

**Democratic Transitions:
Puzzles and Surprises from West to East**

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Recent communist crises in Eastern Europe seem to have caught many analysts by surprise. They also show features that set them apart from contemporary crises of right-wing dictatorships. The paper analyzes the reasons for the surprise in the light of theories of communism and of civil society under communism developed since the death of Stalin. It also examines and tries to account for the special features of the crises: their sudden acceleration, the regimes' loss of a will to rule, the mobilization of large popular strata. Explanations focus on the goal-oriented nature of communist regimes as an alternative to the Western order. It makes the issue of self-identity and self-justification crucial to these regimes—more crucial than for right-wing dictatorships. Therefore, the announcement by the Soviet hegemon itself that the goal has failed removes those tenuous shreds of self-justification to which the regimes desperately cling. This also makes possible and explains mass mobilization and the revival of civil society as a cathartic exercise. The paper concludes with an analysis of the prospects for democratization in Eastern Europe in the light of recent transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America. Democracy may develop—theoretical pessimism notwithstanding—as a matter of calculus and through an accelerated process of learning.

**DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
PUZZLES AND SURPRISES FROM WEST TO EAST**

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I WHY THE CRISES?

II WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT TRANSITIONS IN THE EAST?

III WHERE TO? LITANIES AND PROVERBS

This should be a good time for designing historical paradigms that are oriented to the future, not the past.¹

This paper is about puzzles. Having completed last September a manuscript on democratic transitions,² in which I compare Eastern with Western transitions and take an optimistic view of both, I am nonetheless left with several puzzles. They are puzzles related to what Western transitions may tell us about Eastern transitions, and what they may not tell us. What can we expect from the lessons of the former that can reflect on the latter? Is my optimism warranted by those lessons, or where else does it come from? The paper advances tentative answers and suggests new answer domains. As such, it should be taken as a call for a research agenda -- or for fewer instant analyses to oblige compelling events.

One set of puzzles has to do with the following: though we have witnessed a veritable wave of crises of Western (and Third World) dictatorships in the last few years -- many of them accompanied by successful democratizations -- the crisis of Eastern European regimes caught us by surprise. Why? After all, that first wave of crises taught us to hope; and taught us lessons with new theoretical bearing. Can those lessons travel -- how far?

A second and connected set of puzzles -- and a surprise as well -- has to do with the phenomenology of Eastern European transitions. In several ways, the phenomenology impresses us as different, and different in the counterintuitive direction. There are exceptions to the pattern (Poland and above all the Soviet Union -- though the latter is largely outside my analysis), but we are struck by the generally compressed speed of events. Days, even hours, matter.³ We are also struck by the central role played by collective popular pressure in accelerating and propelling events. The role of the Philippine and Portuguese people in the very first phases of their own democratic transitions may bear a superficial resemblance. But popular presence quickly waned; it does not seem likely that it would wane in the same way in Eastern Europe. We are finally struck by the inability of reforming communist regimes to call the tune; by their repeated retreats in front of oppositional pressures. Why? Were the incumbents getting any trade-offs, for accepting progressively to give up power? Milovan Djilas once said that communist regimes do not commit suicide. Do they now? The experience of regime transitions elsewhere suggests that dictatorships that give up power do so for reasons usually more complex than suicidal desperation and a sense of utter loss. Does that experience offer any insights for Eastern Europe?

A third set of puzzles has to do with the likely outcomes of communist transitions. Will they produce multiparty democracy? Again, just like very few observers were betting only a few months ago on the imminent crises of communist regimes, so also even fewer could have bet on their democratic outcome -- despite the example

of some successful transitions elsewhere. Those successful transitions seemed too different to warrant optimistic extrapolations. Even now, questions remain. I venture some optimistic scenarios in **TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES**. They are worth returning to after looking into the first two sets of puzzles: why the crises in Eastern Europe, and why their idiosyncracies.

All through the analysis I will keep in mind the example of Western transitions -- because they can provide us with analytical bench marks, but also because, having occurred earlier, they are contagious. Keeping the two reasons apart will demand some juggling.

WHY THE CRISES?

Needless to say, crises are not new to Eastern European regimes. But after each crises, the regimes have been reconstituted on some new bases. Often, what we call crises were episodes of reconstitution. The present crises, we agree, are finally something different -- so fundamental to catch us by surprise.

Where does the surprise come from? The list of factors could be fairly long, but at its top we must put the way we have conceptualized communist regimes. Despite the hotly debated conceptual revisionism of the last two decades or so, the traditional view of communism as a system of domination impervious to change has consciously or subconsciously held sway -- sufficiently at least to generate surprise.

Indeed, a long-held element of differentiation between communist totalitarianism and Western-style authoritarianism is that the latter can be reformed and even democratized, the former (allegedly) cannot. Given this, there is presumably little to learn and little to hope from the many episodes of successful democratization in Southern Europe and Latin America in the last fifteen years. In 1979, as some of these episodes had already taken place or were under way, Jeane Kirkpatrick attracted public attention by popularizing the totalitarian/authoritarian or East/West distinction in the context of a running debate on morality and American foreign policy; indeed by using recent developments in authoritarian regimes to prove the distinction.⁴ But Kirkpatrick was not the only one to go public. Five years later, Samuel Huntington stated that "[t]he likelihood of democratic development in Eastern Europe is virtually nil."⁵ Two obstacles supposedly militated against it -- indeed, by extension, against the very prospect of crises of the type we are witnessing. One obstacle is the fact that communist systems, even when drifting toward so-called posttotalitarianism, cannot renounce in principle their control of the economy. The other is that the Soviet Union vetoed reforms in its satellites.

The two obstacles strike me, however, as closely connected: if one falls, the other follows. And since first things should go first, we cannot understand, it seems to me, why the removal of the Soviet veto should make a difference -- indeed, why the veto **has** been removed -- unless we rethink the prevailing conceptualization of communist domination. I am suggesting that the communist model as overtly expounded or subconsciously absorbed may be in part incorrect and in part incomplete -- where incompleteness means that the model is not constructed to give account of change and its sources.

Contrasting Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism

The uniqueness of the communist model of dominance as conventionally understood, and the reason why it does not allow for change, emerge most clearly from the canonical contrast between communist totalitarianism and Western authoritarianism. The latter, being more porous in ideology, organization, and tasks, presents two features in particular that make it potentially open to crises and disintegration from within -- through various processes of extrication and internal secession initiated by components of the regime.⁶

The first feature, more clearly observable in Western and Southern Europe, is that their dictatorships had to contend with a number of state/political institutions with an older history of their own as professional carriers of public functions. In all cases, efforts to sidestep or politicize these institutions (bureaucracies, armies, judiciaries) were either definitely limited and half-hearted, or unsuccessful, or revealed themselves ephemeral once the dictatorships faced their crisis. As a rule, the institutions were expressly incorporated by the dictatorships, to parallel new and specifically repressive or totalitarian institutions. The effect, not always or completely unintentional, was to restrain the regime's totalitarian features. In only one case (Germany) were the older institutions more clearly subordinated to the new ones. But, whatever their new place, the old state institutions never became coterminous with, and never were they defined by, dictatorship -- even in a case like Spain, where the military installed the dictatorship. Thus, at the moment of crisis, the institutional weight of the past (a past that had been liberal and even democratic) was of prime significance in helping European returns to competitive politics. Not only could the structure of the state be more easily recycled to serve democracy; more important, state institutions had a positive interest of their own in being separated from dictatorship and recycled, as a step toward reaffirming their useful autonomy as professional carriers of public functions.

Simply put, state institutions could themselves be the instigators or accelerators of crisis; as, for instance, in the

overthrow of the fascist regime in Italy. This is one of the reasons why, in order to favor the conversion of state institutions, many transitions in the West emphasize -- especially when the conversion of a military is sought -- negotiations, reciprocal accommodations, and outright corporate trade-offs.

Much the same can be said about the effects of the second feature of Western authoritarianism: what Juan Linz calls their limited pluralism. The feature points to the fact that authoritarianism allows the survival of fairly autonomous societal formations and social organizations whose allegiance to the regime may be questionable or contingent. Given such survival, authoritarian regimes open themselves to possible crises and change on two fronts: forces whose allegiance is contingent may be more prone to secede when contingencies advise it; forces of more principled opposition have more space to survive, surface, and mobilize. Once more, the variety of interests, attitudes, and forces at play explains why regime changes are possible, but also demands frequent trade-offs and accommodations between oppositions and regime reformers.

Occasions for crises, and indeed reasons why regimes should negotiate their own transformation as an exit from the crises, should be fewer when it comes to communist regimes. So at least prevailing analyses and perceptions of those systems lead us to believe. By those analyses, communism, much more than even the most ambitious fascism, is the master of a political program that, upon taking over the state, subjects the institutions of the state to total guidance. Even as systematic terror subsides, the guidance does not lack justification. In their pursuit of a collectivized economy, communist **nomenklaturas** build a doctrinally justified vested interest in their own survival. The interest holds them together and stymies those lateral secessions that we more commonly observe in authoritarian regimes.

Secessions should similarly be stymied by the fact that a collectivized economy does not tolerate, as Western authoritarian regimes do, the survival and operation of influential corporate/economic interests -- the type of interests (such as labor, professional, or business associations) that would be likely to look at their probable alliance with the regime as one of convenience, and to act accordingly when the convenience fades. In fact, totalitarian disruption of collective bonds supposedly travels beyond state and corporate interests, to reach civil society at large, and to break down the innumerable horizontal and often primary ties that allow people to act together.

It should follow from this model of communism that imperviousness to crises is greater, that the only conceivable reforms are reforms initiated and tightly controlled by the very core of the regime, and that communist regimes have no reasons or no capacity to push reforms that jeopardize their **nomenklaturas**.

Conversely, if communism is only interested in limited reforms, civil society may not put much trust in those reforms, and may lack the capacity (possibly also the interest) to obtain more.

Until last year, the fact that Eastern European regimes were moving, apparently of their own accord, toward what Spaniards and Latin Americans (who are experts on the matter) call **dictablandas** -- that is, soft dictatorships incorporating features of liberalization and rule of law -- was not generally taken as a harbinger of their demise. On the contrary, the trend seemed to be self-serving, and bound to remain such.⁷ So the mounting events of 1989, as the year moved toward a close, caught us by surprise.

In sum, it seems fair to argue that the Leninist model of communism under which we consciously or unconsciously operated, its assumed resilience when contrasted with authoritarianism, has painted us into an intellectual corner. The model and the contrast imply that, because communist leadership sees no appealing trade-offs in a democratic compromise, stalling and repression in the face of demands for bolder reforms would still pay off. Instead of engendering a general crisis, such behavior would stop it in its tracks.

How then do we account for the events of 1989? First, how do we account for regime crises? More precisely, given the thrust of the communist model, how do we account for the fact that regimes do not resist? One simple and obvious answer is that we must rethink the model. The following possibilities present themselves:

1. A genetic model, such as the one we have presented, is understandably not concerned with crisis, demise, and strategic responses to them.
2. More likely and more importantly, the model being genetic, it tends to overstate the tightness, overbearing presence, pervasiveness, and therefore resilience of the mechanisms for regime domination, especially when used in contrast to models of Western authoritarianism.
3. As part of the latter problem, one matter is the model (a handy guide through reality) and another the realities that fall under its scrutiny.⁸ For one thing, the model does not apply equally well to all concrete regimes. When it comes for instance to the pervasiveness and penetration of the model and its fit in concrete cases, one thing is the Soviet Union, two different things may be the often imported regimes of Eastern and East Central Europe⁹ -- yet another is China and its own domestic version of communism. Thus, without by any means having exhausted the list of communist or pseudocommunist regimes around the world -- in Asia, Africa, and Latin America -- we already have our hands filled with different possibilities and trends, as indeed students of communism are well aware.

4. The model, even as a genetic one, is incomplete. We have overlooked one key aspect: its goal orientation, its teleology. The tightly constructed nature of communism is a means to an end. Thus, assumptions about the resilience of communism notwithstanding, there may come a time when resistance may indeed no longer pay off and spaces for radical change open up -- in communist regimes, just like in other regimes and in some ways even more. Resistance may no longer pay off if regimes lose, as they can lose, in the most incontrovertible way -- in their own terms, not despite their methods but because their methods do not achieve their goals. At such time, communist regimes experience a veritable and potentially devastating identity vacuum.

An Identity Vacuum

I have insufficient space to pursue all four possibilities. Let me pursue the last and most interesting one. To appreciate how heavily an identity vacuum may weigh on communist regimes, it is useful to look, as a point of contrast, at Central and South American dictatorships. One reason why the latter tend to enjoy lesser longevity is that, when not stubbornly resisting, their propensity has been to step down abruptly, but possibly temporarily, to avoid dealing with untreatable emerging situations. In keeping with this mode of extrication, what accompanies it is not necessarily a series of innovations initiated by the regimes, but the strained resumption of competitive practices and institutions (elections, parties, unions, parliaments, civic and local associations) which the regimes had repressed or made a mockery of, but rarely if ever formally abolished. Developments in Eastern Europe already before the Summer/Fall of 1989 reveal instead a flurry of reform-mongering by communist leaders to **prevent stepping down**. The reforms came on the heels of, but also went well beyond, a much more limited and often reversed history of reforms dating back to the beginnings of posttotalitarianism at the death of Stalin.

One way of understanding the difference is to take firm notice of the fact that the long-standing Central and South American pendulum between authoritarian and pluralist regimes -- with the military largely deciding when to step in or out -- is patently inconceivable in communist regimes. Communism is not a temporary care-taking affair, a **régime d'exception** with a limited self-imposed mandate to place a disrupted or disrupting democratic house in order, as many authoritarian regimes like to present/disguise/justify themselves. Communism's original ambition is to offer a permanent social and political alternative, not just domestic but above all global, to liberal democracy. In turn, this very ambition may paradoxically explain communist reforms when the ambition incurs or carries risks. At such points, reforms are judged essential for communist survival.

A basic qualitative distinction must, however, be drawn between the earlier communist reforms and the ones that prelude to 1989. Only the latter ones carried a real, if unanticipated or unavoidable, potential for breaking up the unity of communist **nomenklaturas** and eroding their centrality. Thus, only the latter ones created open-ended conditions for internal disagreement on the extent to which communism should be transformed. The reason for the distinction is that all earlier reforms remained within communism's pristine ambition to replace democracy the world over. In fact, they served to rescue the ambition, against domestic resistance and international obstacles. Recent reforms, on the contrary, were designed, in a momentous shift, to rescue domestic communist regimes from that very ambition: to set the ambition aside, as it appeared finally inviable, except at internal costs that stonewalling and retrenching could no longer reverse.

Otherwise said, reforms preluding to 1989, and their potential as solvents of communist apparats, reflected the fact that for the first time both the global objective for which, and the global context within which, communism came to power, kept itself in power, socialized its economies, and entrusted them to its apparats, had ceased to hold. In essence, as it was losing international coherence, Eastern European communism (especially outside the Soviet Union) was becoming more like other, domestically oriented, dictatorships. If this is in fact the case, the general lesson seems that, unless political analysts and researchers take into serious account the propulsive force of these mutations and their international referents, we may lose sight of the extent to which communist transformations are now unwittingly traveling.¹⁰

As Andrew Janos describes it, the founding "focus of communism was external rather than internal, for its purpose was not "catching up" with the advanced nations, but to destroy a modern world economy that was seemingly reproducing a pattern of debilitating economic disparities."¹¹ Thus, the communist dictatorships of the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe were not simply developmental dictatorships each designed to close the gap of its own retardation, but the collective harbingers and instruments of a new international order. Moreover, this global purpose, thanks to substantial tactical adaptations to permanent obstacles and changing circumstances, had in fact remained basic to communism until the first part of the eighties. Though Stalin rejected Trotsky's vision of a global revolution through popular uprisings, global Soviet hegemony through more conventional statecraft and expansionism was still his central objective. The postwar acquisition of Eastern Europe rallied those countries to that objective. And Chinese communism, also a postwar phenomenon, displayed, in its very rift with Russia, a similar global dedication to peasant revolutions against the "Western City." Nor did the death of Stalin signify an abandonment of the global

objective, but rather a retrenchment to consolidate -- under the banner of peaceful coexistence -- communism's global challenge to the West. In point of fact, this relative retrenchment did not and could not go without a continuous war of attrition, to sustain and test the challenge in various peripheries of the world.

Thus, what I have labeled posttotalitarian reforms were in effect institutional adjustments to tactical shifts in an objective that remained global. Even in Eastern Europe, where the end of Stalinism allowed some of the local communist regimes to pay greater attention to the problem of their domestic economic performance, Brezhnev's doctrine of limited sovereignty brought brutally home the permanent superiority of the global objective.¹² And as long as this has been the case, as long as communism's socialized economies have been bent to the global objective, the integrity and indispensability of the apparats in charge of the economies have also stayed unchallenged. In fact, posttotalitarianism removed lingering menaces to party and bureaucratic integrity, security, and status, that stemmed from the extralegal despotism practiced by Stalin,¹³ or from the populist subversion practiced by Mao during the cultural revolution. Thus, in a way, it is precisely when the global objective of communism became routinized that the staying power of the apparats reached its peak.

Party and bureaucratic integrity lost, however, much of its reason to be and its staying power when -- after Brezhnev in the Soviet Union and after Mao in China -- the global objective receded, making room in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, and in China, for more routine catching-up concerns with domestic retardation and development. The reasons for this momentous shift are to be found, according to prevailing analyses, in the devastating drain on domestic resources exercised by socialized economies, made worse when the economies had to be geared primarily for sustaining the global objective. The inability of socialized economies to carry domestic growth, let alone the global objective as well, and the great deprivations that this state of affairs has cost communist societies, reached crisis proportions as communist societies became more exposed to Western political and life-style models, and as the price tag for maintaining global parity with the West became unbearable.

Thus the crisis assumed more and more the quality of an identity crisis. And neither the more recent lowering of existing barriers to communication and exchange between East and West, nor the posttotalitarian emergence of an implicit so-called social contract between communist governments and their societies, could fill the identity vacuum.¹⁴ On the contrary, by their timidity, these socially ameliorative steps, when consciously compared to their Western counterparts, both announced and propelled the crisis. There is, I strongly suspect, no mistaking it. In regimes that, for all their retrenchment from goals, still attached

tremendous importance to a historical and popular mission, the protracted and utterly ineffective struggle to rally a sullen population to new but less than believable performance goals signified a dispiriting setback of major proportions.¹⁵

Gianfranco Poggi, in a work on the modern state and its prospects, captures forcefully the perverse implications of the communist state's identity vacuum:

[W]hile the [Soviet-type state] is committed to economic success, it is doomed to economic failure, at any rate **insofar as** its economic performance is measured against that of advanced capitalist economies...The seriousness of the contradiction becomes apparent once one reflects that the above clause "insofar as" does not provide an **out**. For three reasons the Soviet state itself, at any rate, cannot but compare itself to the leading capitalist economies: because of the fateful connection between industrial-technological capacity and military preparedness; because a society projecting itself (as Soviet society does) as the model for universal social development **must** at the very least hold its own in terms of economic development; because for too long now the Soviet state has **sold itself** to its citizens by promising to "catch up with and overtake" the standard of living of advanced capitalist countries. (The ambiguity of the expression "for too long" is intentional, for it points up a further contradiction. I mean by it both that the promise has been made for too long **to be believed** by those to whom it is made; and that it has been made for too long **to be surrendered** by those who make it).¹⁶

Whatever the reasons, the fact that the global objective has receded, and the fact that domestic growth and social issues have now become central and yet untreatable in communist terms -- thus feeding an identity vacuum -- mean, as anticipated, that communist **nomenklaturas** as presently constituted have become dysfunctional: no longer the solution, they are now the problem.

These facts also explain another otherwise unexplainable portent: why the Soviet veto to radical reforms in Eastern Europe, a veto imposed by the hegemonic guardian of the global purpose, has finally been removed. Thus the twin obstacles to radical change which Huntington and many more held up as inherently unshakable -- the veto and communism's principled control of the economy -- should be seen as two sides of the same medal. The removal of the veto widens dramatically the identity vacuum of Eastern European regimes precisely because they had been chained together (Romania is a clear exception) by the global objective.

What can the identity vacuum be filled with -- and how? Simply trying to answer the question reveals the depth and extent

of the crisis, as well as the way it is compelled to unfold. True, identity crises are not exclusive of communist dictatorships; but they can be more devastating. Western authoritarian regimes -- and some more than others -- already possessed and even sponsored, before facing demise, societies and economies operating within an existing Western order. Hence the trauma of an exit toward democracy was easier to contain. In fact, the exit could be engineered, and thereby softened, by the regime itself. The Spanish transition is the best example, but not the only one. In striking contrast, because burying the Western democratic model was the historical mission of communist regimes, the idea of filling the identity vacuum -- when the mission fails -- with precisely that democratic model is bound to strike the regimes as nothing short of devastating. And yet *tertium non datur*. As Poggi puts it: the model was fought for too long and uselessly.

WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT TRANSITIONS IN THE EAST?

A first distinctive aspect about transitions in Eastern Europe is the radicalness and, when the Soviet veto was removed, the suddenness of the crises. A second one concerns what appears to be the central role of civil society -- in sum, of the people.

Why are the Crises Radical and Sudden?

The same factors that explain the crises -- an identity vacuum and the removal of the Soviet veto -- also explain their radicalness and suddenness. Let me suggest how.

I argued in *TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES* that, when goals are central -- as they are with communism -- and fail, regimes develop a new way of looking at the costs of reform and toleration versus those of resistance and repression. Toleration may still be costly, but if resistance, by its total inability to reconquer goals, turns out to be incomparably more costly, then toleration may invite a second look. I quoted in this regard a confession by Marian Orzechowski, leader of the communist group in the Polish lower house when Tadeusz Mazowiecki was confirmed prime minister, to corroborate my claim about the futility, even the wrongfulness, of resistance. Interviewed after having voted for the Solidarity leader, Orzechowski declared; "Perhaps, we and our honorable colleagues from *Solidarnosc* had to live through tough years and mature separately before meeting. As to my party, may be it was necessary to end up with our back to the wall for us to understand reality."¹⁷

I continued by pointing out that stalemates between dictatorial regimes and oppositions, of the type captured in Orzechowski's confession, are not a conjuncture of last resort (if nothing else works, given a regime's notoriously stubborn nature, we can only cling to the hope of some unforeseeable and

surprisingly more stubborn opposition that saps regime resolve). Stalemates are by no means unusual ways of setting regime transitions in motion, but resemble what Dankwart Rustow, in his seminal paper on the issue, considers to be the lever of democratization: an inconclusive struggle, the protracted ineffectiveness of resistance, weariness and disillusion (or the anticipation of such predicament); all of which makes outcomes indeterminate and may thus lead to final shifts in the strategies and even objectives of political actors.¹⁸ In this aspect, I argued, the logic by which communist regimes may change does not differ as much as we think from that of other regimes.

But the line of analysis presented in **TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES** needs some adjustment. It is more "on target" for the period before the Summer/Fall of 1989, and for those regimes (Poland, Hungary) that had started their reforms in earnest before that period. Afterwards, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia (and to some extent, by contagion, Hungary and Poland themselves) experienced something less akin to a stalemate and a meeting of wills seeking reconciliation, and more akin to a sudden and total collapse of political will and moral confidence on the part of the regimes. Pragmatic calculus, in view of a possible survival, and deliberate action to affect still indeterminate developments, dramatically gave way to dispirited and fearful retreats.

The cause of the sudden change? Once again, we meet the inevitable answer: the decision by the Soviet Union, eventually cast as the "Sinatra doctrine," no longer to intervene in the internal affairs of Eastern regimes; hence the removal of the Soviet veto to radical reforms. Until then, and only until then, the weight of locally vested regime interests was supported by the remnants of some ideological credibility -- very tenuous to be sure, yet benefiting from Soviet dependency. These remnants were probably insufficient to induce local regimes to use repression -- had the Soviet Union condoned or encouraged it -- in order to save themselves. Too much was already at work against not only the effectiveness but also the rightfulness of repression. Yet the remnants were sufficient to avoid outright abdication.

Thus the change introduced in this regard by the Soviet Union is unmistakable.¹⁹ There are differences in the extent to which each Eastern regime abdicates its political will, which are of crucial importance in assessing each evolution. Nonetheless, no regime has been able significantly to subtract itself from the effects of the Soviet decision. Indeed, once one regime abdicates, the contagion spreads -- to embrace, after a useless bloodbath, Romanian communism itself, the only communism that, independent from Moscow, had no qualms about its identity.

I will continue with the psychology of abdication when discussing civil society and its surprising weight in Eastern transitions. I wish now to highlight the matter, implicit in the

preceding discussion, of the role of international factors in the crises of dictatorships East and West. The crises, whether East or West, do not occur in an international vacuum. Foreign states, hegemon, and other international forces can stir crises by ostracizing and variously debilitating old regimes, by removing support and international legitimation, or by rewarding change. Changing world views about democracy and dictatorship, the successful example of regimes that have changed, or the tragedies brought about by those which chose to resist, can have demonstration effects. Though few of them are consequential, there is in fact a large number of ways in which international factors can impinge on regime crises. There are also interesting similarities between East and West, and interesting differences.

Let me point first to one significant difference. It concerns the role of regional/ideological hegemon. I have argued that the decision of the Soviet Union to scuttle hegemony must be considered sufficient to precipitate collapse and a rush for reforms in Eastern Europe. No other hegemon, it seems to me, can have such decisive effects on its client states. Not the United States -- which quickly comes to mind for comparison. The United States, the leading democracy in the world, is ostensibly committed to promoting democracy in its Central American backyard -- and for this purpose it has no intention of scuttling its regional role. The Soviet Union, the nondemocracy, wishes to see radical reforms in Eastern Europe -- and for this purpose it decisively scuttles its regional role. The paradox is that American action is less successful than Soviet action.

One reason, whose analysis does not belong here, is the unpredictable nature and the mixed motives of American promotion.²⁰ The other is the nature of dictatorships in the American backyard. Even if the United States were to be more forceful and consistent in the promotion of democracy, efficient success is most unlikely. Just as the dictatorships in the American backyard are of the type that comes and goes, so also they are of the type that can endure without a shred of domestic legitimacy and international credibility. Endurance, even at the cost of prolonging a bloody stalemate, counts more than recognition, and the decision when to give up is based on different calculations. Thus weariness may sink in slowly and -- short of appeal to extreme punitive measures -- American action alone can rarely discourage and dislodge local dictators.

Eastern European dictatorships, instead, wish and need domestic legitimacy and international credibility. That is why they have clung protractedly, closely, desperately (East Germany) to the fiction of domestic and international recognition. Willingness to acknowledge the double fiction has taken many years. But once the fiction was revealed by none other than the hegemon, the utter political and moral void also stood revealed. Thus the mere fact that the Soviet Union did not take sides overtly between

regimes and civil societies -- its hands-off attitude, its reserve, its abstention -- helped civil societies and proved deadly for the regimes. Between civil society and the regime hard-core, it was the latter that most **needed** explicit Soviet support and blessing, not the former. And so it is that a Soviet leader who is guarded when it comes to reforms in his own country was hailed by Eastern Europeans as the harbinger of fundamental change. For, without expressly soliciting Eastern Europe to enter it, he has set the region on a path to radical transformations.

A point of surprising similarity between transitions East and West emerges instead when we compare how proximity, not just physical, to democratic Western Europe affects transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe. The case for Southern Europe is quickly if superficially made. The contagion of Western Europe as both a democracy and a more viable economic system, the attraction of membership in the European Economic Community, the material and ideal support extended by Western political parties and other political organizations to local oppositions -- all of these factors, without being a cause of the dictatorships' demise, accelerated and otherwise contributed to the demise. This is particularly clear in the case of Spain; but a similar argument can also be made even for a transition as difficult and contested as that of Portugal. In Spain, where democracy came in through the reforms expressly introduced by the regime, those factors contributed to the demise by helping the reformists within the regime make a case for themselves.

How much the proximity of Western Europe contributed to Southern European demises (and democratic success) we can never ascertain precisely;²¹ but why it contributed is fairly clear. Since the defeat of fascism, Southern European dictatorships had been ideological fossils and (Greece) unconsolidated **régimes d'exception**. Their economies and societies already operated in a Western mode and context. They survived by exceptional circumstances or by actuarial contingencies (Franco's longevity). Hence, given new and appropriate contingencies, the contagion of Western Europe could more easily and smoothly spread. Regime reformists did not turn reformists because the contagion from the West suddenly stripped the regimes of their identity -- their identity had long been porous, contingent, and expendable. And this explains why, most clearly in the case of Spain, reformists could remain largely in control of the reforms, negotiate its steps, extract trade-offs -- and finally abolish the old regime and comfortably operate within democracy. Paradoxically, the very fact that identity and legitimacy had slowly withered away on their own made it easier for the old regime to arrange a transition which was in part from the top and in part deliberately negotiated.

The impact of Western Europe on Eastern Europe is eventually similar -- but also more dramatic and in some ways more radical. The drama, and the surprise, are in this: in keeping with their

pursuit of a global alternative goal, a cohesive Western Europe should have been, and for a long time was, a reason for Eastern European regimes to stick and stick together, a reason (contrary to Southern European dictatorships) to hold onto their alternative identities. It ended up by having precisely the opposite effects.

We are impressed, as we should, by the fact that in 1988-89, as Poland and Hungary began their more deliberate march toward radical reforms, they relied on methods -- negotiations and the search for pacts with the oppositions -- which, they explicitly acknowledged, had been learned from the Spanish example. The great importance of precedents and lessons from other cases should not be overlooked. Yet the events of the Fall of 1989, as more assured and paced negotiations Spanish-style gave often way to less decorous retreats, also and more clearly revealed that Eastern Europe was not just returning, like Southern Europe before, to the Western fold. It was experiencing, in Zbigniew Brzezinski's effective words, a grand failure.²² The role of Western Europe has not been simply to attract, to bring back to the fold. By its sheer proximity, and without doing anything to make the crises in the East more anguishing (on the contrary), Western Europe (and Western Europe more than the United States) has revealed and brought home the identity vacuum of Eastern Europe's alternative regimes. And this, similarly to Soviet renunciation to hegemony, explains why Eastern European regimes have lost the capacity, the will, and the confidence to control the transitions.

These are the important distinctions between the transitions of Southern and Eastern Europe. Unless we have them firmly in mind, the peculiarities and surprises in the manner the latter transitions unfold cannot be fully appreciated. At any rate, precisely because of its objective role in ending communism's old identities, what Western Europe intends to do from now on -- in order to assist a peaceful and consensual evolution of the transitions in the East, and to help the rooting of new democratic identities (*tertium non datur*) -- acquires an importance that goes well beyond what Western Europe did for Southern Europe.

Why the People in the Streets?

Another surprise that needs pondering is the fact that the people, by taking to the streets, occupy center stage in the drama of Eastern Europe. And as the new actors take over the stage, the old protagonists take a quick bow. How do the two facts connect?

The source of the surprise is double. It comes from what we expect of civil societies under communist regimes and, at least for me, from comparisons with Western transitions.

Let me treat the latter first. One aspect about the syndrome

of democratic transitions in the West needs stressing. Street action, let alone violent revolutions, almost never play the decisive role in bringing down the old regimes. If revolution is employed, an authoritarian regime is most likely replaced by another. Only in one case -- that of Costa Rica in 1948 -- did a revolution bring about democracy. Instead, all recent classifications and typologies of democratic transitions reveal that the most numerous and crowded types involve coming to terms domestically, and accommodating in some form, residues from the past regime.²³ This is particularly true of typologies dealing with more recent transitions, where the transition is frequently rooted in, and guided by, an early attempt initiated by the regime to extricate itself from its own crisis. The typical scenario unfolds as follows: regimes faced with a crisis will seek reequilibration, possibly through repression, to reabsorb the crisis. But efforts at reequilibration/repression, proving costly and possibly inconclusive, do not meet with unanimous regime support. In fact, the crisis may itself be ultimately rooted in institutional conflict or generational discontinuity inside the regime about its purposes and its instruments. Under such circumstances, the next step in the crisis has been the progressive scuttling, in exchange for some trade-offs and guarantees, of the regime itself.

Given the scenario -- given the role that, in order to protect themselves, the old regimes and their variously reformist or secessionist fractions have been able to play in recent Western transitions -- it is no surprise that popular action has been rather constrained, and constrained in two ways. First, neither regime collapse nor the manner of its collapse can be attributed to popular action alone -- nor to popular action mainly. Popular action weighs insofar as the regime has already started coming apart internally and giving up its monopoly. Second and concomitantly, recent transitions in the West, in singular contrast with the past, are characterized largely by a prudent conciliatory style on the part of democratic oppositions; a style that shuns direct action and the pressure of the street. Thus, popular action rarely occupies -- visually, physically -- center stage, especially in the first phases of the transitions. If at all, already established democratic governments have later appealed to the people to take to the streets in support of their threatened democratic conquests.

Visually, physically, the contrast with Eastern Europe could not be greater. Permanent and massive mobilization, a trickle of root-and-branch resistance which in a few days becomes a flood, a stepped up popular pressure for rapid and nonnegotiable change -- this is what captures our fancy about Eastern Europe. And the surprise is greater in view of what totalitarianism had made us expect as to the capacity of civil society to survive under its onslaught.

How do we explain the contrast? One way of explaining it is

to hark back to our discussion of why communist crises have been so sudden and thorough. In light of that discussion, it would seem that it is not popular action that, by some overlooked quality, causes dramatic regime crises in the East, it is the already deep-set crisis of the regimes that gives an unusual role to popular action. Once, for the reasons already discussed, the regimes lose will and confidence -- once they signal their abdication -- the gates are open to the popular behavior we are witnessing in Eastern Europe. And when this point is reached, we should no longer be surprised that the oppositions, peacefully though they act, show little if any willingness to compromise on how to dispose of dictatorial features. We are dealing, after all, with so-called party-states, whose specific structures of domination cannot be reabsorbed as easily as in the less pervading dictatorships of Southern Europe.

I find the emphasis on the abdication of the regimes a useful and convincing starting point. Still, it is not the whole explanation for the contrast.

As one corrective, we must not underestimate the importance of circular effects. Although common wisdom and evidence suggest that popular resistance often cause backlashes, the opposite may also be true: the more resistance and defiance, the more the regime becomes confirmed in its belief that it has lost the right to rule.

At the same time, and more important, there must also be more to the explosion of popular **ressentiment** than popular realization that local communist rulers had lost their will to rule. Aside from the fact that it sheds no light on the desperate rebellion of the Romanian people against a dictator who had lost none of that will, this simple explanation, if left unattended, shortcuts and begs many questions about the nature of communist societies and their relations to their regimes, as well as about the motivations leading oppressed people to become active. An answer to these questions seems to me necessary to complete our understanding of the vital emergence of Eastern European public opinions.

The considerations below are more tentative and speculative than anything I have discussed so far. In effect, what follows can be taken as a research agenda, a list of issues and domains to be investigated.

Following a line of reasoning already employed in the paper, we may start by suggesting that one of the reasons why we underestimated the capacity of the people to take center stage is that we have overestimated communist control over civil society. Instead, it now turns out that the citizens of Eastern Europe have managed to resist successfully decades of attempted cultural isolation and socialist socialization by regimes which -- we should not forget -- were imposed and enforced by a foreign hegemon. It

is necessary to understand this in order fully to explain why, once communist regimes signal their abdication, Eastern European societies are capable of rebounding with the speed, the vitality, and the impatience which we are now witnessing.

This line of analysis makes sense; still, whether we have actually overestimated communist control over society, and in what ways civil societies managed to preserve spheres of autonomy -- these are matters that need verification. Per se, the rebounding of participation that we are now witnessing does not prove that we were overestimating all along. There is already a growing literature on civil society in communist regimes, and some of it is concerned with the ways in which forms of civil society, labeled at times secondary society, managed to reconstitute themselves in the cracks of communist regimes. Research would gain from explicit efforts to compare societies in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.²⁴

I wish, however, to explore the potentials of a somewhat different line of analysis, one that combines the experience that most people have under dictatorship -- an experience of outward conformity and political withdrawal to a private sphere -- with the psychology of rebounding from withdrawal. No matter how much we may overestimate the repressive effectiveness of a dictatorship, living under it remains a largely thwarting experience. Yet one impressive aspect about most recent transitions in the West has been what Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter -- who have paid close attention to the phenomenon -- call the resurrection of civil society.²⁵

To be sure, civil societies may have played neither the decisive nor even the main role in the final demise of authoritarian regimes in the West. It may also be slightly misleading to speak of resurrection, since the term suggests something neither always assured under authoritarianism nor, on the other hand, necessary to "resurrection": the survival in nuce of alternative organizations and networks underneath the veneer of societal conformity. Nonetheless, once authoritarian regimes started to liberalize, almost invariably and in close sequence a number of layers of society -- intellectuals, churches and human right activists, independent and salaried professionals, functional and business sectors, workers, community and environmental activists -- gave birth, each with its own contribution and from its own perspective, to a public sphere within which interests and ideals, long thwarted by years of outwardly atomized and private conformity, began to be collectively articulated. At times, the emerging public spheres even resembled, in the associations and organizations articulating interests and ideals, what existed before the authoritarian take over. It was as if time had not gone by and political damage had not been done.

There exist, as we have seen, objective reasons why some

transitions in particular facilitate the resurrection of civil society. But the further question, of relevance to transitions both West and East, is what, over and above facilitating contingencies, motivates people to rebound politically. O'Donnell provides an interesting lead in the search for answers. Writing from the experience of Argentina, but extrapolating to other transitions, he interprets the phenomenon as something "...more complex than the existence, under the aegis of the authoritarian regime, of many individuals who purposely conceal their opposition until the situation becomes ripe for acting...[T]here are also many who are at best politically passive or indifferent during that period, but who as the contextual conditions begin to change, quite suddenly repoliticize..."²⁶

Thus, at the moment of crisis, different people turn against the old regime for different reasons. There are first the opponents; but opposition comes itself in various shades -- over time, even for the same people. Next to them, and bordering at times with them, there are many who acquiesced, but whose passivity has now become a source of embarrassment that must somehow be removed. There also many who, while abandoning ship, continue to consider the authoritarian experience valid in its own historical context. But that validity is now a thing of the past. Authoritarianism has gone wrong, or has simply lost relevance. Thus nostalgia for the past is not a motive to save it.²⁷

But in the mix of personal experiences that motivate people to turn against the regimes, there is one experience that possibly touches upon most lives -- the more so as the different experiences actually shade into each other at the border. It is also the one that possibly best explains the mental readiness of so many people eventually to become mobilized and involved. This is the experience described by O'Donnell's reflections on Argentina as that of people who were compelled under the dictatorship to lead psychologically impoverished lives of outward conformity, isolation from the concerns of others, retreat into a totally private sphere, and who were deprived at the same time of their self-esteem by the complicity with the expectations of the dictatorship which such behavior objectively entailed. For the expectations -- fulfilled through ideological and organizational enforcement but also through selective incentives -- are precisely that there will be no autonomous political sphere where people will dare articulate shared political aspirations against the regime.

There is a remarkable similarity between the Argentinean experience described by O'Donnell and the predicament of Eastern European people under communist systems, as recently depicted by Timothy Garton Ash:

...by demanding from the ordinary citizen seemingly innocuous semantic signs of outward conformity, the system managed somehow to implicate them [sic] in it.

[U]ntil almost the day before yesterday, everyone in East Germany and Czechoslovakia was living a double life: systematically saying one thing in public and another in private.²⁸

Similarly, Václav Havel:

All of us have become accustomed to the totalitarian system, accepted it as an unalterable fact and therefore kept it running...None of us is merely a victim of it, because all of us helped to create it together.²⁹

How, then, do these common experiences account for the surge of popular mobilization? The answers for Argentina and Eastern Europe are again very similar.

O'Donnell relies on Albert Hirschman's observations about historical cycles of political involvement and political apathy, to point out that under a dictatorship the cycle of apathy is not natural and voluntary but artificial: in part coercive and in part ambiguously self-imposed. When this happens, and when the dictatorship meets its crisis, the rebounding from apathy -- the return to the other side of Hirschman's cycle -- is inevitable, magnified, and targeted against the dictatorship. As people bear witness against the regime, most of them reach for a catharsis: by purging the regime, they purge themselves. Thus, also, utilitarian free riding does not apply. What are under normal circumstances the unnecessary personal costs of collective participation, become here necessary steps -- **rewarding in themselves** -- to recover one's public self.

Or, as Garton Ash puts it:

In order to understand what it meant for ordinary people to stand in those vast crowds in the city squares of Central Europe...you have first to ... understand what it feels like to live a double life, to pay this daily toll of public hypocrisy. As they stood and shouted together, these ordinary men and women were not merely healing divisions in their society; they were healing divisions in themselves.³⁰

And later on he adds:

People had had enough of being mere components in a deliberately atomized society: they wanted to be citizens, individual men and women with dignity and responsibility, with rights but also with duties, freely associating in civil society.³¹

But in the broader similarity between the experience of living under Western authoritarianism and that of living under communism,

some aspects about the latter experience make it particularly abject and degrading, and make communism particularly false in the eyes of its subjects. I am referring to the experience -- especially central under Brezhnevite "normalization" -- of living in systems of mutual make-believe virtues: the make-believe virtue of the new socialist citizen/producer rewarded with the make-believe egalitarian performance of the new socialist model. This may add to the reasons why in Eastern Europe **ressentiment** runs deeper; why also public discourse is accented with calls for truthfulness, dignity, morality, civility, community, service, duty; why most of the opposition movements prefer to label themselves as civic forums, citizens' initiatives, and the like.

To be sure, most regimes, dictatorships or democracies, fall amidst denunciations of rampant corruption, self-serving appropriation, moral degeneracy, abuse and deception of the people's trust. To be sure, purging was also an issue in the fall of Western European dictatorships. But -- with the exception of Nazi Germany, whose case is very special in more than one way -- in none of the other cases did purging took up such central and shared significance. In none did it involve as much of a cathartic exercise: purging oneself by purging the regime. Most importantly, in none was catharsis an exercise in which reforming members of the regime so widely and genuinely participated. Not in Spain, not in Greece, not in Portugal (especially after the radical military lost its bid for a virtuous Jacobin polity), not in Vichy France, nor even in fascist Italy.

One reason, I believe, is that goals and combat tasks were more marginal to these regimes, or (Italy) more quickly discounted.³² Fewer pretensions and more discountable promises meant in turn that the lie by which these regimes finally lived, and in which they implicated their people, was less big, less resonant, more easily lived down, less traumatically removable. Also, at least in the case of Spain, Portugal, Greece (and by extension of Latin America) people perceived their regimes, to some extent, as reflections of their societies, manifestations of ingrained class injustice and inequality, images of historical backwardness. In this sense, the regimes had not perverted society; they had only revealed it.

But consider the case of communism. There is originally the global promise of alternative societies, and there is the Leninist party as a combat tool that deploys its innumerable if select cadres on a large societal front in order to create that alternative. Among the rank and file, the experience of mass mobilization was meant to create a climate of purpose, spaces of awareness and collective duty, that would reach all layers and all corners of society.

That genetic vocation for collective service never entirely disappears from communism. It provides millions with a substitute

for an autonomous public sphere which communism denies to the people.³³ But it is eventually overshadowed, and contaminated over time, by the emergence of systemic features that belie the vocation. I am referring to what has come to be known as Soviet and Soviet-style parasitic neotraditionalism.³⁴ The causes of the emergence are not of necessary concern here. Suffice to say that, as long as the Bolshevik task of communist parties as overseers of society remained central, the only alternative to Stalinist party terror -- terror by the party on cadres who deviate from the task -- became the routine absolutization of party **nomenklaturas**.³⁵ The implications of absolutization are double: for the system, and for the people.

As to the system, the implication was corruption -- a phenomenon that, in order to protect the cadres, becomes elevated, explicitly so during the Brezhnev era, to an organizational principle. Kenneth Jowitt, referring to the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, puts it as follows:

today what impresses one...is the party leadership inability and/or unwillingness to devise a credible and authoritative social combat task capable of sustaining a distinction between the regime elite's particular status interests and the party's general competence and interest. Today the party leadership appears unable to ...prevent the routinization of a party based on charismatic impersonal discipline into a neotraditional status organization of cadres primarily oriented to personal, familial, and material concerns.³⁶

In a **dirigiste** economy, the self-righteous privatization of official concerns had in turn systemic repercussions that went well past the party. Systemic performance -- the performance anchored to combat tasks, plans, campaigns, struggles, fronts -- turned make-believe. And the performance of people followed suit. Again, Jowitt on the Soviet Union deserves quoting at length:

Members of...society were forced to act in morally debilitating and personally insulting ways. Brezhnev's rule saw the degeneration of the Party, and the Party's denigration of society. Shoddy work, bribery, recourse to the 'second economy,' nepotism, hypocrisy, and servility were imperatives... For those members of Soviet society who were more educated, urban, skilled, **but above all** more individuated, articulate, and ethical this reality was embarrassing, alienating, and offensive; the source of increasing resentment, anger, and potentially political rage.³⁷

But there is more. For, systemic corruption contaminated the people not only as producers, but as consumers as well. The make-believe nature of socialist production, plus the entitlements

openly expected by **nomenklaturas** imbued with their public primacy, resulted in the bifurcation of consumption opportunities for the privileged and for the masses.³⁸

First, it gave life to two firmly separated consumption markets: one where select elites had prompt title to a panoply of quality goods; the other where the common people "queued" for a miserly basket of shoddy and rarely available goods and services - be it fresh produce, a house, or medical care (let alone information).

Second, and in many ways more important, in the continuous struggle to have access to that impoverished market, and more in general in the struggle to organize one's life around it, people in communist societies were literally being robbed of an essential life resource: time. Time which they could have devoted to less demeaningly impending and more attractive personal or public concerns. Thus socialist egalitarianism was denied, in quality and quantity, where it ultimately matters: when it comes to consumption and to life chances.

In sum, the final experience is again one of anger and degradation. Anger at being pushed toward a privatization of life concerns; degradation at having to contemplate with inevitable suspicion others who, whether by official privilege or by chance, manage to beat the system. Yet at the same time, a moral and political boost of sorts must have come to the people of Eastern Europe from their practice of what O'Donnell, *à propos* of Argentina, calls "oblique voice": the survival of semantically coded critical communication especially among more articulate strata, more consciously affected by the system's make-believe. In fact the voice may have been kept alive precisely by the bonds that socially homogeneous and relatively more resourceful microgroups formed among themselves, as they pooled ingenuity in the art of material survival.³⁹

Some analyses of Eastern European prospects believe that the popular syndrome just described does not bode well for the future of the region. Believing that the cynicism and retreat to private concerns are, as communism expects, habit-forming, the analyses fear that, when the people must choose whether to alter radically their political and social habits (both of production and consumption), a sort of complicity in degradation will prevail. Just as **nomenklaturas** will resist changes that would rob them of their Brezhnevite standing -- with its accompanying "right to private appropriation of the best that society has to offer"⁴⁰ -- so also and sadly the people, faced with the prospects of further sacrifices in the name of reforms, will resist giving up that shoddy but, in the final analysis, reassuring egalitarianism that the system has been guaranteeing to most.

Thus, if we take these analyses for good, the future of the

region, even as communist elites lose confidence in their mandate, should offer a variation -- more or less indentured to the past, more or less civilized, more or less palatable -- of the half-way regime described by Vilfredo Pareto in his discussion of the crisis of bourgeois hegemony:

The declining elite becomes softer, milder, more humane and less apt to defend its own power... On the other hand, it does not lose its rapacity and greed for the goods of others, but rather tends as much as possible to increase its unlawful appropriations and to indulge in major usurpations of the national patrimony.⁴¹

There are, however, three factors that militate against pessimism as to the social conservatism of the people. First, the people have taken to the streets, most recently even in Moscow, and certainly not in defense of their "social contract" with their regimes. Too early to tell? Consider then the second factor.

What some students of communism have labeled a social contract, by means of which communist regimes buy popular support in exchange for a mild authoritarian welfare state, is not at all an affectively neutral arrangement but, as we have described it above, and as Jowitt incisively puts it, a demeaning "protection racket."⁴² In view of this, once the reciprocal pretense is, so to say, out of the bag, it is difficult to imagine how the nostalgia for a demeaning and indecent past can carry much weight. That is why I have argued that what we are witnessing may instead be a needed cathartic exercise. To be sure, egalitarian welfare-state sentiments are deeply rooted in Eastern Europe; but they spring from the promises of a participatory socialist tradition long obscured by communism, yet never totally lost and worth recovering. Almost literally, this tradition appeals to something at the opposite end of a protectionist racket.

Nor, thirdly, should we leave out a factor which would deserve much more attention than the span of a short paragraph. At the same time as Brezhnevite normalization degraded socialist societies, these same societies nonetheless underwent, after Stalin, complex processes of urbanization and articulation that have helped enhance the ability of emerging articulate strata -- in the professions, in the technical sectors, in the intelligentsia, in the managerial class -- to take critical consciousness of their plight and their aspirations.⁴³ The changes are reflected in the proliferation of civic initiatives and grassroots organizations. All of this may be a source of much social unrest, but certainly not a motive for resigned complicity in degradation.

Some analysts, we have seen above, fear habit-formation: people getting used to the safety of their degraded condition. But is it too fanciful to imagine that, when the indecency of the

condition becomes of public domain, addiction may as well develop to better habits? As Martin Krygier suggests in reference to Poland and to its communist political class, "[s]ince the Party is composed largely of careerists, many of these are likely to see some advantage in appearing decent since indecency hasn't worked. It might become habit-forming."⁴⁴

WHERE TO? PROVERBS AND LITANIES

Krygier's suggestion prompts me to raise the question of where Eastern Europe is going. Can the success of transitions in Southern Europe (and elsewhere) be repeated? Can it be contagious? Will diffusion work? Since most analyses show doubts and concerns, my intent is to balance the picture -- to take a second look.

It could be said that the transitions in Eastern Europe are different from those in Southern Europe, and that the differences do not help. But there are at least two problems with this line of reasoning. The first problem is that much pessimism was also exhibited when the transitions in Southern Europe took place. We should not let our memory be tricked by the eventual success of Southern European transitions. Many analysts did not expect success in those cases either. The second problem is that the main reasons that are given as a specific impediment to democratization in Eastern Europe (the double conundrum of how to marketize collectivist economies and how to privatize communist parties) tend to be the same reasons that were given a few months ago as an impediment to a crisis of communism *tout court*. Yet the crises have occurred -- and that, in my view, was by far the most difficult (and important) step.

Much of the ground on which the misplaced pessimism rested then, and rests now, is in the last analysis similar. With all due regard for the specifics of the Eastern European case, the litanies of what could and would go wrong -- in Southern Europe in the seventies, in Eastern Europe in the nineties -- are classical variations on three connected themes derived from an established literature about democratization.

The first theme is that attempts at rapid regime changes are invariably traumatic and can backfire. Resistance and resentment build up among leaders and followers of the old regime who are losing power, benefits, and possibly more, as a consequence of the change. Resistance is greater and more effective if the regime is still in place, and has in fact been working to introduce, and by the same token to contain, changes designed to reabsorb a crisis.

The second theme is that, even if democracy were to emerge at first, the trauma of its birth will be reflected on its legitimacy and performance. Democracy is about rules for mediating plural and conflicting interests. But when democracy is introduced abruptly

and at the sufferance of some of the players, it can hardly work as it should: the losers will resist it and the winners, lacking tested democratic organizations and personal experience, will not be fully at ease with the effective use of its methods. Thus, consolidation is in question, and backsliding is an impending threat.

The third and overarching theme is that, historically, the best, yet no longer available, path to democracy has been both slow and tied to the emergence over time of fitting socioeconomic and cultural conditions.⁴⁵ The canonical conditions are economic prosperity and equality; a diversified, yet not pillarized, social structure in which non-dependent middle classes occupy center stage; a national culture that, by its tolerance of diversity and penchant toward accommodation, is already implicitly attuned to the democratic method. Accelerated transitions unavoidably violate the recipe: because they are fast and because their occurrence responds to political contingencies that may have little to do with the self-propelling emergence of those fitting conditions.

Given these classical themes about democratization, an attitude of extreme caution, of pessimism itself, would seem quite in order when confronted with the type of willful, politically driven, transitions which we have been witnessing since the seventies. In the case of Eastern Europe, the first theme predicts the effective resistance of the *nomenklaturas* to being dispossessed. The second theme predicts that aspiring democrats without democratic traditions will confront communist incumbents who ignore what sharing power means. The third theme predicts that the conditions which best fit democracy do not exist. In fact, in the immediate but decisive future, Eastern European transitions are likely to undermine economic viability as well as equality and to activate at the same time premodern national and ethnic cleavages.

Pessimism is hardened by the vociferousness, the uncertainty, the contentious issue agendas, that regularly accompany recent transitions. Yet, why should we be taken aback by contentiousness? Why should we fear it? Why should we expect the worse from it? Per se, is contentiousness not the fitting ingredient of any newly emerging, naturally open, political game? Are the three themes all there is to be said about the prospects for democratization? Or, granted that our transitions are marked by contentiousness, is it not more interesting to ask how transitions can nevertheless succeed -- and be made to succeed?⁴⁶ For, as we know, many of them, outside of Eastern Europe, have already succeeded.

As Gregory Freidin puts it in the sentence I have placed at the head of the paper, "This should be a good time for designing historical paradigms that are oriented to the future, not the past." Freidin was aptly reflecting on pessimistic assessments of political prospects in the Soviet Union. I have no ambitions to produce new paradigms. But the litany above, of everything that

can go wrong, and occasionally goes wrong, with transitions and their aftermath, strikes me at times as a rosary of conventional proverbs -- each bead a concentrate of unquestioned wisdom. The fact is that proverbs have their opposite: is it, for instance, "out of sight out of mind," or is it that "absence makes the heart grow fonder"?

Let me offer, to conclude, a counterlitany for Eastern Europe, assembled from the experience of successful transitions elsewhere. The beads are not arranged in logical sequence, but blend, as they do in a rosary, into each other.⁴⁷ The thrust of the argument is that democracy can emerge from a regime crisis as a simple matter of convenience or compulsion. In the process, political actors can learn to remove objective and contingent impediments, as well as motives of personal resistance. Especially favorable conditions are not required.

1. Genuine democrats need not precede democracy. Democracy's rules, being a means for otherwise difficult mutual coexistence, may come to be embraced as simply an expedient second best. They can be a matter of instrumental agreement worked out, even in the absence of a popular or elite consensus on fundamentals, as the transition unfolds.⁴⁸ In some cases, as Albert Hirschman has amply illustrated in many of his works on political development, new attitudes and beliefs may well develop **after** political actors trespass, intentionally or not, into new behavior (by calling, for instance, for more or less free elections). The function is to remove dissonance between old attitudes and new behavior.⁴⁹ Also, opting for democracy can be a relative choice. Often we choose it because other regime options are foreclosed or finally discredited, not necessarily because we consider it inherently superior.

If these considerations have any virtue, one of the grounds on which we question the prospects of democratization in Eastern Europe is less than solid. If in fact Eastern European regimes have lost not just temporary clout and credibility, as authoritarian regimes in the West often do, but the very will to rule, if they are (*pace* Djilas) committing suicide, then the question of what motivates incumbents (and opponents) to move toward democracy, though interesting per se, loses decisiveness. Whether prompted by conversion, calculation, or necessity, the behavioral results may be similar.

2. The lack of familiarity with the working of democratic rules and institutions is no hindrance either. In the same way in which new behavior can modify beliefs and attitudes, so also behavioral skills can be learned with practice. How much practice? On the historical example of democracies that slowly emerged from liberal oligarchy, democratic theory emphasizes the virtues of prolonged, even generational, socialization. Yet I am impressed by the rapidity and eagerness with which political actors seem to be learning the ropes of the democratic game in recent transitions.

Just as civil society shows amazing capacities to reorganize itself, after years of constant repression, so also political actors seem quite capable of picking up in a short time new habits and practices. Nor is there anything particularly surprising about it.

The opposite would rather strike me as surprising. Since democracies have been around long enough, since the examples of how to succeed or how to fail are abundant, and since there is an investment in succeeding, any ambitious political actor that does not want to be left behind must be a quick-study.⁵⁰ Democratic Spain is the best example of effective learning, but not the only one. If Spain, why not Eastern Europe? In point of fact, we already know that Spain has been taken as a significant example in Eastern Europe. Nor should we overlook the fact that, committed as they are to the removal of all communist residues, Eastern Europeans have shown an equally forthcoming commitment to the reconstitution of a diverse and tolerant community.

It may be argued that such laudable desire is put in jeopardy by the excessive fragmentation, the "alphabet soup," of emerging political parties and civic groups. But I consider this a red herring. The phenomenon is common to most democratic transitions. Whether or not they temporarily coalesce in some oppositional front, all sorts of formations are tempted to try their luck the first elections around. But most contestants quickly disappear into oblivion. The practice of elections -- even when proportional representation pure and simple is adopted -- has something to teach about the economies of political party scale.

3. If aspiring democrats can learn the ropes, so also incumbents can change their tune -- and be rewarded for it (Krygier: since indecency did not work, decency may become advantageous and habit-forming). Vested institutional interests, such as the interest incumbents have in their own incumbency, are not thereby immutable. What makes regime transitions different is that "normal social science methodology," as O'Donnell and Schmitter call it, -- i.e., reliance on enduring group interests, structures, and values to predict behavior -- is no longer useful.⁵¹ In the destructured context of transitions, those predictors may cease to work as tried channels and constraints. Interest perceptions tend to shift, class alliances may be suspended, institutional identities may lose their appeal, cultural values may no longer instruct. In particular, the behavior of incumbents becomes contingent, for all but the most hardened among them, upon shifting perceptions of costs, success, and the behavior of others.

Once again, it matters little in this perspective why incumbents modify their behavior. If nothing else convinces them to change, because -- as with communism -- the regime is especially resilient and goal-oriented, then a stalemate, material and political costs that far exceed returns, a fall of goals and

therefore of will, may all convince them. As I described it, this seems to be the case of Eastern Europe.

4. Incumbents who modify their behavior in response to the predicaments I just described may not wish democracy, yet they may back into it. They may believe that measures of liberalization will suffice, but may discover what Tocqueville had discovered: that regimes are in greatest danger precisely when they begin to relax their grip. Otherwise said, liberalization may create impermanent half-way houses with no apparent solution to those predicaments. The need for further reforms may become more compelling. They may be initiated either by the same incumbents or by other incumbents with more innovative dispositions. Thus, what starts as an effort by the old regime to rescue itself may take an unintended and quite different direction.

Because Eastern European regimes have suffered not just a stalemate but a more devastating fall of goals and will, the scenario may fit quite well the region.

5. The more the reforms inch toward democratization, the more a bandwagon effect may be created. If at the beginning more conservative (less risk-prone) members of the regime may be reluctant to join in, later they may find it less and less convenient to stay out. Therefore, if forcing a retrenchment from liberalization may still be an option when, early on, liberalization proves itself insufficient to rescue the regime, the option becomes more costly and less likely as reforms mount. The bandwagon effect may be created in part by the rewards of joining and the disincentives of isolation, in part by the lack of acceptable and workable conservative alternatives.

The availability of clear conservative alternatives seems to me to be absolutely essential for those who wish to arrest democratization and its bandwagon effects. Without them, the risk of failing, and being left out of what may emerge as the only game in town, may prove excessive. Without them, we may witness the phenomenon -- in some ways quite useful to reformers trying to implicate their right in their reforms -- of regime hard-liners who grumble and denounce reforms, but end up by voting for them. It has happened when the Spanish Cortes approved the **Ley de Reforma Politica** in 1976. It is now happening in Eastern Europe and, most clearly and most tellingly, in the Soviet Union.

6. It follows from this that the fear of backlashes as democratization proceeds has been exaggerated. For instance, we are often impressed by the record of military countercoups. The fact is that the "record" does not take into account non-events: cases where the military complies with reforms, cases where threats of a coup are not carried out, and cases where coups fail.⁵² Such non-events often go unobserved or fail to impress us. When backlashes become risky and chancy, a point of no return may be

reached past which hard-liners, foot-draggers, and nostalgics may prefer to deal with their discontent through the political channels that democratization is opening up; hence, within the logic of the newly emerging game. In Hirschman's terminology, voice may replace exit. Almost regularly and unsurprisingly, the venting of voice will create an apparent climate of instability and irresoluteness. But we should be able to separate impression from substance.

In view of the spirit of abdication of communist regimes, in view of the apparent unavailability of the Eastern European military for coup activities, and in view of much else that I have argued above, it seems to me that -- save for Romania -- the point of no return to which I just referred is close at hand in the rest of Eastern Europe.

7. If hard-liners and discontents attempt a backlash or coup, they may, to be sure, unleash -- in a scenario that attracts most attention -- a spiral of popular resistance and violence pushing reformers to waffle and backslide, and upsetting peaceful reforms. But the attempt may also rally the people to the cause of reforms and strengthen the resolve of reformers -- the more so the more, as in the attempted 1981 coup in Spain, democratization is well advanced. Which is which?

Once again, and with the exception of Romania, civil society in Eastern Europe is too central and at the same time too adamant about its wish to rebuild in peace its political communities to embark, even assuming the danger of a backlash, on the first scenario.

8. Extreme discontent about precarious economic conditions, possibly brought about by democratization, is not sufficient reason for people to turn against democratization. Support for democratization is also based on appreciation for democracy as a civic/political conquest: as a method, as the way to reconstitute a diverse political community. Between the two wars, when democracy as a method was most seriously challenged by totalitarian models, displeasure with democracy was not necessarily higher where material performance was objectively poorer but where alternative totalitarian models had made, for other reasons, a greater inroad. By the same token, when democracy is on the rebound, as it is nowadays, and no other significant models are offered, democratic legitimacy should not be a mere reflection of what democracy can materially deliver. Research on Spain in the late seventies and early eighties shows that while confidence with economic performance fell over the years, support for the new democracy was not affected by it.⁵³

In Eastern Europe, where the people took to the streets not to ask for more bread but to ask for political dignity, the prospects of democracy should not be linked simply to material performance. Besides, as I argued at the end of the previous

section, the material performance of communism was so offensive to its people, that it makes the notion of a return, by popular demand, to communism's impoverished "social contract" difficult to believe.

9. Finally, successful democratic transitions in the past show that, after some proper weeding out and recycling (often less than one may morally wish), the same state apparatuses that served the dictatorships can serve most often democracy as well.⁵⁴ Recycling may be more or less demanding and successful, depending on the type of dictatorship and the place occupied by the apparatus in it. Communist apparatuses present obvious and strong difficulties of their own. But once other options narrow, as they narrow in the litany I just recited, employment under democracy is not a bad trade-off for renouncing darker aspirations. "Recycle or Die" may be the bottom line.⁵⁵

CONCLUSIONS

An excessively long paper deserves excessively short conclusions. To stretch the argument at this point would take me into life after the transitions -- not exactly a subject for parsimonious treatment. I will therefore conclude on a note about life beyond transitions that restates some of the immediately preceding points.

Life for would-be Eastern European democracies will not be easy. Nothing I have said above authorizes to conclude otherwise. Hirschman himself warns that when political actors trespass, even intentionally, into new but unchartered behavior, before consonant attitudes stimulated by that behavior develop, the path to political development "will be more halting and circuitous", tensions between old and new attitudes may well persist, and the "development profile and experience cannot but bear the marks" of the path that was followed.⁵⁶ The reader can adapt Hirschman's abstract language to the flesh and bones of Eastern Europe today.

Yet, the example of transitions that preceded those in Eastern Europe suggests that any assessment of how threateningly difficult democratic life will be must be tempered by at least one fact. Once the search for a democratic agreement is under way, and the more so once a democratic agreement takes shape and credit, a turning point is reached such as to alter the calculus that political actors who are still reluctant toward democracy make: it becomes increasingly difficult to resist democracy; increasingly advantageous to resist, if at all, within democracy. To restate my argument, voice tends to replace exit. The latter threatens democracy, the former challenges it. Eastern Europe may be approaching that turning point. After all, reaching it does not require prolonged socialization.

ENDNOTES

1. Gregory Freidin, "But is This Z End?" (Mimeo, Stanford University, January 1990).
2. **To Craft Democracies: Reflections on Democratic Transitions and Beyond** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
3. As Timothy Garton Ash put it to Václav Havel: "In Poland it took ten years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks: perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take ten days!" ("The Revolution of the Magic Lantern," **The New York Review of Books**, January 18, 1990). Naturally, as Garton Ash himself recollects, the quip became a public slogan, with possibly something of the self-fulfilling prophecy to it.
4. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," **Commentary**, 68 (November, 1979), pp. 34-46.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" **Political Science Quarterly**, 99 (Summer, 1984), p. 217.
6. In truth, the implications that these features have for authoritarian crises have become clearer after the wave of such crises that started in the midseventies. We may be undergoing the same learning experience with communist crises.
7. There is no doubt that liberalization is often meant to be self-serving. A different matter is whether it works that way, whether it can in fact save a regime, whether it can be contained before it opens the door to much more radical change. On the self-serving nature of liberalization, in contrast with democratization, Aleksandr Gelman, a member of the Soviet cinematographers' organization, writes colorfully: "Democratization provides for the redistribution of power, rights, and freedoms, the creation of a number of independent structures of management and information. And liberalization is the conservation of all the foundations of the administrative system but in a milder form. Liberalization is an unclenched fist, but the hand is the same and at any moment it could be clenched again into a fist. Only outwardly is liberalization sometimes reminiscent of democratization, but in actual fact it is a fundamental and intolerable usurpation." Cited in Zbigniew Brzezinski, **The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century** (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), pp. 45-46.
8. For criticisms, along these lines, of model-building in communist studies see Jerry F. Hough, **The Soviet Union and**

- Social Science Theory** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), chap. 11.
9. A distinction is often drawn between Eastern and East Central Europe, often bearing on the implantation of Leninism on two different historical, cultural, and politico-institutional contexts. See for example Mihály Vajda, "East-Central European Perspectives," in John Keane, ed., **Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives** (London & New York: Verso, 1988).
 10. The importance of international referents and the way they have changed are underscored in Andrew Janos, "Social Theory and the Dynamics of Political Change in Communist Societies," (working paper, University of California, Berkeley, August 1989). Janos derives from the changes implications for communist transformations more guarded than mine, and with different emphases.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
 12. The best example is the repression of Prague's Spring, for attempting to go beyond tactical domestic and global shifts.
 13. The fall of Khrushchev can be understood in this light, as the price for threatening, by the personalistic improvisations of his reforms, the status and influence of Soviet **nomenklaturas** -- at a time when status and influence were at their peak.
 14. On the social contract and its limits see George Breslauer, "On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare State Authoritarianism," in Karl V. Riavec, ed., **Soviet Society and the Communist Party** (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978); Walter D. Conner, "Workers, Politics, and Class Consciousness," in Aracadius Kahan and Blair Ruble, eds., **Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R.** (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979).
 15. I will return, with a more trenchant eye, to these points, and to the function of the "social contract," later in the paper.
 16. Gianfranco Poggi, **The State: Nature, Development, Prospects** (Cambridge: Polity Press, forthcoming), chap. 9. pp. 26-27. Emphases in the text.
 17. Interview published in the Italian daily **La Repubblica**, August 25, 1989. Emphasis supplied.
 18. Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," **Comparative Politics**, 2 (April, 1970), pp. 337-63.

19. Jeane Kirkpatrick herself put the change to convenient use. In the same oped page in which, ironically, one article took her to task for having prematurely announced in 1979 that communism cannot change, Kirkpatrick argues in another article that, abandoned by the Soviet Union, the regimes of Eastern Europe have "died of a broken heart and spirit." Indeed, to the author nothing else is necessary to explain what happened: born as soulless client states, armed only with Moscow's iron fist, the regimes of Eastern Europe were killed by their birth defect. See Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Enough to Break an Old Bolshevik's Heart," **San Francisco Chronicle**, January 10, 1989.
20. See a treatment of this aspect in Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., **Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives** (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), especially pp. 10-19.
21. In **To Craft Democracies** I prefer to focus on what I consider to be the decisive role of domestic strategies by regime and opposition elites.
22. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *op. cit.*.
23. Robert A. Dahl, **Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition** (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 40-47; Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-14; Alfred Stepan, "Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in O'Donnell, et als., *op. cit.*, pp. 64-84; Enrique A. Baloyra, ed., **Comparing New Democracies** (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 9-52; Leonardo Morlino, "Democratic Establishments," *Ibid.*, pp. 53-78.
24. One important unpublished contribution is Elemer Hankiss, **East European Alternatives: Are There Any?** (Budapest: Institute of Social Sciences, 1988). See also by the same author "The 'Second Society': Is There an Alternative Social Model Emerging in Contemporary Hungary?" **Social Research**, Vol. 55, Nos. 1-2 (Spring/Summer, 1988), pp. 15-42.
25. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, **Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions** (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), chap. 5. See also Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the Fruitful Convergences of Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty and Shifting Involvements: Reflections from the Recent Argentine Experience," in Alejandro Foxley et als., eds., **Development, Democracy, and the Art of Trespassing: Essays in Honor of Albert O. Hirschman** (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 249-68.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
27. Remarkably, popular support for authoritarian parties is scant wherever transitions succeed. We should not be misled by the ability of authoritarian movements to rally imposing crowds, as they have been able to do in Spain, to commemorate dead dictators and historical events of the past. Symbolic attendance, the comradely basking in a mythical and mystical past, the resurrection of martial rituals and paraphernalia, may have psychological more than political significance. Thus I wonder how many of those who attend such communal affairs vote for the master of ceremony. Once the past is on its way out, nostalgia, while offering those who harbor it a psychological cushion softening their desertion, may well prove a less than forceful guide to significant political behavior. Evidence that attitudes toward the authoritarian regime are not a reliable guide to political behavior under democracy is provided for Spain by Peter McDonough, Samuel H. Barnes, and Antonio López Pina, "The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain," *American Political Science Review*, 80 (September, 1986), pp. 735-60.
28. Timothy Garton Ash, "Eastern Europe; the Year of Truth," *New York Review of Books*, February 15, 1990, p. 18.
29. Cited *Ibid.*, p. 18.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
32. Andrew Janos suggests that, while communist (and Nazi) regimes sought a global alternative goal to existing international inequality, fascism sought nationalist development. Andrew Janos, *Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986) pp. 97-102. It might also be argued that in Italy the catharsis was achieved by the armed resistance against fascism between 1943 and 1945.
33. Poggi, *op. cit.*, chap. 9, p. 22.
34. Kenneth Jowitt, "Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime," *Soviet Studies*, 35 (July, 1983), pp. 275-97.
35. Kenneth Jowitt, "Gorbachev: Bolshevik or Menshevik?" (mimeo, University of California, Berkeley, October 1989).
36. Jowitt, "Soviet Neotraditionalism..," *cit.*, p. 284.

37. Jowitt, "Gorbachev..," *cit.*, p. 11. Emphasis in the text.
38. A sophisticated conceptual treatment of the phenomenon, which analyzes its implications for a new class domination in communist societies, is offered by Victor V. Magagna, "Consumers of Privilege: A Political Analysis of Class, Consumption & Socialism," *Polity* (Spring/Summer, 1989), pp. 30-41.
39. For an experiential account of survival in the second market see Martin Krygier, "Poland: Life in an Abnormal Country," *The National Interest* (Winter 1989/90), pp. 55-64.
40. Magagna, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
41. Vilfredo Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites* (Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1968), p.59.
42. Jowitt, "Gorbachev," *cit.*, p. 10.
43. For the emergence of such changes in the Soviet Union itself see Gail W. Lapidus, "State and Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in the Soviet Union," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., *Politics, Society and Nationality: Inside Gorbachev's Russia* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1989).
44. Krygier, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
45. The best analysis of paths and conditions is in Dahl, *op. cit.*. See also their treatment, in reference to contemporary prospects for democratization, by Huntington, *op. cit.*.
46. Writing about third world countries, Myron Weiner comments: "It ill serves the cause of democracy...for countries to be told that their growth rates are too low, their middle class not large enough, their political culture inappropriate for democracy... Perhaps it is time to recognize that democratic theory, with its list of conditions and prerequisites, is a poor guide to action..." in Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory and the Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy," *PS*, 20 (Fall, 1987), pp. 862-63.
47. See a more systematic treatment in my *To Craft Democracies*, *passim*.
48. Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 362.
49. Albert O. Hirschman, *A Bias for Hope* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 321-25. In fact, removing dissonance and adopting attitudes in keeping with democratic behavior is not even necessary. Research on Spain shows that Spaniards who sympathize for the Franco regime are not

necessarily adverse to the new democracy. Spaniards judge the two regimes as distinct experiences, and on the basis of different orientations and expectations about government. See Peter McDonough, Samuel H. Barnes, and Antonio López Pina, *The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain*, *op. cit.*.

50. A particularly sophisticated example is actually offered by a communist leader. The same Polish leader whose interview I quoted before also answered a question about future relations between his parliamentary group and his party's central committee as follows: "We do not want to impose ourselves upon the central committee, but we wish to be a pulling force, not just executors. Similarly to Western parties, our members of parliament must be better represented in the central committee and the political bureau. A fusion between central committee and parliamentary group is not ruled out." *La Repubblica*, *op. cit.*.
51. O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions*, *cit.*, chap. 1.
52. On the accommodation of military regimes to democracy see Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
53. McDonough, Barnes, López Pina, *op. cit.*.
54. See again on this point Stepan, *op. cit.*.
55. Freidin, *op. cit.*.
56. Hirschman, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

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