czech Republic	1014	-0.04	-0.18
DE13-Germany	1495	-0.27	-0.29
DK03 Denmark	1259	-0.01	-0.39
DK13-Denmark	1209	-0.15	-0.5
EE13-Estonia	679	-0.26	-0.63
ES03 Spain	1165	0.19	0.18
ES13-Spain	1079	-0.09	0.25
ES95 Spain	1204	0.01	0.16
FI03 Finland	1287	-0.22	-0.16
FI13-Finland	1142	-0.38	-0.34
FR03 France	1484	-0.1	-0.51
FR13-France	1776	-0.01	-0.54
GB03 Great Britain	796	-0.09	0.06
GB13-Great Britain a	783	0.1	0
GB95 Great Britain	980	-0.05	0.12
GE03 Germany	1136	-0.28	-0.14
GE13-Georgia	1459	0.19	0.09
GE95 Germany	1734	-0.39	-0.25
HR13-Croatia	917	-0.32	0.37
HU03 Hungary	999	0.02	-0.15
HU13-Hungary	967	0.21	0.1
HU95 Hungary	979	-0.14	0.16
I95 Italy	1074	0.1	0.14
IE03 Ireland	1009	-0.13	0.93
IE13-Ireland	1009	-0.35	0.88
IE95 Ireland	953	-0.01	0.67
IL03 Israel	521	0.14	0.26

IL13-Israel	571	-0.25	0.37
IN13-India	1453	0.13	0.56
IS13-Iceland	965	-0.12	-0.4
JP03 Japan	1055	-0.24	0.42
JP13-Japan	1193	-0.34	0.27
JP95 Japan	1205	-0.36	0.32
KR03 Korea (South)	1310	-0.05	0.2
KR13-Korea (South)	1272	0.05	0.16
LT13-Lithuania	1126	0.19	0.21
LV03 Latvia	606	-0.09	-0.03
LV13-Latvia	677	0.05	-0.04
LV95 Latvia	651	0.07	-0.24
MX13-Mexico	973	0.12	0.43
NL03 Netherlands	1637	-0.39	-0.66
NL95 Netherlands	1918	-0.49	-0.43
NO03 Norway	1339	-0.05	-0.42
NO13-Norway	1358	-0.02	-0.52
NO95 Norway	1381	-0.04	-0.5
NZ03 New Zealand	788	0.19	0.06
NZ95 New Zealand	800	-0.04	-0.09
PH03 Philippines	1189	0.62	0.31
PH13-Philippines	1183	0.63	0.35
PH95 Philippines	1185	0.59	0.4
PL03 Poland	1258	0.39	0.31
PL95 Poland	1544	0.22	0.08
PT03 Portugal	1462	0.45	0.17
PT13-Portugal	933	0.21	-0.12
RU03 Russia	2264	0.17	0.35
RU13-Russia	1472	0.32	0.38
RU95 Russia	1551	-0.08	0.06
SE03 Sweden	1004	-0.34	-0.66
SE13-Sweden	922	-0.57	-0.79
SE95 Sweden	1112	-0.24	-0.67
SI13-Slovenia	944	-0.44	-0.15
SI95 Slovenia	931	-0.01	-0.14
SK13-Slovak Republic	1100	0.21	0.35
SK95 Slovakia	2414	-0.26	0.04
TR13-Turkey	1610	0.22	0.56
TW03 Taiwan	2001	-0.34	0.03
TW13-Taiwan	1896	-0.3	-0.23
US03 United States	1064	0.41	-0.06
US13-United States	1043	0.02	-0.17
US95 United States	1215	0.11	-0.1
UY03 Uruguay	991	0.18	0.09

VE03 Venezuela	1035	0.66	0.23
ZA03 South Africa	2187	0.37	0.6

Table A3: List of supplementary variables in MCA analyses

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]1. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is... to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry
1. Very important.
2. Fairly important.
3. Not very important.
4. Not important at all.

How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?
1. Very proud.
2. Somewhat proud.
3. Not very proud.
4. Not proud at all.

How close do you feel to you country
1. Very close.
2. Close.
3. Not very close.
4. Not close at all.

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Television should give preference to [COUNTRY] films and programmes
1. Agree strongly.
2. Agree.
3. Neither agree nor disagree.
4. Disagree.
5. Disagree strongly.

Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?
1. It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions.
2. It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society.

Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be...
1. Increased a lot.
2. Increased a little.
3. Remain the same.
4. Reduced a little.
5. Reduced a lot.