

**BETWEEN STATE and MARKET:
Changing Agriculture in Postcommunist Poland**

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The paper deals with the problems of changes in Polish agriculture under current conditions. These conditions include the legacy of the communist period (agrarian structure as well as patterns of activity among farmers), the new pro-market agricultural policy, and the need for privatization of former large state farms. However, the transformation of the largest part of Polish agriculture, that is, about two million relatively small family farms, seems to be the key problem now. The author tries to analyze some stimulants and barriers to the process of change, as well as some options for the future. These options include: the so-called "farmerization path," the "fossilization solution," and the "third way."

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'During communism there was no freedom, but there were cheap credits'

A Polish farmer interviewed during the hunger strike in 1991.

Is private ownership a wonder cure for everything ?

Observers and commentators on the changes presently taking place in East Central Europe agree on the fact that the most important element of these changes is the transformation of ownership in the economy. In other words, the key to the success of the changes underway, is the move from an economy based primarily on state ownership to an economy based on private property. This transformation in ownership is treated as an essential or basic condition for a whole range of other changes which should take place in the economies and political systems of these countries. An economy based on private ownership is essential for the creation of a commodity market capital and services, as well as the attraction of foreign interest and capital. These transformations

in the economy are also expected to form the basis of a stable democratic system based mainly on a newly formed middle class.

These processes have reached different stages in various countries. The level of progress in Poland is a favourite subject of political discussion for groups in opposition to successive governments. It is argued that these governments are responsible for the slow advance of privatisation in Poland which is lagging behind similar changes in Czecho-slovakia , Hungary, and, of course, the ex-German Democratic Republic. An accurate answer to this problem would necessitate a detailed analysis of the privatisation plans in each country of the former Soviet bloc and of the real level of their advancement. This is not however the subject of this paper.

Nevertheless it is worth mentioning that regardless of political discussions, the role of the private sector in the Polish economy is growing. This is particularly true of trade. In internal trade, private companies are already responsible for 80% of volume, in 1990 employing over 80% of persons working in this field. The participation of the private sector in international trade is also developing fast. In 1991, 20% of Polish exports were sold through private firms (in 1990 only 5%), while for imports these figures are 46% and 14.4% respectively.

The participation of the private sector in industry and construction is also growing, although not as fast. In 1990 the private sector employed 31.2% and 41.2% respectively of the total number of persons working in industry and construction businesses. This sector also includes the largest number of enormous factories linked with traditional heavy industry. During the communist period these factories were considered exemplary products of the new

system and according to communist doctrine were a legitimacy of the power of the ruling party. Production has been falling in these factories for at least the last few years due to recession, most are in debt and fighting for survival.

With this background, it is worth considering the situation in Polish agriculture. If the above mentioned idea of the fundamental importance of private ownership for the changes taking place is accepted, then it can be said that in Polish agriculture these conditions are already fulfilled. 75% of cultivable land in Poland is in private hands. In 1990, almost 90% of persons employed in agriculture were employed in the private sector. Within the former Soviet bloc countries the situation of Polish agriculture is unique. It is an unusual inheritance from the communist period during which the direct collectivisation of peasant farms in the 1940's and 1950's, and the later attempts called 'socialist transformation of agriculture' did not work (Gorlach 1989).

Agricultural economists, when describing the starting point of the agriculture of the countries of East Central Europe in relation to the changes presently taking place, generally point out its disadvantages in relation to Western Europe or North America. Five basic disadvantages can be described (Duczowska- Piasecka 1991: 127): high costs of production, low productivity, obsolete technology and production methods, the lack of integral links within agriculture itself as also with other sectors of the economy and finally the large percentage of the labour force employed in agriculture. Let us look more closely at this last point (see appendix, table 1).

This table alone shows the state of Polish agriculture. Poland is similar to the European countries of Greece and Rumania. All

countries of the former Soviet bloc except Rumania show a lower percentage of employment in agriculture. At the same time, agriculture in all these countries produced on average 3 to 4 times more national income employing, on average, 4 to 8 times more labour force comparing to Western countries, which demonstrates its low productivity. In addition, this agriculture is 3 to 4 times less mechanized (Duczowska-Piasecka 1991: 130-131). In spite of such general characteristics, agriculture in the East Central European countries remained diverse. Agriculture in Czechoslovakia, Hungary or East Germany, due to its economic characteristics (level of mechanization, productivity, etc.) was superior to agriculture in Bulgaria or Rumania. At the same time government subsidies were a basic method of supporting agriculture in all these countries. Production was subsidized (for example subsidies on the price of machinery, chemicals, etc., which resulted in their being artificially lowered), as were the results of production (the repayment of losses sustained by state farms as an effect of unprofitable production), as was consumption (state subsidies of food prices intended to prevent increases). An important element of reforms implemented in individual countries is the withdrawal of these subsidies, which inevitably produced sharp price rises and inflation, in this way raising the social costs of the economic reforms.

Factors which will determine the future structure of agriculture in the former Soviet bloc countries can be divided into two groups. The first includes the elements which go to form a market economy, that is what all these countries, according to their declarations, are aiming for. These include: autonomy of decision making of economic units, the existence of a market for goods and

services as well as capital based on the laws of demand and supply, competition and the elimination of inefficient units. The responsibility of owners for their own decisions they make is also an important factor. The second group includes elements linked with the situation in which the above mentioned countries find themselves at present. This includes the general economic situation, the level of social support for the changes being implemented, the educational level in the ways of a market economy (Duczowska-Piasecka 1991), and finally the important heritage of experience, customs and habits contributed by societies which spent the last decades within the logic of the communist system (Sztompka 1991, Mokrzycki 1992).

Referring to the future of agriculture in the countries of East Central Europe, the most important problem for the sociologist is the issue of the emergence of new forms of ownership in this sector of economy. Will the collectivised agriculture in these countries be privatized? Will agricultural workers be interested in taking over ownership of the land? How far will these processes go and how long will they take? Is the prospect of agriculture based on private or family farms practicable for all the countries in this part of Europe?

This problem however does not concern Poland. Poland, as it were, has already 'passed' the stage of transformation to private ownership because of its unsuccessful collectivisation in the Stalinist period. As a result of this however, other questions arise. Is private farming structured in such a way really an opportunity to follow in the footsteps of West European countries? In this process must the farms of 'the last peasants in Europe' - to use the phrase by M. Halamska (1991b) - undergo a basic

transformation ? What should be done with the relatively small (as compared to other countries of former Soviet bloc) state owned sector ? All these questions require a closer look at the characteristics of private farming in Poland. An analysis of its situation may show that in spite of enthusiasts for the present changes, private ownership in this part of Europe may be not a wonder cure for everything.

The Postcommunist Family Farm: Stimulant or Barrier to Change ?

In order to isolate and explain the main characteristics of peasant farming within the socialist economic system in Poland, some authors referred to the so-called 'subsumption' theory. Others emphasized the adaptable yet also active attitude of the peasants. This complicated situation made possible the formulation of generalizations which reflected both the importance of this kind of work and the importance of the achievement of the peasants as a social category. They were expressed in statements emphasizing that: "(...) the determined struggle of the peasants to survive, as also the weakness of collective forms of agriculture enabled the peasants to force through greater changes in the socialist economic system than other social groups" (Wilkin 1988: 8). Attention was also paid to such basic facts as that: "(...) these farms (peasant farms - K.G.) not only had to share their profits with society in the form of direct taxes, and even indirect ones, buying various products from the State for prices relatively higher than those of agricultural products" (Tomczak 1988: 43).

On the other hand these analyses did not ignore the weaknesses of peasant farming, pointing out for example that: "(...) not the

strength of peasant agriculture, but the weakness of the collectivized economy was the main reason for the survival of such a large private sector in Polish economy" (Wilkin 1988: 27). Often emphasizing mistakes in agricultural policy, it was also inevitable that situations like the following should be noticed: "By interfering in the process of rational competition in agriculture, state agricultural policy encourages the survival of large, visibly stagnant farms which only exist thanks to subsidies, and moreover causes the reproduction of inefficient farms" (Adamski, Turski 1989: 69).

At the present time therefore, it becomes particularly pertinent to ask to what extent these remnants of state socialism, not only in the psychological sphere but also in objective factors will be a handicap or a stimulant in the survival of family farms in Poland in the new socio-economic order.

A basic characteristic is the spatial size of the farm. Generalising, this is an issue of the agrarian structure of Polish family farming. The last four decades resulted in a lack of concentration of land in family farms at a level comparable with many Western countries. This, in turn, resulted in the "medialisation" of family farming in Poland. In spite of conditions which could have encouraged the improving of agrarian structure; such as the migration of millions of peasants to the towns, the parcelling out of land during the agrarian reform in 1944 and 1945, the possession of land reserves by the State (Land Fund), the natural closing down of farms and the increasing number of farms without heirs; changes in agrarian structure were too slow and uneven in different regions. In spite of various positive changes, such as the slow increasing number of farms of ten hectares or more (large

family farms in Poland), and the increase of general land area covered by this type of farm, there have not been any fundamental changes in agrarian structure (see: appendix, tables 2 and 3).

In awareness and the motivation to produce, this has undoubtedly resulted in the entrenchment of the habit of thinking in terms of farms only a few hectares, usually producing diversified produce. According to sociological research in the previous period, the favoured size of farms usually reflected the existing agrarian structure of the given region or even the local community. Peasants usually expressed acceptance of the size of their farm, only complaining about its fragmentation (Adamski 1974: 189-192; Kocik 1986: 51). The entrenched idea of farming on an area of only a few hectares may be a barrier in a situation where objective opportunities are increasing for the creation and functioning of larger and specialised farms and in which economy of scale becomes a more important factor.

Turning to the analysis of mechanisation, let me concentrate again on those consequences which primarily interest the sociologist, bearing in mind the low average technical equipment of family farms in Poland. The gaps in supply of these kind of goods, typical of state socialism, resulted in two different patterns of behaviour. On the one hand they encouraged various types of informal links with local administrative institutions with the aim of acquiring the possibility of purchasing a certain kind of machine or mechanism needed on the farm (Adamski 1968; Nagengast 1991). The bureaucratic 'nationalised' economic institutions which displaced the social cooperative movement based on pre-war traditions, encouraged the growth of "(...) attitudes of 'individualistic' socialism - the building of favourable relations for oneself with

the agricultural service sector within the system of command economy" (Banaszkiewicz 1988: 207). On the other hand, they aroused a so-called 'psychosis of possession' sometimes unjustified by the real needs of the farm. This phenomenon was one example of a general attitude easily noticeable in the typical socialist 'economy of shortage'. This tendency could be observed in enormous workshops with store rooms filled with goods and in homes with stuffed refrigerators and larders. Moreover the inefficiency of the state agricultural services system strengthened this tendency, forcing attempts at self-sufficiency in the technical equipment of farms. These attempts were often justified by the limited access to services, especially during periods of increased fieldwork, by the low quality of services and also by attempts to maintain the technical and organizational rhythm of production. Nevertheless, in many cases, neither the size of the farm nor the level and type of production provided rational grounds for the maintenance of these trends towards the technical self-sufficiency of peasant farms (Kocik and Serega 1985: 45-47, 78).

In order to take a closer look at this question let me first compare the amount of arable land per tractor in Poland with figures for some other countries (see: appendix, table 4). Referring to the data in the table 4, it can be said that the relative number of tractors on Polish farms is comparable to that in the most advanced countries of Western Europe. More detailed information on the subject of the mechanisation of Polish farms is provided by the research of Maria Halamska (1991a: 159-160). The following are some of her more important finds. The mechanical power of Polish family farms is on average even higher than that of West European farms. This is the result of on the one hand the

small average size of Polish family farms, and on the other hand of the power of the tractors which results in their inefficient use. In Poland the tractor is still used mainly as transport, whereas in Western countries it is used almost exclusively for fieldwork. Moreover most Polish farms are not equipped with complementary machinery. The tractor is therefore a peculiar symbol of the status of an independent farm, taking over the role once fulfilled by the horse. It is worth adding that these tractors are usually of poor quality. As Halamska writes: "In Poland the coefficient of tractor breakdowns is undoubtedly the highest" (1991a: 160). The same can be said of combine harvesters.

In the present situation where the problem of limiting demand has arisen, these habits can lead to a situation in which tendencies opposing new economic solutions are strengthened. Moreover the tendency towards 'mechanical self-sufficiency' on individual farms has caused the relative weakening or disappearance of all collective forms of ownership of the means of production, which work so well today in, for example, French or Scandinavian farming. It is an unusual paradox that this occurred within a system which according to its doctrine, should have strengthened such collectivist tendencies and customs. As a result there is a situation where the machines used by the farmer are generally his or her own. On the farms investigated by Halamska (1991a: 160), only one in five had shared ownership of agricultural machinery, whereas in France, for example, this situation occurs in 80% of farms investigated.

Moving on to a discussion of the internal mechanisms of the family farm and the socio-economic characteristics resulting from this type of organisation, I consider that they can be expressed as

three, analytically separated forms of unity: 1/ The unity of conceptual, managerial and practical work. 2/ The unity of productive activity and way of life. 3/ The unity of productive and consumer functions (unity of farm and household).

Turning to the first characteristic, it can be stated that it forms the basis for a feeling of independence, of "being one's own boss", or even for a feeling of social agency on the part of farm owners (Gorlach and Seręga 1991). Because notwithstanding the real level of independence in the face of the institutional, economic and political system which interfered to a greater or lesser extent in the activities of the family farm, this characteristic a cultural value was undoubtedly an important element in the identity of individual farmers. It can be argued that in a socialized economy with administrative and political pressures on social and economic life, "being one's own boss" was most often defined as being independent of the "authorities", and of the whole state system. Today, in a situation of increasing economic pressure and the rules of a free market economy, this independence can transform its meaning and "being one's own boss" means forcible adaptation to economic rules and personal responsibility in the face of this process.

The second characteristic is linked with the unity of productive work and the way of life of a family working on a farm. Usually authors analysing this problem emphasized the negative consequences of this state of affairs. "Analysis of the productive function shows that farming is still at the same time the way of life of a peasant family, which involves an exceptionally large number of duties and a very wide spectrum of activities. The difficulties which this state of affairs causes are decreased in an

obvious way by progress in the equipment and organization of services for farms" (Kocik 1986: 98). Further, the same author adds: "(...) comparisons with towns and the lifestyle of other occupational groups increases the conflict between aspirations and the way of life which is inevitable on a private farm" (Kocik 1986: 101). It can be added that the present entry of family farms into the market economy and the increasing pressure on production due to the high cost of the means of production, difficulties with sales, etc. can cause an even greater limitation on the realisation of aspirations and ambitions of a farming family. On the other hand, it should be remembered that recently there has been a re-evaluation on the part of rural inhabitants regarding life and work in a city. The problems of urban life such as the lack of housing or environmental problems have led to a lowering of these ambitions. This tendency has been strengthened after the introduction of the new economic system by the increasing unemployment in towns.

Turning to the third characteristic of family farms, the unity of the productive and consumer function, it is worth remembering that this unity can be a favourable mechanism easing the flexible adaptation to a changing market situation and making possible effective competitiveness with large industrial farms (Chayanov 1966). This mechanism worked in the same way in communist system, enabling family farms to adapt to unexpected changes. It could be argued that the continual insecurity of the future of family farms in the communist society, the tendency to invest profits outside of the farms or simply to consume them was strengthened. This tendency may be reversed in the present situation, where the causes of insecurity for the future of the farms are not political, administrative or legal, but simply economic. At least among some

farming families this situation may awaken initiative, encouraging saving and investment in farm production. It is worth remembering however, that agricultural policy may also have an opposite effect. Excessive economic difficulties may cause families to close in on themselves, limiting consumption and investment and possibly searching for other, non-agricultural sources of income. Such a strategy was well rehearsed during the communist period. Further, modern farms with clear specialisation, which reinvest large resources in agriculture, are particularly sensitive to state economic and financial policy.

The problems mentioned above have already risen sharply during the process of transformation of the Polish economic system. A number of farms which recently attempted to modernize found themselves in a debt trap. This debt trap resulted mainly from the sharp increase in interest rates, up to 50% and over in January 1990, which was a part of the battle with hyperinflation which was undertaken by the first non-communist government and has been well known as the so-called "Balcerowicz program". Some of these farms are still unable to repay these debts. Although this problem only affects more less 21 thousand family farms (only 1% of such farms in contemporary Poland), and banks have started to take possession of only 4000, (they are therefore threatened with liquidation and sale), this is nevertheless a particularly visible and dramatic moment in the modern history of Polish agriculture. Hunger strikes, road blockades and the occupation of the Ministry of Agriculture building in the spring and summer of 1990 year, demonstrate this.

The present condition of family farming shows the naive of many statements and declarations voiced toward the end of the communist period. According to these statements, family farms which

formed an enclave of free enterprise in the state controlled communist economy, were to become, under improved conditions the springboard of a capitalist market economy. It becomes apparent however, that the heritage with which these farms emerge from the communist economy may cause serious problems in the creation of new economic and social relations in Poland. The question therefore remains, to what extent farms that are accustomed to survival and not dynamic change, with a tendency towards irrational investment in mechanisation, and which often function in a part-time farming model; are capable of being a starting point in the construction of a new economic system for the whole society ?

What is the Future?: An Attempt at Sociological Prognosis

Organisational transformations and the process of changing the economic system have created a new challenge for Polish farmers. The elimination of state subsidies of the means of production, product and consumer goods has resulted in a sharp rise in prices. As a result the average Polish family has started to spend approximately 60% of its monthly income on food, while in some poorer segments this figure has risen to 80-90% (!). This has limited demand for various food products (eg. the consumption of milk and its by-products has fallen at the beginning of 1990 by 30%), which has resulted in agricultural producers (both family farmers and socialized sector) having problems with sales. Only those producers who are able to lower their costs sufficiently to offer competitive prices are able to sell the whole amount of agricultural produce. This explains why farmers were calling for

the formation of an Agricultural Market Agency, a State office for the purchase of surplus agricultural produce.

This issue is connected with the prices which farmers can get for their products. Due to the changes being introduced in the economic system there is an apparent surplus of food, resulting in low prices for agricultural commodities, which according to farmers do not ensure them sufficient income. Because of this there has been a struggle during the last three years on the part of political and trade organisations representing farmers to introduce guaranteed minimum prices for basic agricultural products, that is, milk, meat, grain etc. As a result of unprofitable relative prices, (high costs of production and low prices of products) agricultural production has declined in Poland over the last two years, causing a decrease in the growth of exports. The value of exports in 1991 was only 19% higher than in 1990. During the same period the value of food imports into Poland increased by 130%.

It is not surprising therefore that in this process of change farmers are seriously critical of the new situation (Galaj 1991: 29-34). Their attitude is strong criticism of the economic policy of successive postcommunist governments, for the following reasons: the unfavourable comparison between the prices of agricultural and industrial products, the high interest rates resulting in expensive credits (the best available charge 22%), imports of food from EEC countries, problems with exporting to EEC countries, the bankruptcy of former Soviet markets and the lack of demand for agricultural produce due to the limitation of domestic demands.

The situation in which Polish farms presently find themselves is a harsh test inherent in the change from command to market economy, and the opening up of the Polish economy to the European

and even world markets. I believe that three possible courses of development are possible here. The first I refer to as 'farmerization'. This involves minimal intervention by the State and maximum and uncompromising influence of market forces. Only those farms that most decrease their costs of production, increase their size and adapt production to market demand, will survive. According to economists, at this moment only more or less 10% (about 200 thousand) of family farms in Poland are capable of this. A 'farmerization' program would involve the abolition of a large proportion of the 2.1 million family farms which presently exist and a significant increase in the average size of the Polish family farms. This program would result in massive rural unemployment that could not be absorbed by a non-agricultural sector which is still in recession. This program is encouraged by institutions offering foreign aid to Polish agriculture, for example, loans from the World Bank or loans from the EEC through the so-called 'Agroline'. The idea of farmerization is linked with an intensive rebuilding of the whole rural infrastructure, especially the processing of agricultural produce and a banking or financial system for farmers (a banking system). This option arouses the greatest fears and protests of peasant organisations due to the high social cost for a large proportion of the Polish rural population.

A second possible course of development is sometimes referred to especially by critics of peasant organizations, as 'fossilization'. This would involve maximum intervention by the State in the protection of farms from market forces. Agricultural policy, in this case, becomes a part of state social policy towards even those running the smallest, most traditional and unprofitable farms. In this situation high costs are paid to avoid unemployment and mass

rural poverty which threatens in the case of the abolishment of unprofitable and uncompetitive farms.

A third, unusual possible scenario could be described as so-called 'ecological family farming'. This would involve limited intervention by the State in the transformation of agriculture so as to not allow excessive concentration of land ownership and the reduction of family farming to a relatively small number of commercial farms. In this situation, farms would cover less than 20 hectares and would not use fully industrial forms of production. They would compete with West European agriculture by the quality and not the quantity and the price of their products.

The transformation affects and will affect state farms as well as private ones. State owned land is now controlled by the Agricultural Property Agency. Of the 1100 such farms (Panstwowe Gospodarstwa Rolne) which exist in Poland, in 1990 60% of them covered at least 1000 hectares. The average area of a state farm in 1991 was over 3500 hectares. Approximately one third of these farms are threatened with bankruptcy, one third have serious financial problems which they cannot solve without State aid, and one third are operating in the free market system. Those farms which go bankrupt, will be put up to auction by the Agricultural Property Agency, while those which are better off will be contracted out to management teams. In this way they will participate in the economy in the same way as non-agricultural businesses.

It is highly probable that the actual development of agriculture in Poland will be in the direction of some kind of mixed model, in which different types of family farms will clearly dominate. Besides commercial family farms, there will probably be smaller ecological farms and small farms run by part-time farmers.

A number of the present state farms will remain, either as large industrial farms or as scientific agricultural centres subsidised by the State, where new techniques and technologies of production and new types of cultivation and husbandry will be tested. This, however, is a future issue. The present day mood of Polish farmers is best expressed by the quote which is the motto of the remarks presented in this paper.

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APPENDIX

Table 1: Labor force employed in agriculture

COUNTRY	YEAR	% OF TOTAL LABOR FORCE
POLAND.....	1988.....	27,8
German Dem. Rep....	1989.....	10,6
Hungary.....	1987.....	20,9
Soviet Union.....	1988.....	18,5
Rumania.....	1989.....	28,1
Czechoslovakia....	1980.....	13,1
Bulgaria.....	1985.....	16,5
Greece.....	1988.....	24,6
Spain.....	1989.....	12,3
Italy.....	1987.....	9,1
Austria.....	1988.....	7,9
France.....	1987.....	6,7
Fed.Rep.of Germany.	1987.....	4,8
Denmark.....	1986.....	5,7
Holland.....	1989.....	4,3
Japan.....	1989.....	7,4
United Kingdom....	1987.....	2,1
Canada.....	1987.....	4,9
U.S.A.....	1989.....	2,9

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1991, Warszawa: Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych, p. 500, tab. 13(711)

Table 2: Family farms in Poland according to size

YEAR	FARMS (thousands)	SMALL (%)	MIDDLE (%)	LARGE (%)
1980.....	2390.....	55,7.....	30,0.....	14,3
1990.....	2138.....	52,8.....	29,8.....	17,4

SMALL - 1.0 - 4.99 ha
MIDDLE - 5.0 - 9.99 ha
LARGE - 10.0 and more ha

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1991, Warszawa: Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych, p. 323, tab. 6(419)

Table 3: Farms in size categories (as % of all farms)

COUNTRY	YEAR	SIZE CATEGORIES (ha)		
		(1.0 - 4.9)	(5.0 - 9.9)	(10.0 -...)
Denmark.....	1986.....	2.0.....	16.6.....	81.4
France.....	1986.....	24.0.....	11.7.....	64.3
W. Germany...	1986.....	31.0.....	17.8.....	51.2
U. Kingdom...	1986.....	12.9.....	12.4.....	74.7
POLAND.....	1987.....	53.4.....	29.3.....	17.3

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1991, Warszawa: Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych, p. 524, table 54 (752)

Table 4: Area of arable land per one tractor in 1988

COUNTRY	AREA OF LAND (HA)
Austria.....	4.6
France.....	12.9
Spain.....	28.3
Holland.....	4.8
Fed.Rep. of Germany.....	5.1
German Dem. Rep.....	29.5
Bulgaria.....	77.1
Czechoslovakia.....	36.3
Hungary.....	100.0
Soviet Union.....	86.3
Rumania.....	58.5
United Kingdom.....	13.5
U.S.A.....	40.7
POLAND.....	13.4

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1991, Warszawa: Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych, p. 537, table 81 (779)

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Since its establishment in 1969, the Center has tried to orient students towards questions that have been neglected both about past developments in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European societies and about the present. The Center's approach is comparative and interdisciplinary, with a strong emphasis on the historical and cultural sources which shape a country's political and economic policies and social structures. Major interests of Center members include elements common to industrial societies: the role of the state in the political economy of each country, political behavior, social movements, parties and elections, trade unions, intellectuals, labor markets and the crisis of industrialization, science policy, and the interconnections between a country's culture and politics.

For a complete list of Center publications (Working Paper Series, Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series, Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series, and *French Politics and Society*, a quarterly journal) please contact the Publications Department, 27 Kirkland St, Cambridge MA 02138. Additional copies can be purchased for \$4. A monthly calendar of events at the Center is also available at no cost.