

**From International Ideas to Domestic Policies:
Gatekeepers, Priors and Educational Multiculturalism
in England and France**

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Abstract

The interaction of domestic institutional structures and preexisting ideas is critical in explaining crossnational differences in the impact of international ideas. This paper argues that the interaction of decentralized policymaking and liberal gatekeepers in England led to an acceptance of educational multiculturalism, whereas this international idea found little purchase across the channel because of the combination of France's centralized educational system and its policymakers' republican and *laïque* priors. By examining the case of the differential impact of educational multiculturalism in two relatively similar countries, this paper contributes to ongoing political science debates about the impact of international ideas on domestic politics.

From International Ideas to Domestic Policies: Gatekeepers, Priors and Educational Multiculturalism in England and France

Introduction

Political scientists are increasingly interested in the role ideas play in determining policy outcomes. The major focus of the work to date has been in two directions. Some research has used ideas as independent variables, attempting to demonstrate how a change in ideas has determined a policy outcome.¹ Other studies have looked at how different national institutions funnel, shape and adopt similar international ideas.² By holding an idea constant and looking at its differential effect across time or across states, social scientists can begin to understand the way ideas and institutions interact to affect policymaking.

This study follows in the second tradition by focusing on the application of the idea of multiculturalism to education policy in England and France. Multiculturalism first appeared on the education policy agenda in the 1960s, and it remains a hotly debated and much discussed topic today.³ Whereas multiculturalism blossomed in the ethnically diverse United States, it was often contested and fell on sometimes fertile and sometimes rocky soil in the more historically homogeneous Western European states.

England and France are two countries which reacted to multiculturalism in particularly different manners. English education policy took on board many of the common changes advocated by supporters of multiculturalism, and multiculturalism is now generally accepted as part and parcel of many English educational institutions. In contrast, France has only grudgingly accepted very small pieces of the multicultural agenda, preferring to maintain education as a sphere for assimilating immigrants to the national culture.

This divergence is curious given the similarities of the two countries. Each experienced relatively large-scale immigration in the decades following the Second World War, leaving the two

¹See especially the edited volume by Goldstein and Keohane 1993, and the work of Soysal 1994 and Hollifield 1992 on the effects of macro-ideational shifts over time.

²See Hall 1989 (Hall 1989), Checkel 1995 and also Soysal 1994.

³Though now this is more true in the sphere of political theory than in education policy. See especially the edited volume by Gutmann (1994) with papers by Taylor, Habermas and Walzer among others, and Kymlicka 1995.

countries with roughly the same percentage of ethnic minorities as a portion of the total population. Both France and Britain have enjoyed relative economic prosperity and do not diverge widely on significant socioeconomic indicators. And finally each country has been exposed to the concept of multiculturalism through its participation in various international educational organizations and networks. So, why have England and France responded so differently to the idea of multicultural education?

I suggest that the key to this puzzle lies in the interaction between two variables: the different number of *gatekeepers* controlling the access of ideas into the policy process, and the different *priors* of gatekeepers in each country. Institutionally, England has a much more decentralized education system than does France. I will argue below that the effect of decentralization is to increase the number of policy gatekeepers who have power to accept or reject a new idea into the policy system. Counterintuitively, a greater number of gatekeepers may lead to an increased likelihood of policy change.

Yet, the raw number of gatekeepers is clearly not the entire story. Policy gatekeepers must also have the inclination to take on board new ideas. Policymakers are not blank slates on which actors try to write new ideas into policies; rather these gatekeepers have a host of ideational assumptions that affect their attitudes to change.⁴ When an idea runs contrary to these priors of gatekeepers, it is unlikely to be implemented. Understanding the interaction between international ideas and domestic gatekeepers and their priors provides fresh insights into the theoretical queries of political scientists.

In the case of English and French education policies, I argue that England's decentralized system—and therefore its greater number of gatekeepers—coupled with a particular distribution of “liberal” priors contributed to the rise of multiculturalism in English education policy between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s. France, on the other hand, has a centralized education system with few policy gatekeepers. These gatekeepers' republican and *laïque* priors made them quite hostile to

⁴On the independent influence of the state (and its bureaucrats), see especially Hecló 1974, Krasner 1978 and the edited volume by Evans, et. al. 1985.

the philosophy of multicultural education, strictly limiting the impact of this international idea in France.

This paper proceeds in four parts. Section one gives a quick background and overview of the international idea of educational multiculturalism. Section two covers the history of English education policy and the influence of multicultural ideas over the past thirty years. Section three examines the French case, demonstrating the limited take-up of multiculturalism in France. Section four explains the crossnational differences and argues for the importance of the interaction of gatekeepers and priors in determining the reception of educational multiculturalism across nations.

1. Multiculturalism and education policy

Multicultural education has moved on and off international agendas since its inception as a philosophy in late 1960s America.⁵ It rose during a period of civil rights advances for minorities and civil disturbances in U.S. cities, and has since spread to other industrialized countries to the point where in the mid-1980s, a leading author on the topic could say that “across the OECD countries there is a growing willingness to adapt educational systems to take into account differing cultures” (see Churchill in CERI [Centre for Educational Research and Innovation] 1987: 92). The OECD itself sponsored a conference on multicultural education in 1985, and the European Commission recently published a booklet called “Community of Learning: Intercultural Education in Europe” detailing its policies and expenditures on multicultural education.⁶

Multiculturalism exists, but to define it is no easy task (see Rex 1987). This is not unusual for a political idea. Even when such ideas arise from the texts of one primary author, they are frequently debated, contested and understood differently both within and across countries.⁷ There is no original body of writings outlining a doctrine of multiculturalism; this fact lends added flexibility to the

⁵For a concise introduction to the rise of educational multiculturalism see the chapter by Nathan Glazer in CERI 1987.


⁶Though these policies and expenditures are quite limited.

⁷As Peter Hall (1989: 363) comments in the conclusion of his edited volume on Keynesianism, “even the ideas associated with *The General Theory*, on which this book focuses, were multifaceted; and, like many doctrines, his did not have to be accepted in toto to be accepted at all.”

interpretation of its meanings or prescriptions. In practice, the term multiculturalism has covered a wide range of policies.

For the purposes of this paper, I suggest that there are two key elements to the definition of multicultural education policies. The first is a focus on diversity—diversity policies are any policies which takes ethnic, racial or cultural diversity into account in their formulation or implementation. This is a very broad definition, which is useful in developing a relatively objective measure for classifying policies. Yet it is insensitive to the second important element of multiculturalism: the intent of the policy. For this reason, it is necessary to subdivide diversity policies into four categories along the lines of intent.

Figure 1: Multicultural and Non-Multicultural Diversity Policies



Policies can be (1) assimilationist; (2) preparationist; (3) passive multiculturalist; or (4) active multiculturalist. Assimilationist policies are aimed at minorities with the goal of erasing cultural differences and promoting cultural homogeneity. These generally include language training classes designed to speed acquisition of the national tongue, though they can also include mother-tongue teaching inasmuch as its goal is to help the student develop English or French skills (in the two cases discussed here). Preparationist policies foster cultural differences with the intent of preparing for the expulsion or departure of cultural minorities. Such actions typically state clearly the goal of maintaining minority cultures and/or languages in order to facilitate the return to the home country.

Multicultural policies therefore fall into two of the four categories of diversity policies. In contrast to non-multicultural policies, multicultural diversity policies accept other cultures as fully legitimate within the nation. Passive multiculturalism is an attempt to allow for a measure of cultural di-

versity by making certain exceptions for minorities while limiting the effect of changes on the majority. These types of changes might include supporting language or religion classes for the communities, and they often correspond with the goal of raising the achievement of minority pupils by respecting their cultural differences. Finally, active multiculturalist policies have the goal of creating a new national culture which encompasses minority as well as majority cultures and perspectives. Unlike passive multiculturalism, active multiculturalist policies address whole classes, schools, regions or countries.

Though these policies are mixed and matched in practice, this study is concerned primarily with the rise and extent of policies in the latter two categories, passive and active multiculturalism.⁸ Nevertheless, understanding the variations in diversity policies helps to place multiculturalism in context and makes it possible to chart general trends and changes within and across countries. As the next two sections will demonstrate, England has gone relatively far in implementing both passive and active multiculturalism, whereas France has focused primarily on assimilationist policies and has even flirted with preparationist measures.

2. Education policy in England

School policies towards ethnic and racial minorities in England have shifted substantially since 1945. In the early postwar period, schools either had no diversity policies at all, or they tried to assimilate immigrants into the national culture. This initial period of assimilationism began to give way in the mid-1960s to a series of passive multiculturalist policy initiatives. In the late 1970s and through the late 1980s, much of English educational policy was engaged in active multiculturalism, epitomized at its pinnacle by the 1985 government report entitled "Education For All." In the 1990s, however, the momentum of active multiculturalism has been largely lost. Nevertheless,

⁸Classifying policies based on their intent can be complicated. This is so primarily because coalitions may arise between groups with different intentions. For example, a preparationist and a multiculturalist (and even some assimilationists) may all agree that mother-tongue teaching is an appropriate policy, but for different reasons. The issue of intent, however, is so crucial to common understandings of multiculturalism that it must be accounted for in spite of the complications it raises.

there is still a significant level of multiculturalism present in local education policies, especially in ethnically mixed areas.

2.1 1945 to the mid-1970s: from assimilation to passive multiculturalism

Until the mid-1960s, there were few if any initiatives designed to meet the particular needs of immigrants and their children in English educational institutions (Willey, cited in Verma 1984: 61). The actions and reports of policymakers and politicians during this period made it clear that England was understood to have a set culture to which immigrants were expected to adapt (Rose 1969: 403). In religious education, for example, the period of the 1940s and 1950s has been described as “the Biblical phase” (Parsons 1994: 166), and as late as 1962, the city of Birmingham’s agreed syllabus on religious education specified: “We speak of religious education, but we mean Christian education...the aim of Christian education in its full and proper sense is quite simply to confront our children with Jesus Christ” (Nielsen 1988: 69).

The early 1960s also saw government documents such as the Second Report of the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Committee, which was concerned with “the role of the education system in bringing about the cultural assimilation of immigrant children into ‘British life’” (Tomlinson 1983: 16). Furthermore, the Minister of Education made a statement that some schools were “irretrievably immigrant” and that a cap of 30 percent immigrants should be imposed in the future (Tomlinson 1983: 17). In 1964 a former Tory MP from Southall intoned that: “Sikh parents should encourage their children to give up their turbans, their religion and their dietary laws. If they refuse to integrate then we must be tough...” (quoted in Troyna and Williams 1986: 16). And in 1965, even a Labour spokesman suggested that ““only immigrants most likely to be assimilated into our national life’ should be permitted to stay in Britain” (Tomlinson 1983: 12). Finally, the Department of Education and Science (DES) sanctioned a policy of “dispersal” in 1965 with its Circular 7/65. Though several Local Education Authorities (LEAs)⁹ did not take up this policy, many others be-

⁹There are a few more than 100 Local Education Authorities in England and Wales. The LEA has substantial powers over education policy in its district.

gan bussing the immigrant children with the goal of better assimilating them into British society (see Tomlinson 1983; Troyna and Carrington 1990; Verma and Bagley 1984).

Yet these assimilationist attitudes and policies began to change in the mid-1960s, and have continued to fade since then. Though the transition was not immediate and was not effected through a discrete number of events, the trends in political rhetoric and in concrete policies show a clear long-term shift in educational policy. In 1966, then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins proclaimed that integration was defined “not as a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Freeman 1979: 57). This statement signaled a break from assimilationism and a move toward multicultural policies.

The majority of policy changes during the years from 1965 to 1975 were aimed at minority children, and were designed to accommodate cultural differences while minimizing changes in the education of white Britons.¹⁰ In this decade, minority religions became acceptable in English schools. The 1966 syllabus of the west riding of Yorkshire became the first to include a reference to other religions (Nielsen 1988: 69), and by 1975 even Birmingham had put forth a multi-faith syllabus, with other religions “studied for their own sakes” (Nielsen 1988: 69; see also Parsons 1994: 176). Starting in the 1970s, issues of Muslim dress and food were raised and overcome through compromises such as ensuring that religious clothing conformed to the colors of the school uniform and provision of vegetarian or halal lunches (see Joly 1995: 16; Nielsen 1992: 54). Finally, in 1971 the Schools Council published its Working Paper 36, “Religious Education in Secondary Schools,” which announced a shift to an “undogmatic” approach which “does not seek to promote any one religious viewpoint” (Cole 1988: 126).

Alongside the development of policies designed to facilitate the learning of English, came policies and statements favorable to linguistic pluralism. The Bullock Committee stated in 1975 that schools “should help maintain and deepen knowledge of their mother-tongue,” two years before

¹⁰The literature on education policy generally refers to this period as “integrationism,” which I feel underestimates the significance of the transition away from assimilation, especially when viewed in an international context. The term I use, passive multiculturalism, highlights the fact that policy changes in this period were symbolic of increasing tolerance of diversity. On the triptych of educational policy phases—assimilation, integration, cultural pluralism—see Verma 1984; Troyna and Carrington 1990; and the edited volume by Arnot 1985.

the EEC mandated mother-tongue instruction in 1977 (Bullivant 1981; on the EEC directive see Churchill 1986; Verma 1984: 66). In sum, policies and attitudes towards ethnic minorities were changing; they were becoming more tolerant of diversity within English educational institutions, while not necessarily requiring widespread changes which would imply a move towards active multiculturalism.

2.2 The mid-1970s to the present day: from passive to active multiculturalism and back again?

Beginning in the mid-1970s, research organizations (both government affiliated and not) increasingly described Britain as a multicultural or multiracial society.¹¹ This was the start of a broad shift in thinking which led to policies aimed at the attitudes and activities of more than just the ethnic minority children. The active multiculturalism of this stage was meant to bring about changes in the education of the “native” English children as well as the “immigrants.”

In 1977, the Department of Education and Science published a Green Paper entitled “Education in Schools.” Gajendra K. Verma (1984: 63) explains: “The British government’s support for multiculturalism or cultural pluralism appeared in [this document]. This Paper emphasised that the presence of ethnic minority groups in Britain has implications for the education of all children, and that all schools, whatever their ethnic composition, should give their pupils an understanding both of the multiethnic nature of British society and of Britain’s place in an interdependent world. The Green Paper refers to ‘the needs of this new Britain’ which should be reflected in school curricula.”

Though this may be an overly optimistic interpretation of the Green Paper (which focused only a few paragraphs on minority issues), it is true that the period between 1975 to 1988 saw significant rhetoric and policy initiatives at both the local and national level in the direction of active multiculturalism. Antiracism gathered momentum during this period as a challenge to passive multiculturalism. While antiracism was a local movement, it began as a frank and open challenge to “native” or

¹¹See, for example, the 1973-1976 Schools Council project entitled “Education for a Multiracial Society,” (though this report was later quashed) (Troyna and Carrington 1990) and the 1974 Community Relations Commission report “Teacher Education for a Multi-Cultural Society” (Bullivant 1981). In a broader national context, see also Great Britain: Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration 1973.

“white” Britons and their views on race (on antiracism, see Troyna and Williams 1986, and Arnot 1985). Britain was understood in a wide variety of governmental and NGO documents as a multicultural and multiracial society.¹² And by 1981, about twenty-five LEAs had appointed an advisor for multicultural education, and a few had produced policy documents on multiculturalism; by 1989, at least fifty-four of the 108 LEAs had multicultural, antiracist or equal opportunities policies, and a further twenty had policies under review or in preparation.¹³

The major announcement of active multiculturalism in this era came, however, with the 1985 publication of the Swann Report, “Education for All.” In it, the government committee stated that “it is essential to change fundamentally the terms of the debate about the educational response to today’s multi-racial society and to look ahead to educating all children, from whatever ethnic group, to an understanding of the shared values of our society as a whole as well as to an appreciation of the diversity of lifestyles and cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds which make up this society and the wider world” (Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons 1985: 316, emphasis in original). In the conclusions and recommendations (p. 769), the report talks about combating racism and inherited stereotypes and ensuring that multiculturalism permeates all aspects of a school’s work.

Furthermore, the government supported the findings of the Swann Report with a small amount of money. All told, some £3 million was funneled through the “Educational Needs in a Multi-Ethnic Society” program between 1985 and 1989 to cover the costs of 119 projects. They ranged over a wide variety of English regions, including many “all-white” districts, and from 1988 on, “projects were to be more firmly and openly directed towards changing the attitudes and behavior of white pupils” (Tomlinson 1990: 106). Though the funding was not enormous and the duration of

¹²See the 1978 Home Office report which states “For the curriculum to have meaning and relevance for all pupils now in our schools, its content, emphasis and the values and assumptions contained must reflect the wide range of cultures, histories and life styles in our multi-racial society” (Troyna and Williams 1986: 25), and the DES “Framework for the Curriculum” document of 1980 and “its successor document” recognize that “our society has become multicultural; and there is now among pupils and parents a greater diversity of personal values” (Lynch 1984: 152). For more information on this period, see the edited volume by O’Keeffe 1986, in which some authors also discuss the limits of multiculturalism.

¹³See Taylor 1992. She received responses from ninety-three of the 108 then-existing LEAs, of which fifty-four had policies and twenty were reviewing or developing them.

the program was limited, the Department of Education and Science took a concrete step towards active multiculturalist policies.

Yet even as active multiculturalism was on the rise in the 1970s and 1980s, there were counter-currents of monoculturalism which eventually halted the momentum of the movement. In the early 1980s, both Thatcher and her education secretary Keith Joseph made statements to the effect that Britain's schools were meant to express a certain culture, and that there were elements of sense in monoculturalism (on Thatcher, see Tomlinson 1985: 74; on Joseph, see Troyna 1990: 403). There were vocal and vehement attacks on multiculturalism coming from right-wing groups such as the Monday Club and academic think-tanks like the Salisbury group which often played up several prominent cases of parent or teacher discontent with multiculturalism.¹⁴

Anna-Marie Smith (1994), David Gillborn (1995), Sally Tomlinson (1990) and others have argued that the rise of the New Right has led to a marginalization of race and ethnicity in politics and policies, especially in the late 1980s and 1990s. The Education Reform Act of 1988 contained virtually no reference to ethnicity or race, and there have been few references in other government documents since then. In spite of these efforts, however, no attempt has been made to roll back the tangible changes of the earlier decades. There have been no major policy changes affecting the presence of ethnic minority clothing and food in local schools. Moreover, in 1991 95 percent of surveyed LEAs had multicultural/anti-racist or equal opportunities policies in existence, under review or in preparation, up from 80 percent in 1989 (Taylor 1992: 11). Finally, there is evidence that localities with high percentages of ethnic minorities continue to regard the fact of diversity as socially and politically important within their districts.¹⁵

In sum, the birthing of policies which articulate England as a multicultural and multiracial society has faded in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The production of new active multicultural mes-

¹⁴On such groups, see Tomlinson 1990: 35-41. On attacks on multiculturalism, see especially the 1986 case of Ray Honeyford, given the golden handshake from his headteacher job in a Bradford school after strongly and publicly criticizing multicultural policies (Halstead 1988); see also the Headfield controversy, where parents in a northern town withdrew their children from a local school on the grounds that it was not representative of British culture, 85 percent of the pupils being of Asian origin (Banks 1995: 171-78).

¹⁵This judgment is based on interviews with senior educational policy officers in three inner London boroughs.

sages has subsided at the national and local level in “all-white” areas. Nevertheless, there is a legacy of both passive and active multiculturalism which has left an imprint both nationally and especially in localities with diverse ethnic and racial populations. Although occasional voices are raised in favor of assimilation of ethnic minorities, it appears as if the majority of education policy-makers and practitioners are convinced that assimilation is not an appropriate method for dealing with cultural diversity. And therefore English students—at least a significant portion of them—continue to learn about England as a multi-ethnic society through a combination of passive and active multiculturalism.

3. Education policy in France

The history of both passive and active multiculturalism is much shorter in France than in England. From 1945 until the early 1970s French schools dealt with ethnic minorities as they had always done with their own citizens. From the early 1970s to the early 1980s there were limited measures designed around immigrant children; they were aimed either at better integrating them into French society (assimilation) or preparing them to return to their “home countries” (preparationism). In the first few years of the 1980s, there was a brief and weak push towards active multiculturalism, but this quickly gave way to the more assimilationist rhetoric and policies of earlier eras.

3.1 Through the end of the 1970s: assimilation and preparation

Educational institutions have had pride of place in turning immigrants into Frenchmen.¹⁶ As Noiriel (in CERI (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation) 1987: 25) notes, “the school was a powerful factor in the abandonment by the children of immigrants of their culture of origin; for their generation this stigmatisation was a fundamental psychological incentive which filled them with a fierce determination to integrate within the French society by ridding themselves of the slightest trace of any difference.” Teaching the national language and literature has always helped

¹⁶To paraphrase the title of Eugen Weber’s 1976 classic *Peasants into Frenchmen*.

to diffuse the national idea and develop attachments to France (see Schnapper 1991), and this tendency was particularly strong up to the late 1960s. Facing increasing numbers of immigrants in its schools, French educational policy either ignored diversity or developed policies designed to assimilate culturally different pupils.

Beginning in the early and mid-1970s, politicians and educational policymakers started to institute new initiatives focusing specifically on the needs of immigrants. Special classes to ease foreign students' transition to French schools were introduced first at the primary and then at the secondary level. These were followed by mother-tongue teaching agreements negotiated bilaterally with eight foreign states between 1973 and 1987.¹⁷ Additionally, special centers, known as CEFISEM, were created to train teachers of immigrant children.¹⁸

But even these changes were very limited in scope. Boyzon-Frader (1992: 157) notes that in 1989-90 only 17.3 percent of eligible students took part in the mother-tongue teaching program, or some 60,000 students; and Weil (1991: 277) states that a mere 1 percent of foreign students take part in the transition classes. And according to Seksig (1991: 90), CEFISEM have been largely ignored both by policymakers and teachers. These kinds of policies were clearly very limited in scope, a fact which becomes particularly clear when compared with the British situation.

Furthermore, what few policy adjustments were made certainly did not aim to promote the notion of France as a culturally diverse nation; they were designed primarily either to facilitate integration of immigrants into French society or to maintain the possibility of their return to the "home country" (see Seksig 1991: 91-95; Weil 1991: 243-47). The bilateral texts on teaching languages and cultures of origin go so far as to state that "the maintenance of the knowledge of their culture of children living in France constitutes...an important means of facilitating their eventual insertion in

¹⁷For an overview of diversity policies in France, see Seksig 1991. On the special classes (CLIN or classes d'initiation and its secondary school equivalent CLAD, classes d'adaption) see Lorcerie 1995 and Costa-Lascoux 1989. On mother-tongue teaching (known as ELCO—Enseignement de Langues et Cultures d'Origine) see the above and Fase 1994 and Boyzon-Frader 1992. The fact that ELCO classes are part of international agreements suggests that the initiative for these diversity policies was not wholly French.

¹⁸CEFISEM stands for "centres de formation et d'information pour la scolarisation des enfants de migrants," or "centers for training and information for the teaching of children of migrants."

their societies of origin,” (cited in Seksig 1991: 92) reflecting threads of preparationism within the dominant assimilationist paradigm.

3.2 The 1980s and 1990s: from assimilation to assimilation via tentative active multiculturalism

From the very end of the 1970s until approximately 1985, there were limited but noticeable moves away from pure assimilation in education policy towards a more pluralistic view of French society. Writing in 1983, Françoise Henry-Lorcerie noted the strong increase in the use of the term “intercultural” in varied contexts in French society.¹⁹ Henry-Lorcerie contended that the concept of interculturalism rose on the periphery of French thinking and institutions and subsequently integrated itself into government projects, especially in the education sphere. As she explains, interculturalism as a philosophy was meant by some thinkers and actors to contravene the societal “denial” of minorities as groups, and perhaps also as individuals (Henry-Lorcerie 1983: 267-73).

Paralleling developments in England, France produced a document in 1985 on education and the demographic fact of cultural pluralism. By this time, however, it was clear that the extent of multiculturalism (either active or passive) in France would be limited. In contrast to the Swann Report “Education For All,” the Rapport Berque was entitled “Immigration in the Schools of the Republic,” already signifying that the dominant paradigm of France continued to juxtapose “natives” to “immigrants.”²⁰ The Rapport Berque can be seen as advocating a halfway house between a France with an “historic French cultural identity,” and one where there is a “new concept of unity, respecting and taking into account heterogeneity, which the problem of immigrants’ children raises.” (Berque 1985: 57).

Since 1985 there has been a marked trend in rhetoric and policy towards a renewed integrationist or assimilationist model of dealing with ethnic pluralism in educational institutions. The majority of French public discourse, government documents and policies have stressed the value of the French

¹⁹Intercultural is the French equivalent of “multicultural”—the very word multicultural being anathema to many in French society. On the rise of interculturalism (and for a strong critique of it), see also Seksig 1991: 95-98.

²⁰On the predominance of the immigrant paradigm in France, see Favell 1995.

system of integrating foreigners into the established fabric of society.²¹ Schnapper (1991: 351) notes that the Commission on Nationality stresses the role of education and socialization in determining Frenchness, a position much more in line with traditional notions of “le creuset français” (the French crucible—see Noiriel 1988) than with a reconceptualized pluricultural community as advocated by active multiculturalism. Also, though the government-established High Council on Integration (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration) accepts that cultural diversity can enrich the nation, it does not appear to advocate any major changes to French institutions, particularly educational institutions, as a result of it. Rather, it states that “integration policy increases [valorise] solidarity, stresses similarities and convergences” (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 1995: 13).

In sum, France has made a limited number of policy changes since the early 1970s which have directly addressed the issues of ethnic and cultural diversity. With the exception of policies in the early 1980s, however, most have had the explicit or implicit goal of turning immigrants into Frenchmen. France tinkered twice with its dominant mode of assimilationism, once in the late 1970s with limited moves toward preparationism, and once in the early 1980s with weak and abortive steps toward active multiculturalism. In historical perspective, few French educational policies or public statements have been directed at French society as a whole with the aim fostering active multiculturalism, and this is even more true today than it was ten to fifteen years ago. France has thus reacted to multicultural ideas in a very different way from its cross-channel neighbor.

4. Explaining cross-national variation in the impact of multiculturalism on education policies

Why did England embrace multiculturalism in its education policies when France did not? I argue that the reasons for change are centrally related to the interaction between different institutional structures and different pre-existing ideas in the two countries. Specifically, the difference in num-

²¹For some exceptions to the rule, see Boyzon-Frader 1992: 159, where she mentions a 1989 Ministry of Education project to encourage schools to stress the “foreign contributions to French heritage.” See also Seksig 1991: 97. On the resurgence of integrationism as a motivating philosophy, see Lorcerie 1995.

bers of gatekeepers and the different priors about the role of culture in education policy play a key role in explaining crossnational variation in the take up of multiculturalism. In contrast, the divergent policies have less to do with demographic flows, colonial legacies or the rise of far right movements than might be assumed.

4.1. What it isn't: demography, colonialism, and far-right politics

There are strong arguments to be made that England and France developed contrary education policies because of divergent patterns of ethnic minority settlement or because of different colonial legacies. It is true that non-white ethnic minority immigrants settled in England in the postwar era in large numbers approximately a decade earlier than in France, and that this may be responsible for ethnic and cultural issues coming on to the education policy agenda in the 1960s whereas they only became a factor in France in the 1970s. Yet it is undoubtedly the case that the number of ethnic minorities in France today exceeds the number in Britain in the 1960s,²² and there is still no multiculturalism evident in French education policy. If anything, France has reaffirmed its commitment to assimilation in the face of growing numbers of minority immigrants and citizens.

The colonial legacies argument asserts that whereas Britain managed “the natives” and never tried to make them British, the French set out to create culturally French, well assimilated subjects.²³ Modern education policies are thought to reflect this difference in that England tolerates cultural diversity at home, whereas France still tries to assimilate minorities into the national culture. The colonial legacies argument is not wholly without merit. Ultimately though, it falls down

²²France does not keep ethnic statistics on its citizen population, so a precise comparison of minority populations is impossible. Nevertheless, given the citizenship laws in France (which make acquisition of French citizenship for foreign resident children relatively easy upon reaching age of majority) and data on the numbers of foreigners in schools, rough calculations show ethnic minorities to be a substantial and growing portion of the French citizen population. At the very least, 35 percent of the 1.3 million immigrant French citizens come from the Maghreb (this, of course, does not include children of immigrants), and that there are estimated to be 1 to 1.5 million French citizens who are Muslim, most of whom are presumably from non-European countries (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration 1995: 14, 31). On citizenship laws and reforms, see Hargreaves 1995: 170-76; for statistical information on children in schools, see the annexes in Berque 1985.

²³See Doyle (1986: 307), but note that even this assertion is not unassailable. Anderson (1991: 92) writes that the British instituted “a thoroughly English educational system” in India which “would create ‘a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect.’” And in spite of France’s non-differentialist rhetoric, it kept statistics on race groups in its colonies (see Silberman 1992).

because it is too blunt an instrument: by implicitly assuming that “all British” or “all French” are affected in the same way by the culture of colonization, it cannot cope with tensions and variations in policy outcomes within each country. For example, the colonialism explanation cannot account for English efforts in the 1940s, 1950s and into the 1960s to assimilate its immigrants. Even today, there are important strands of the British educational policy establishment which believe that “children should be taught to be British” (see Richardson 1995). As Lapeyronnie (1993: 132) notes in his study of integration policies in Britain and France, “the explanation of current policies by the mode of colonization...seems a little heavy and too general to be directly useful.”

Finally, it is possible to see the timing of the rise of far-right movements as a key factor in stunting multicultural education policies across nations. But while Le Pen and the Front National acted as an important nail in the coffin of the budding education policy changes in France in the 1981-85 period, the Powellism of the late 1960s in Britain did not have the same effect on English policy. Though Britain saw no major national multicultural initiatives undertaken by the government of the right of the early 1970s, local policies continued to become more diversity-oriented, and the next government of the left picked up the multicultural themes. This has not been the case in France, where the 1988-1993 government of the left showed no further interest in promoting an image of France as a pluricultural society.

4.2 What it is: gatekeepers and priors

England and France differ in two central respects in the field of education policy which have had a determinative impact on the divergent take-up of multicultural doctrines. First, England’s decentralized policy system provides a far greater number of policy gatekeepers than France’s centralized structure. This has meant that teachers, school principals and regional education authorities have had much less direction and supervision from the national level in England than in France. Second, a large number of France’s educationalists are imbued with the idea that cultural pluralism is anathema to the *laïque* republican values they cherish. This has made them unreceptive to the internationally popular philosophy of multiculturalism. In contrast, American-style liberals have been concen-

trated in several important areas of the English educational policy sphere, making them particularly willing to take on board the multicultural doctrines and practices originating in 1960s U.S. society.²⁴

The interaction of decentralized gatekeepers and liberal priors in Britain has thus provided a warm reception for international educational multiculturalism. In contrast, the combination of centralized gatekeepers and *laïque* republican priors has frozen out the entry of multiculturalism in France.

4.2.1 Gatekeepers

A policy gatekeeper is an individual or a group which has power to make or block a policy decision. The number and location of gatekeepers is determined by the formal institutional rules governing a policy sphere. We normally think of gatekeepers as individuals who screen out unwelcome newcomers or intruders, and they certainly can have this effect when actors with new ideas come knocking on policy doors. Yet gatekeepers also provide access to the inner sanctum, and can prepare the path from idea to implemented policy.

Gatekeepers can be arranged either sequentially or spatially, and I argue that both the number and arrangement of policy gatekeepers will have a critical effect on the likelihood that a new international idea will become a domestic policy. Sequential gatekeepers are arranged so that an initiative must pass through first one, then another gatekeeper before it becomes policy, whereas spatial gatekeepers control separate and geographically organized policy domains within the national community.

Drawing on insights from Immergut's arguments about health policymaking in France, Switzerland and Sweden, sequential gatekeepers constitute what she refers to as "veto points." Used in


²⁴I focus on gatekeepers and priors over elements of political bargaining, interest group power, electoral considerations and the impact of material interests for two reasons. First, while these factors have played a role in some local policy outcomes, they are themselves affected by the institutions and ideas captured by the concepts of gatekeepers and priors. Second, a focus on these other variables is insufficient to explain the differences in policy outcomes between Britain and France.

this sense, gatekeepers do indeed act as potential brakes on policies. In Immergut's (1992: 63) study:

Political decisions are not single decisions made at one point in time. Rather, they are composed of sequences of decisions made by different actors at different institutional locations. Simply put, enacting a law requires successive affirmative votes at all decision points.

This type of institutional arrangement can be represented by Figure 2a. In this scenario, before a new policy can enter into the policy system, it must pass through all five gates and can be vetoed by all five gatekeepers. Because of this, all else equal, it will be more difficult to transform an idea into policy the greater number of gatekeepers that stand between the outside world and the policy system.

Figures 2a-c: Gatekeepers and the spread of ideas.



But not all policy decisions are as systematically sequential as those examined by Immergut. In the case of education policy (as in any policy area) there is undoubtedly a time element to decisionmaking. But because the decisions taken in these cases have generally been lower profile pol-

icy choices rather than high profile legislative decisions (as in Immergut's study), the fundamental dynamic of educational multiculturalism can be captured without the complication of sequential decision making.

Instead, the important difference is that of spatial gatekeepers. Whereas the centralized system, represented in Figure 2b, has only one policy gatekeeper, the decentralized system has more than one. In the case represented by Figure 2b, the gatekeeper is the central government; in Figure 2c, decision-making power is also located at the level of the central government, but in addition it is distributed spatially throughout the regions of the country. Furthermore, once an idea has passed through a gatekeeper and into a region ($R_p\Delta$), there is a strong potential for cross-learning by other regions ($R_p\Delta$) and the central government ($N_p\Delta$).²⁵

A greater number of gatekeepers can thus paradoxically increase the likelihood of an idea being adopted domestically, *ceteris paribus*, provided that gatekeepers are arranged spatially and not sequentially. More gatekeepers means more possible destinations for the traveling idea salesman to attempt to hawk her wares. If she knocks on one door and is turned away, she can try the next house in a decentralized system, but must pack up and go home in the centralized one. And once she has sold her product to one buyer, she can use him as an example of a satisfied customer or rely on word of mouth advertising to encourage others to take up the merchandise.

Applied to the empirical cases at hand, Figures 3 and 4 represent the difference between the French and the English educational policy systems, respectively. England and France have very different institutional rules determining who is or is not a policy gatekeeper. Whereas the British educational system is highly decentralized, the French system is highly centralized. The education system in Britain is actually three education systems, one governing England and Wales, another Scotland and a third Northern Ireland.²⁶ Within England and Wales there are over 100 Local Education Authorities (LEAs) composed of elected politicians, each of which has a substantial regional

²⁵For insights into why and how one region may learn from and copy another, see especially DiMaggio and Powell's (1991) arguments about institutional isomorphism. See also footnote 27 below for specific learning channels in English education policy.

²⁶This paper therefore limits its scope to education policy as it relates to England and Wales, for which the shorthand "English education policy" is used. For some of the basic differences between the three British systems, see Glenn 1989.

bureaucracy designed to oversee and coordinate the activities of primary and secondary schools within its jurisdiction. In addition, before the changes brought about by the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA), decisions on curriculum goals were often taken at the school level.

Such a spatial distribution of gatekeepers made it easier for multiculturalism to enter into policy-making in England, because the central government had difficulty preventing regions, schools and teachers from developing their own policies. Because decisions on multiculturalism could be taken at local levels, more gatekeepers meant more possible paths for multiculturalism to enter into education policy. Localities and national policymakers could then learn from one another about new techniques or ideas for running multiethnic schools or regions and multicultural policies and ideas spread.²⁷

The decentralized system and plurality of gatekeepers also poses fewer entry costs to groups wanting to alter policies on ethnic minority issues. For example, outside organizations and researchers can invest time and resources producing multicultural teaching materials, knowing that they do not have to convince one central government gatekeeper that the materials are appropriate for the nation as a whole, but rather they can attempt to convince a myriad of local gatekeepers that such texts are valuable for a particular school or region.

Because of the decentralized nature of British education policy, it was never likely that all schools would partake in the trend toward multiculturalism, and indeed, not all have. But the structure of institutions in England has allowed multiculturalism to pivot back and forth between national, local and school level policies and rhetoric. Crucially, the lead was most often taken by the regions. Had policies come only from London, it is doubtful whether England would have a substantial multicultural component to its national education policy, and it is even more doubtful that these policies would have survived the antimulticulturalist tendencies of the Thatcher period.

²⁷This learning has taken place primarily through three paths. First, some LEAs (with their own monetary sources) have sponsored studies of multiculturalism by leading academics (see especially Tomlinson 1990, funded by the Wigan LEA); second, bureaucrats and politicians can be exposed to "internal" policy documents and reports on multiculturalism issued by other LEAs; finally, bureaucrats can move between LEAs, applying their knowledge and experiences from one LEA to another.

Decentralization and spatially distributed gatekeepers, however, meant that the Local Education Authority policies have come to the attention of other regional and sometimes national policymakers. These policymakers subsequently undertook their own multicultural initiatives. Even since the late 1980s, when institutional changes in British policymaking have had the effect of focusing teaching on the new National Curriculum (which contains only slight provisions for multiculturalism), local level practitioners and policymakers can provide a safe haven for previous multicultural gains. Furthermore, they can continue to lean on existing national-level policies and to learn from the experiences of other regions to further their own local interests in multiculturalism.

France's education system, by contrast, is highly centralized. The fact that policies are determined in Paris allows an Education Minister (or any parent, for that matter) look at his watch and know what subject all pupils in France are studying at any given moment. The regional supervisors in the French education system are all politically appointed from the center and change as the national government changes. This ensures a uniformity of educational perspective, strictly limiting the number of independent gatekeepers who can make choices about issues such as teaching methods and curriculum materials. Moreover, the costs of changing policy become prohibitively high for small interest groups (i.e. the kinds of groups responsible for many of the curriculum materials and other initiatives in England) which in France must work at the national rather than the local level. With the exception of a few virtually unnoticed projects on immigrant cultures, there is little evidence of local multicultural initiatives.²⁸

It is thus much more difficult for non-governmental actors to insert multicultural policies into the national system. If educational multiculturalism were to arrive in France, it would have to come from the top down through the central gatekeeper. In a country where less than five percent of the population are ethnic minority citizens, it is less clear that multiculturalism is an appropriate policy for the whole nation than it is for localities with rather higher proportions of ethnic minority residents. The greater number of gatekeepers has thus made it easier for multiculturalism to work its way into the English system than into the French. Decentralization allowed multiculturalism to en-

²⁸For references to the limited initiatives, see Lorcerie 1995 and Boyzon-Frader 1992.

ter in England through the regions and to spread over time, whereas the paucity of regional gateways in France has meant that multicultural initiatives must pass through the central government.

4.2.2 Priors

It should be apparent that, all else equal, a single gatekeeper is better than many sequential gatekeepers for entrepreneurs wishing to turn their ideas into policies; on the other hand, multiple spatial gatekeepers can be better than one gatekeeper if gatekeepers are likely to be hostile to changes. This makes it clear, however, that to fully understand the transformation of international ideas into domestic policies, it is critical to examine factors affecting the attitudes of gatekeepers to new ideas. Arguments about the number and type of gatekeepers (sequential or spatial) are necessarily only part of the story.

A gatekeeper's priors ideas are central to her reception to a new international movement such as multiculturalism. When a new idea is presented to a policymaker it will have a certain "fit" with that individual's preconceptions which may cause it to be enthusiastically endorsed or rejected out of hand.²⁹ This argument is very similar to the one made by Hall in the conclusion of his edited volume on the impact Keynesian ideas across nations. Hall (1989: 383) discusses "the structure of political discourse," asserting that it can "work to the advantage or disadvantage of new policy proposals." For Hall, the "prevailing set of political ideas":

include[s] shared conceptions about the nature of society..., various ideas about the appropriate role of government, a number of common political ideals, and collective memory of past policy experiences. Together, such ideas constitute the political discourse of a nation. They provide a language in which policy can be described within the political arena and the terms in which policies are judged there.

The notion of priors employed below in the account of educational multiculturalism, however, is intended to be slightly more flexible than "shared conceptions" of Hall's political discourse. Priors can certainly be national in scope (as Hall's prevailing ideas are), but they can also be contested across segments of society within a nation. The distribution of priors across one or multiple gate-

²⁹Obviously, preconceived ideas can change over time. When priors shift, the likelihood of accepting an international idea will also change. Explaining when and why priors evolve (and therefore making priors a temporal as well as spatial variable) is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.

keepers will therefore determine the impact of the international idea. While some gatekeepers may have priors which are hostile to change, others' priors may make them quite receptive to new initiatives.

Where there is one gatekeeper—as in a centralized system—the impact of an international idea will depend to a large extent on that policymaker's priors. If the gatekeeper is receptive, the idea will have a strong impact domestically; if she is hostile, the idea will have no impact. In a sense, a centralized system approximates an “all or nothing” gamble for the policy entrepreneur carrying the international idea. On the other hand, a system with multiple spatial gatekeepers—a decentralized system—will most likely offer only partial gains. It is probable that gatekeepers will have a mixed bag of priors, and that only some will convert the new idea into policy. From the point of view of a policy entrepreneurs, the ideal situation is that of a single gatekeeper whose priors are sympathetic to the proposed changes. Second best is a system with multiple spatial gatekeepers, some of whose priors are likely to fit with the new initiative. Worst of any options are centralized systems with one or multiple sequential gatekeepers any one of whom is hostile to the entrepreneur's ideas.

Table 1: The effect of gatekeepers and priors on policy outcomes

system	number of gatekeepers	arrangement of gatekeepers	priors	outcome
centralized	1	---	favorable	much pΔ
decentralized	multiple	spatial	mixed	some pΔ
centralized	multiple	sequential	mixed	no pΔ
centralized	1	---	hostile	no pΔ

pΔ = policy change, in this case the take-up of international ideas

Policymakers in Britain and France adopted or rejected educational multiculturalism based to a large extent on their priors. In France, multiculturalism cut strongly against the grain of the nation's republican and *laïque* values, inherited from the Revolution and from the late nineteenth- and

early twentieth-century struggles over religion in school.³⁰ It has become de rigueur to cite republicanism and *laïcité* as the primary rationales for rejecting the “Anglo-Saxon model” of multiculturalism (see Granjon 1994 on the intellectuals’ hostility to multiculturalism; see Todd 1994 for a particularly scathing critique of “differentialism” and a hearty defense of assimilationism).

Culture is “out-of-play” in French educational policy, whereas it is institutionalized in English policy through mandatory religious education. Though many foreign critics claim that France’s assimilationist model is monocultural (see especially Rex 1987), the French themselves see it as a-cultural. There is indeed a sense in which the culture is very French (since the school imparts a knowledge of the French language and French history), but French education policy is also *laïque*—not favoring any one religion over another—and therefore seen to be neutral and universal. This notion of impartiality also extends to racial or ethnic differences, which makes French actors resist the kind of multiculturalism which has made inroads in England.

Leading authors and even the policy entrepreneurs tend to fear “moving from an immigration to a minority question,” and “community withdrawal,” each of which is strongly associated with the “community logic” of multiculturalism (Désir 1991: 109-10). They also view multiculturalism as a “group-oriented” or “differentialist” strategy and argue that any “right to difference” would lead to a “difference of rights,” a situation wholly unacceptable in a state which attempts to maintain a relationship with individual citizens rather than with corporate identity groups.³¹ These priors are shared by France’s central government policy gatekeepers as well as many practitioners in the education field. As Hargreaves (1995: 176) notes, “few politicians or civil servants are prepared to endorse the concept of multi-culturalism.”³² On the particular importance of early century struggles over *laïcité* to the attitudes towards multiculturalism, one observer interviewed summarized the

³⁰For an introduction to French thinking about republicanism, see Berstein and Rudelle 1992. For background into the historical and legal foundations of (and exceptions to) *laïcisme*, see Baubérot 1994. On the influence of historical ideas on French thinking about citizenship, see especially Brubaker 1992.

³¹On the fears of the “right to difference” see especially Taguieff (1987: 328-29), who argues that “the recognition of the Other can only be hierarchical,” backing up the claim with references to the former U.S. doctrine of “separate but equal.”

³²He also cites opinion polls which show that the French people think that immigrants should conform to French cultural norms and not retain the traditions of their country of origin.

general opinion of teachers as: “we’ve won the battle with Catholicism, we don’t want to fight it with the Muslims.”³³

The rejection of multiculturalism based upon national ideational priors about the values of *laïque* republicanism has become a national idiom, repeated in the contexts of educational, citizenship, and immigration debates. To the extent that this discourse predominates in many layers of French society, these ideational priors approximate Hall’s notion of a national “shared political discourse.” Although there are authors and actors who are sympathetic to pluri-cultural policies and perspectives,³⁴ it is indisputably true that as a rule, French gatekeepers’ priors make them very reluctant to embrace educational multiculturalism.

British priors, in contrast, are not as uniform as those in France. Although there is passive acceptance among many that Britain is a multicultural society (Rex 1987), there are still numerous individuals on the political right who believe in an “essential” Britishness (or more accurately, Englishness).³⁵ Nevertheless, a strong “liberal” group of gatekeepers has opposed this tendency and has encouraged a focus on ethnic minorities as disadvantaged communities.³⁶ This group has commonly found a natural home in Britain’s Labour Party, and has had an important impact in many Local Education Authorities, especially in inner-city areas.

These gatekeepers with liberal priors have been in both elected and appointed offices and have acted as critical switchmen, tracking international ideas about multiculturalism into their regional policies. Additionally, Labour Party liberals would occasionally take important national posts—such as Roy Jenkins as Home Office Minister in the late 1960s and Shirley Williams as Education Minister in the late 1970s—and use their positions (as described above) to inject multicultural ideas in national policymaking. Even the Conservative Party-appointed Lord Swann succeeded in nudg-

³³This interviewee is himself a Catholic educationalist.

³⁴See the contributions of Mappa and Grandguillaume in CERI 1987.

³⁵See above in Section 2.2 for references; see especially footnote 14.

³⁶By “liberal” here, I mean liberal in the American sense, with a sympathy for the rights and well-being of “underprivileged” groups. This is reflected in Britain not only in education policy, but also in policies toward race and ethnicity in many areas. See the discussion in Omi and Winant (1994: 57-59) on the liberal project and its competing paradigms.

ing national policy and rhetoric in a liberal, multicultural direction in the middle of the Thatcher years.

Finally, there is evidence that many school principals and teachers themselves have liberal priors. Gillborn examines three schools which have developed sustained antiracist policies. He finds that “the moves towards antiracist change were initiated by a small ‘core’ group of committed teachers, supported by their headteacher and senior management” (Gillborn 1995: 93).³⁷ And when asked why he thought that Britain had more multicultural policies than France, one history teacher replied “it’s because we’re nicer,” reflecting a liberal prior against those who oppose multiculturalism.³⁸

Thus, priors are distributed much more evenly for and against multiculturalism in England than they are in France. In France, the one national-level gatekeeper has been unsympathetic to change. In England, the national-level gatekeeper has been (off and on) more sympathetic to multiculturalism. The force of the changes, however, has come at the LEA level, where gatekeepers with liberal priors have dominated politics and policy for long periods of time. In sum, whereas France corresponds to the fourth model in Table 1—a centralized system with one hostile gatekeeper—England corresponds to the second model—a decentralized system with multiple gatekeepers representing a mixture of priors. Accordingly, there has been “some policy change” in England in the direction of multiculturalism, and “no policy change” in France.

Conclusion

The impact of international ideas on domestic policies depends on a host of elements. This paper demonstrates the central importance of two factors—gatekeepers and priors—in determining the influence of educational multiculturalism in England and France. I have argued that the English combination of multiple spatial gatekeepers and a generous smattering of liberal priors resulted in a significant level of multiculturalism in domestic education policy. In contrast, the mixture of a single,

³⁷A headteacher in Britain is the equivalent of a principal in the United States.

³⁸This comment was made to this author in a personal interview.

centralized gatekeeper and the prevalence of republican and *laïque* priors strictly limited the influence of educational multiculturalism in France.

Institutional structures and ideas emerge as two critical elements in explaining crossnational differences. In particular, this paper highlights the important interaction between gatekeepers and priors in translating international ideas into domestic policies. When there is a single gatekeeper with receptive priors, a new idea is likely to resonate and greatly affect national politics. If gatekeepers are spatially distributed in a decentralized system and have a range of priors, there will most likely be partial internal changes within the country. With sequential gatekeepers or a single gatekeeper, if any one gatekeeper's priors are hostile to change, an international idea will find little or no toehold in the domestic scene.

Domestic institutional structures and preformulated priors are likely to be relevant to the reception of international ideas in a wide variety of cases. This will most often be true when decisions about the appropriateness of a new movement are taken in the relative shelter of a bureaucracy rather than in the bright lights of public debate. The more decisions are left to gatekeepers, the more their individual priors will take precedence over the collective bargaining process of pluralist decision making, and the more the number, location and structure of gatekeepers will affect political outcomes.

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