Ethnic Issues in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia

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This paper examines the increase in the political salience of ethnicity in the postcommunist period in Czechoslovakia. As in several other postcommunist states, ethnic issues dominated the political agenda in the first two years after the collapse of the communist system and led to the negotiated breakup of the federation. Differences regarding reform led to a series of political crises in 1990 and 1992. Symbolic issues also contributed to the conflict. Political leaders played an important role in increasing the political salience of ethnicity during this period. Their ability to channel the dissatisfaction and uncertainty that accompanied the economic and political changes underway to mobilize support for ethnic aims reflect the fact that Czechs and Slovaks differ in their attitudes toward many important economic and political issues. These differences, in turn, reflect the influence of each people's history, levels of economic development, the legacy of the communist period, and the distinct ways in which the transition to the market affects each region.

In Czechoslovakia as in several other Post-Communist states, political conflicts based on ethnic issues clearly have been among the most critical issues of the day. Although tensions between ethnic groups are not as acute as in the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, ethnic issues dominated the political agenda of early the Post-Communist period and complicated the tasks of constitutional revision and economic reform. In contrast to the situation in parts of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, there is little likelihood that ethnic problems between Czechs and Slovaks will result in armed conflict. However, as in the interwar period, when the dissatisfaction of the Sudeten Germans and many Slovaks provided the pretext for the break-up of the republic, tensions between Czechs and Slovaks posed the main threat to the stability of Czechoslovakia's newly recreated democratic political system in the first two years of the Post-Communist period and were the primary factors responsible for the impending break-up of the state. As the result of the victory of Vladimír Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Civic Democratic Party of Václav Klaus in the June 1992 elections, a negotiated end of the Czechoslovak federation seems all but assured. Most citizens in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia continued to oppose a break-up of the common state even as their leaders negotiated its end. However, as Václav Havel's resignation from the Presidency in July 1992 in response to the Slovak National Council's declaration of sovereignty illustrates, there is little hope that a political resolution will be found that will avoid the separation of the two parts of the country.

The pages to follow examine the dimensions of the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks in the Post-Communist period. They then turn to the roots of the conflict, the impact of the economic and political transitions underway at present on ethnic relations, the role of leadership in increasing the political salience of ethnic issues, and the way in which ethnic issues are reflected in popular

attitudes.

The Dimensions of the Problem

As in the interwar and communist periods, Post-Communist Czechoslovakia remains a multi-ethnic state. The end of censorship and repluralization of political life that followed the collapse of communist rule in 1989 have allowed the open expression of tensions among the various ethnic groups in the state. Leaders of many of these groups have organized to articulate and to defend the interests of their groups in ways that were not possible during the communist period. In Moravia, demonstrations in 1991 demanding greater consideration of the region's interests in the budgeting process and popular interest in a tripartite federation reflected the shift in Moravian identity from a secondary, cultural identity to one with more direct political content. The high level of support for the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy, Association for Moravia and Silesia, which won 7.9 percent of the vote to the House of the People and 9.1 percent to the House of Nations in the June 1990 parliamentary elections and 4.9 percent of the vote to the House of the People and 4.2 percent of the vote to the House of Nations in the June 1992 elections,[1] reflects the new political significance of this identity. Representatives of the approximately 600,000 Hungarians and 40,000 Ukrainian/Ruthenians in Slovakia have organized to call for greater attention to the cultural and educational rights of these groups.[2] Activists have also emerged among the gypsy population, estimated to include from approximately 115,000 to over a million and a half individuals.[3]

As was the case in the interwar and communist periods, however, the most important ethnic issues at present arise from the relations between the two largest groups in the state, Czechs and Slovaks. There was a high level of

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cooperation between representatives of the groups that emerged in the Czech Lands and in Slovakia to lead the movements that overthrew the communist system in November 1989. However, the coordination of actions by leaders of Civic Forum in the Czech Lands and Public Against Violence in Slovakia in the early Post-Communist period soon gave way to more open conflict between Czech and Slovak leaders. Evident in the dispute over the name of the country, which was changed twice in the space of a month in the spring of 1990, tensions between Czechs and Slovaks led to a series of political crises in 1990 and 1991.[4]

One of the most acute of these occurred in December 1990 when the failure of Czech and Slovak politicians to approve a power-sharing agreement that would specify the powers of the federal and republic level governments led then President Havel, earlier an advocate of a limited presidency, to request an increase in the emergency powers of the President. Representatives of the republic and federal governments reached a provisional agreement in early 1991, but only by postponing discussion of many outstanding issues.[5] The continued inability of representatives of the two republics to resolve these issues led Havel in November 1991 to propose a series of constitutional amendments designed to deal with what he described as the "paralysis" of the government. However, these amendments, which included measures to facilitate the holding of a referendum on the future of the country and a provision that would have given the president the right to dissolve the Parliament and rule by decree until the next elections, if necessary, were not approved by the Federal Assembly.[6]

Ethnic tensions also complicated political life within each republic in the first two years after the end of communist rule. This was particularly true in Slovakia, where the existence of the Slovak National Party and other nationalist groups radicalized the debate about the future of the federation and pushed other

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political forces to take more extreme positions. Disagreement over relations with the Czechs were among the factors that led to the split between supporters of Vladimír Mečiar, then Prime Minister of Slovakia, and other leaders in Public Against Violence, which resulted in Mečiar's ouster as Prime Minister and replacement by Ján Čarnogurský, leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, in April 1991.[7]

The increased political salience of ethnicity in Slovakia was also evident in the fact that the Slovak National Council defeated several motions to vote on a declaration of Slovakia's sovereignty by narrow margins in 1991 and 1992. Discussions of issues ranging from economic reform to measures to repair the environmental damage wrought by the communist regime have also been conditioned by the varying perspectives of Slovakia's main political actors on the national question. Differing views on the future of the country divided the members of the coalition between the Christian Democratic Movement led by Ján Čarnogurský and the Public Against Violence-Civic Democratic Movement that ruled the country from June 1990 to June 1992. In March 1992, they were also reflected in a split within the Christian Democratic Movement itself.

The main points of contention between Czech and Slovak leaders in the first two years after the fall of communism centered around constitutional and economic issues. In the former area, Czech and Slovak representatives proved unable to find a formula for dividing the powers of the federal and republic governments that would satisfy both sides. The power sharing agreement reached in late 1990 left many issues unresolved, such as the question of who would control foreign affairs, banking, and important economic assets, including the gas pipeline. By December 1991, the two sides had reached agreement on many of the substantive issues, but procedural disagreements continued to prevent the conclusion of a

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final agreement. The introduction of new republic and federal constitutions, which were to have gone into effect in October 1991 on the anniversary of the founding of the interwar republic, was postponed. Negotiations concerning a power-sharing agreement, which were suspended in late January 1992, were resumed in February 1992 and resulted in a proposed agreement. However, this effort at resolving the deadlock was defeated by the failure of the Slovak National Council, by one vote, to approve the proposed compromise, and negotiations were once again suspended in March 1992. The atmosphere of acute crisis that prevailed in the last months of 1991 receded temporarily, but many citizens in both parts of the country began to feel that it was an open question whether there would be a common state in the future.

The results of the June 1992 elections posed this question very sharply. Slovakia's new leader, Vladimír Mečiar, and his supporters argued after the elections that they did not want an end to a common state with the Czechs, but rather a confederation that would consist of two sovereign republics. Václav Klaus, on the other hand, took the position that such a confederation could not work. In addition to pointing to the impossibility of having both two independent states and a unified state, supporters of his position argued that such an arrangement would only allow Slovakia to drain money from common resources, and most importantly, would endanger continued progress in recreating a market economy.

In large part, the difficulties in reaching a power-sharing agreement reflected different conceptions of the proper role of the federal and republic level governments. But, as the election campaign and the negotiations that followed made very clear, part of the difficulty stemmed from different understandings of the concepts of sovereignty and independence. Numerous Slovak leaders,

including Mečiar, but also others more supportive of the maintenance of the federation, argued that sovereignty for Slovakia was compatible with the continued existence of a common state. Czech leaders, including Petr Pithart, former Prime Minister of the Czech Republic who was criticized by many Czechs for being too accommodating to the Slovak side in negotiations in late 1991 and early 1992, argued that the two were incompatible. The frustration of the Czech side in dealing with this issue is captured by Pithart's comments on the occasion of the breakdown of the negotiations in November 1991. Referring to a response by Ivan Čarnogurský, then Deputy Chairman of the Slovak National Council to a question concerning the Slovak side's definition of what it wanted, Pithart commented,"He was asked, first of all, whether he favored a common or an independent state. He said he favored a common state. When asked about his conceptions of this state and how he perceives it, he said that a common state is a state comprising two independent states."[8]

Economic issues also divided the two groups and increased the political salience of ethnicity in the period after November 1989. Czech and Slovak leaders disagreed over the extent to which each republic or the federal government should control economic life; they also held different perspectives on the economic reform enacted by the government. Evident throughout the early Post-Communist period, despite agreement on the economic reform plan adopted in September 1990 by the governments of both republics and the federal government, Slovak reservations about a rapid move to the market were voiced more openly in 1991.[9] As a later section of this article discusses in greater detail, many Slovak leaders argued that the government's economic policies did not pay sufficient attention to the specific conditions of Slovakia's economy.

Relations between Czechs and Slovaks have also been complicated by a

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number of less tangible, but nonetheless important symbolic issues. These include Slovak perceptions that the federation did not meet Slovak interests as well as the insistence of many Slovaks on the right to determine their own policies and their own route in the Post-Communist period, free of what they perceived to be outside domination. As will be discussed more fully below, there were important differences of opinion within Slovakia concerning the future of the state. However, the perception that the federation did not serve Slovak interests was widespread. On the other side, even among leaders who were former dissidents, there was a often good deal of incomprehension in Bohemia and Moravia concerning Slovaks aims and perspectives. There was also, at times, a fair degree of frustration as the result of the conflicting signals given by members of Slovakia's governing coalition in 1991 and early 1992. The subtext of the conflict, in other words, included perceptions of power relations by both Czechs and Slovaks that were colored by past experiences and the history of relations between the two groups. In addition to differences about concrete political and economic issues, then, there were important symbolic and emotional issues at stake.

Roots of the conflict

The roots of the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks and the increased political salience of ethnic issues in the first two years after the collapse of communism can be traced to several factors. In part, these tensions reflected the historical differences between the two groups and the legacy of policies adopted during the communist period on ethnic relations. Czech-Slovak relations also have been influenced by several aspects of the economic and political transitions taking place at present and by trends in the broader international environment.

At first glance, the current levels of tensions between Czechs and Slovaks are puzzling. The two groups, which speak mutually intelligible languages, are less deeply divided by cultural and religious differences than the various nations of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. Although there were periods of enmity among Czechs and Slovaks in the past, there is no history of mass slaughter of one group by the other or of the widespread use of violence to resolve ethnic disputes between the two groups.

But, although they are not as obvious as those that separate many other ethnic groups, there are important differences in the perceptions, values, and orientations of Czechs and Slovaks that reflect historical differences in the cultures, levels of development and political experiences of the two groups.[10] Many of these result from the fact that Slovaks and Czechs were part of two larger states prior to the formation of a common Czechoslovak state in 1918. The different experiences of members of the two groups during the interwar period and World War II created further grounds for conflict, as did the impact of communist rule.[11]

The political experiences of Czechs and Slovaks differed greatly prior to 1918. Part of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, the inhabitants of the Czech Lands had an increasing number of opportunities to participate in public life within the framework of imperial and regional institutions in the second half of the nineteenth century. Conditions were also more favorable than in Slovakia for the development of a mass-based, widespread Czech national movement. Although Vienna did not grant the Czechs autonomy similar to that which the Hungarians achieved by the compromise of 1867, the Habsburgs did allow the formation of nationally oriented groups in Bohemia and Moravia. Coupled with the growing industrialization of Bohemia, these policies allowed the consolidation of ethnic

loyalties among the Czechs and the development of a tradition of citizen involvement prior to independence.

In Slovakia, which was ruled by Hungary, suffrage restrictions prevented most non-Magyars from playing any role in public life prior to 1918. Slovaks also were subjected to substantial pressures to give up their national identity and to assimilate. Efforts to propagate Slovak nationalism were also handicapped by the low levels of urbanization and literacy among Slovaks during this period.[12] Czechs and Slovaks thus entered the interwar Czechoslovak republic established in 1918 with very different historical referents and political traditions.[13]

The two regions also experienced very different patterns of economic development. The Czech Lands, and particularly Bohemia, become one of the industrial centers of the Habsburg Empire and developed a social structure similar to those of other industrial urbanized areas of Europe. Slovakia, on the other hand, remained one of the least developed and most agrarian regions of the Empire.[14]

Efforts to industrialize Slovakia and to reduce the disparity in levels of development and social structure in the two regions during the interwar period failed, in part as the result of the world depression.[15] Although substantial progress was made in the areas of education and culture during this period, it did not lessen Slovak dissatisfaction with the interwar republic. Rather, the increased literacy rates and levels of urbanization of the population provided additional resources which Slovak national leaders could mobilize to support national aims. Continued economic hardship and Slovak resentment of what was perceived to be the domination of Slovakia's economic and political life by Prague fueled the growth of extremist views in Slovakia and provided ready recruits for movements such as the Slovak People's Party, led by Father Andrej Hlinka and

later by Josef Tiso.

Relations between the two groups were further complicated by the different experiences of the two parts of the country during the Second World War. Thus, while Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by the Germans after the Munich agreement of 1938, Slovakia became a pseudoindependent state under Hitler's tutelage in March 1939. Virtually a Nazi puppet, the Slovak Republic nonetheless did satisfy the desires of some Slovaks for their own state and created expectations for state arrangements that would give Slovakia greater autonomy in the post-war period.[16]

There are also significant differences in religion between Czechs and Slovaks. Most of those who identify themselves as believers in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia are Roman Catholics. However, the levels and meaning of religious affiliation and the role of religion in public life differ in the two regions. Although they were recatholicized after the Thirty Years War, levels of religious affiliation were lower in the more developed, secularized Czech Lands than in Slovakia. Both groups have important Protestant, as well as, Catholic traditions, but Protestant traditions have been more important in Bohemia, where the Hussite legacy as well as Catholic influences were an integral part of the sense of national identity that emerged in the 19th century. Religion also played a much more important role in the political life of Slovakia than in the Czech Lands between the two World Wars. Levels of religious observance continued to be higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands during the communist period.[17]

The results of the most recent census document the persistence of these differences. Thus, 39.2 percent of the inhabitants of the Czech Lands, but 60.3 percent of Slovaks, identified themselves as Roman Catholics. The number of those who indicated that they were without any religious affiliation was far lower

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(9.7 percent) in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands (39.7 percent).[18]

Legacy of the Communist Period

The current state of relations between Czechs and Slovaks also reflects the legacy of the communist period. As in the previous area, the impact of this factor at first appears to be paradoxical, for the leaders of Czechoslovakia were far more successful than those of other multiethnic communist states in reducing the inequalities between the Czech Lands and Slovakia.

This success was particularly evident in the economic sphere. In contrast to the situation in the interwar period when the development gap remained stable between the Czech Lands, which had been one of the most highly developed areas of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Slovakia, which had been one of the most backward, a good deal of progress in economic equalization of the two regions occurred under Communism. According to almost all indicators of development, including occupational structure, rates of urbanization, levels of education, availability of health care and other services, and ownership of consumer durables, Slovakia was still somewhat less developed than the Czech Lands at the end of communist rule. But, the gap was very small in all areas.[19]

However, the near equalization of the material conditions of life that occurred during the communist period did not lead to any diminution of ethnic identity or to the elimination of ethnicity as a source of tension and political conflict. Slovak dissatisfaction with what many perceived to be the lack of parity within the common state was one of the factors that led to the reform movement of 1968. In the course of the political reform, Czech and Slovak leaders agreed to change the structure of the state. A federal system was adopted in October 1968 and went into effect in 1969. This change, which was one of the few elements of

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the reforms that remained after the invasion by Warsaw Pact troops in August 1968, institutionalized ethnicity as a factor that had to be considered in all policy-making areas and ostensibly satisfied Slovak aspirations for parity. However, although federalization was important symbolically, the powers of the republic governments were soon reduced by a series of amendments that increased the powers of the federal government in decision-making, particularly in the economy.[20] Ethnic tensions continued to exist under the surface for the remainder of the communist period. Continued Slovak dissatisfaction with the structure of the state was paralleled by growing Czech resentment of Slovaks, whom many Czechs felt benefitted from policies adopted by the leadership of Gustáv Husák to "normalize" Czechoslovakia by eliminating the political and economic reforms of 1968.[21]

These sentiments could not be voiced openly until the end of the communist period. However, specialists, professionals, and other intellectuals continued to discuss the distribution of power within the state and other Slovak grievances. In the last two years of communist rule, when Gorbachev's policies began to have echoes in Czechoslovakia, some of these issues were aired more openly. Expert discussions of issues such as the use of federal funds for Slovakia's development and controversial aspects of Slovakia's history published in the late 1980s presaged the crystallization of political debate along ethnic lines that occurred after November 1989. [22]

As in many other contexts, then, further modernization did not reduce the political salience of ethnicity in Czechoslovakia, but rather increased the role that ethnic identity played in political life. Instead of serving to decrease the importance of ethnicity, the increased levels of urbanization and education that further economic development produced provided new resources for Slovak

leaders to use in the political realm.[23] Given the constraints on public debate, the monopolization of political life by a single party, and the inability of citizens to organize independently outside the framework of officially approved organizations, these resources were not translated into political assets during the communist period. However, once the political system changed, Slovak leaders were able to use these resources to support their efforts to mobilize the population around ethnic issues.

A further element of the legacy of communism that played a central role in determining the state of ethnic relations in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia was the nature of economic development that took place in Slovakia under communist rule. As noted earlier, the overall developmental level of Slovakia increased dramatically. However, because most of the Slovakia's industrialization occurred during the communist period, the region's development reflected the priorities and economic distortions associated with the Stalinist model of economic organization and strategy of economic development. Thus, many of the very large, inefficient industrial enterprises constructed during the communist era are located in Slovakia, as is much of the sizeable arms industry. As a result, the impact of the economic changes enacted since 1989 has been much more painful in Slovakia than in Bohemia or Moravia. As in other areas of life, then, relations between Czechs and Slovaks continue to reflect the impact of policies adopted during the communist period.

Life in Transition

Ethnic relations have also been influenced by the transition from a communist to democratic political system rule and the effort to move from a command to a market economy. The impact of these factors is most evident in the

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economic sphere, but the political, psychological, and social aspects of the transition also have had important reflections in ethnic relations.

In the first area, it is clear that the timing and kind of industrialization that occurred in Slovakia meant that the move to the market would be more painful in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands. The impact of this factor is evident in a number of areas, including levels of unemployment. By late 1991, unemployment had reached 10.30 percent in Slovakia, compared to 3.94 percent in the Czech Republic.[24] Slovak unemployment rates were particularly high in engineering, the electrotechnical and electronic fields, textiles, foodstuffs industries, as well as in construction. Unemployment continued to rise more rapidly in Slovakia and reached 12.3 percent in March 1991, compared to 3.7 percent in the Czech Lands.

The greater impact of the shift to the market in Slovakia is also evident in other areas. The 64 percent increase in prices and 30 percent decrease in real purchasing power that occurred in the first half of 1991, for example, created greater hardship in Slovakia where a higher proportion of households are found in the lowest income group. [25] Although a recent study found little difference in the proportion of households in the two parts of the country that ranked at the top in terms of per person income (7 percent in the Czech Lands and 6 percent in Slovakia), nearly half (49 percent) of all households in Slovakia, compared to 42 percent in the Czech Lands, were in the poorest group.[26]

Slovakia has also proved to be less attractive than the Czech Lands to foreign investors. Twenty-three percent of the 3,400 joint ventures registered in the country by October 1991, for example, were found in Slovakia. Foreign investment is also heavily concentrated in Bratislava. [27]

Due in part to the formation of tripartite councils of the Employers

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Association, the government, and the trade unions at both the republic and federal levels, there has been relatively little labor unrest in either the Czech Lands or Slovakia since the end of communist rule. However, in 1991 and 1992 there were several strikes in Slovakia that were directly related to efforts by federal institutions to remove subsidies and guarantees to Slovak industries and agriculture. Strikes in Slovakia also tended to be more political than those in Bohemia and Moravia, where economic issues related to working conditions and benefits were the primary catalysts.

The statements and actions of many Slovak political leaders since November 1989 have reflected popular fear of the impact of the economic reforms and reactions to growing economic hardships. Vladimír Mečiar, the head of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and Prime Minister of Slovakia since June 1992, was among the earliest to argue that the different economic conditions in Slovakia required a modification of the economic reform program. Arguing that he is committed to re-creating a market economy, Mečiar has nonetheless indicated that he will make changes in both the speed of moving to a market economy and the role of the state. He has also identified a "social market economy" akin to Austria's as a model for Slovakia.[28] Ján Čarnogurský, head of the Christian Democratic Movement and Prime Minister of Slovakia from April 1991 to June 1992, reaffirmed his government's commitment to the common economic program, but also noted the need for special measures to ease the pain of the economic transition in Slovakia.[29]

The politics of transition

The political transition has also influenced relations between Czechs and Slovaks. One of the more important aspects of this transition is the fact that the

political system itself is still very much in flux. Although Czechoslovakia had many of the preconditions necessary for establishing and maintaining a stable democratic system that were lacking in other Post-Communist states at the outset of the Post-Communist period, political life nonetheless shares many of the same features as politics in other Post-Communist states.

The end of the Communist Party's monopoly of power and the repluralization of the country's political life that occurred after November 1989 created new opportunities for citizens to be active in politics and new channels of mass-elite relations. Free elections held in June and November 1990 legitimized the government formed immediately after the ouster of communist rule and resulted in the replacement of large numbers of political leaders at all levels. Led by former President Václav Havel, the country's new leaders also made a good deal of progress in revamping the country's legal codes and revitalizing political institutions in the first two years after the collapse of the communist system. However, many serious political problems remain. [30] As the results of the 1990 and 1992 elections and numerous public opinion polls indicate, the process of channelling the widespread desire for political change evident in late 1989 into coherent political directions and policy preferences has yet to be accomplished. As in other countries in transition from authoritarian rule, the political preferences of citizens are still volatile. [31] A stable party system is also still in the process of being recreated.

In both of these areas, the legacy of four decades of communist rule continues to be felt. Thus, in part as a reaction to the forced mobilization of the communist era, many citizens are reluctant to join political parties. Public opinion polls concerning partisan preferences in late 1991 found an increase in the numbers of citizens without attachments to any political party. While 15

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percent of those questioned by the Institute for Public Opinion Research of the Slovak Statistical Office in September 1991 indicated that they did not sympathize with any political party, for example, by October 1991, this proportion had reached 25 percent. [32]

Citizen reactions and allegiances to political parties have also been influenced by the multiplicity of political parties. As in many of the other Post-Communist states in the region, the repluralization of politics that followed the end of communist rule resulted in the resurrection of Czechoslovakia's multiparty tradition. Many of the parties that formed prior to the 1990 elections have been winnowed out as viable political forces by threshold requirements that prevent parties that do not gain a specified percentage of the vote from seating deputies in the republic and federal legislatures. However, in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia, there are numerous political parties that remain more or less credible political organizations.

In the early Post-Communist period, political life in both the republics was dominated by the organizations that led the revolutions of 1989. The breakup of the Civic Forum in the Czech Lands and Public Against Violence in Slovakia in early 1991 has further fragmented the party system. The impact of this differentiation is evident in the results of public opinion polls concerning citizen's voting preferences. As Table I illustrates, in the Czech Lands, the Civic Democratic Party of Václav Klaus was the strongest political force in late 1991 and the first half of 1991 with a projected 20 percent of the vote. Of the remaining political parties and groupings, only the Social Democrats, the Communist Party, the Peoples' Party, and the right wing Republican party received levels of support above the five percent required to seat deputies in the Parliament. In Slovakia, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the group that broke

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away from Public Against Violence under the leadership of Vladimír Mečiar, emerged as the most popular political force from 22 to 30 percent of those questioned supported this group in the fall of 1991 and the first half of 1992. The Christian Democratic Movement led by Ján Čarnogurský, and the Party of the Democratic Left, the successor to the Slovak Communist Party, also received the support of more than 10 percent of the population.

A sizeable portion of the electorate in both parts of the country were either undecided or did not plan to vote. Thus, thirteen percent of the population queried in early November 1991 in each republic indicated that they would not vote.[33] Political preferences were somewhat more crystallized in Slovakia by 1991. Approximately a quarter of those surveyed in the Czech Lands in late 1991 and early 1992, and 31 percent in April 1992 were undecided which, if any, party to support in the elections. In Slovakia, approximately 16 percent of those surveyed were undecided in February 1992, and 12 percent in April 1992.[34] Approximately 83 percent of citizens actually voted in the June 1992 elections.[35]

The fluidity of the party system and the low levels of party identification mean that citizens do not have the benefit of this tool that is used in more established democracies to simplify political decision-making and to mediate political conflict. These features of transitional politics also mean that ordinary citizens are more readily available to be mobilized by political elites than in situations in which levels of party identification are higher and party alignments more stable. Political elites are also relatively unconstrained by mass preferences in such a situation.

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Table I

Voting Preferences of Citizens, November 1991, December 1991, February 1992 (in percentages)

	Czech Republic				Slovakia		
	Nov. 1991	Dec. 1991	Feb. 1992		Nov. 1991	Dec. 1991	Feb. 1992
Civic Democratic Party	20	21	22	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	22	30	31
Social Democratic Party	9	10	10	Party of the Democratic Left (Communist Party)	12	16	9
Liberal Social Union[a]	-	8	7	Christian Democratic Party	16	13	14
KSČM (Communist Party)	9	9	9	Slovak National Party	13	12	12
Citizens Movement	4	6	5	Democratic Party	3	5	4
Society for Independent Moravia	4	5	2	Do not know	18	12	16
Peoples Party	7	4	6				
Republican Party	5	4	4				
Do not know	23	25	26				

[a] Liberal Social Union: A coalition of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Green Party, and the Agricultural Party.

Source: Institute for Public Opinion Research, research carried out October 30-November 6 and December 4-11, 1991, and February 3-10, 1992.

The political implications of these factors are compounded by the psychological and social costs of the transition. This aspect of the current situation, which is well understood by all who live in Post-Communist societies, is

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often overlooked by outside commentators, in part because it is so difficult to quantify. However, living in times in which one must adapt to significant changes in all areas of life ranging from the workplace to culture to the organization and availability of services is clearly taking its toll on individuals and families. As Václav Havel noted in a November 1991 interview:

> We are living in a time of peculiar--I would say--social and psychological chaos. People are unsettled by the fact that they cannot see firm order, structure of values, or orderly community life anywhere. Everything has been thrown into uncertainty. The whole legal system and the constitutional setup are uncertain. Political parties are quarreling among themselves. They attack each other. Everybody says something different. Everybody proposes something different. It is not known what the reform will bring or what social shocks it will cause.[36]

Coupled with the decline in the standard of living and uncertainty about the future, this situation has resulted in increasing levels of popular discontent and dissatisfaction with existing political institutions and political leaders. Public opinion polls document a steady decline in optimism and satisfaction among the population since early 1990. Thus, 86 percent of a sample of 2,400 respondents surveyed in January 1990 were satisfied with recent political developments, and most (83 percent) believed that the political changes underway would result in a major transformation of the political system rather than only a change of leaders.[37] By May 1990, 66 percent of those surveyed indicated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the political situation. However, the fading of the euphoria of the first months after the Revolution was reflected in the fact that nearly half of those surveyed felt that the November revolution had gone well in the beginning but had "somehow turned sour."[38] Popular dissatisfaction with the results of the transformation continued to grow during 1991 and 1992, particularly in Slovakia. In September 1991, for example, 61 percent of respondents in the Czech Republic but 78 percent in Slovakia were rather or very

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dissatisfied. Equally telling, only three percent of the population in each republic was very satisfied.[39]

Levels of dissatisfaction continued to increase in 1991 and 1992.[40] In January 1992, from 64 to 79 percent of citizens surveyed in the country as a whole were dissatisfied with social welfare provisions, domestic politics, the economy, and the standard of living. As in previous surveys, levels of dissatisfaction were higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. These differences were particularly marked in regard to levels of dissatisfaction with the economy, (84 percent of Slovaks, compared to 68 percent of Czechs), and the living standard (78 percent of Slovaks and 74 percent of Czechs).[41] By May 1992, 73 percent of those surveyed in the Czech Lands, and 86 percent in Slovakia, were either rather or very dissatisfied with the overall political situation.[42] Expectations regarding further developments, particularly in the living standard and the economy, were also much less positive in Slovakia.[43]

Public trust in political institutions and political leaders decreased significantly in 1991 and 1992 in both republics.[44] This trend was particularly notable in respect to the federal government and the Federal Assembly. As Table II illustrates, by late 1991 less than half of respondents in the Czech Lands and less than a third in Slovakia trusted the federal government. Trust in the Federal Assembly was slightly greater in Slovakia, but substantially lower in the Czech Lands. Trust in the republic governments and parliaments also fell, particularly in Slovakia. Levels of trust in these institutions continued to decline in 1992. A January 1992 survey by the Institute for Public Opinion Research that found that 52 percent of respondents in Slovakia felt that the federal government worked to the advantage of the Czech nation, while 41 percent of Czechs felt that it benefitted Slovaks disporportionately provides some insight into the low regard

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in which the federal government was held in both parts of the country.[45]

Table II Trust in Public Leaders and Institutions, January 1991, December 1991, February 1992, May 1992 (in percentages)								
	January 1991		December 1991		February 1992		May 1992	
	CR	SR	CR	SR	CR	SR	CR	SR
President Havel	90	60	82	50	86	52	78	52
Federal government	78	46	46	30	50	28	46	26
Federal parliament	65	51	27	33	25	29	25	26
Republic government	79	85	55	35	52	29	51	28
Republic parliament	71	69	49	33	47	26	46	24

Source: Information from Institute for Public Opinion Research, "Postoje čs. veřejnosti k základním politickým institucím," Prague, May 1992.

Support for former President Havel, who served as a symbol of the country's hopes for the future immediately after the Revolution, also decreased, particularly in Slovakia.[46] Thus, in January 1991, 90 percent of respondents in the Czech Republic expressed their confidence in the President, a proportion that was higher than those who trusted the federal government, federal assembly, and republic level institutions. In Slovakia the proportion of those who trusted the President (60 percent), was substantially lower than levels of trust in the Slovak government (85%), the Slovak National Council (69 percent) and several Slovak politicians, including then Prime Minister of Slovakia Vladimír Mečiar.[47] In August 1991, less than half of respondents in Slovakia, compared to 84 percent in the Czech Republic, trusted Havel.[48] Support for the President increased somewhat in Slovakia in late 1991 and 1992 but remained far lower than in the Czech Lands.

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The political situation in the first two years after the collapse of communism, then, created fertile ground for the growth of ethnic tensions and extreme nationalism. Coupled with the hardship and dislocations that accompany large-scale economic change, growing popular dissatisfaction and increasing distrust of most political leaders and institutions provided incentives for political leaders to use nationalism as a tool to gain or to keep influence and power in the new system.

Finally, although the tensions between Czechs and Slovaks may be traced largely to factors within the country, developments in the larger international community have also heightened the political salience of ethnicity in Czechoslovakia. These include the break-up of other multi-ethnic former communist states and, paradoxically, the movement toward greater unity in the rest of Europe. Advocates of independence for Slovakia often pointed, for example, to the independence of the Baltic countries and to international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states to support their claims. Certain Slovak leaders, such as former Minister of International Relations, Pavol Demeš, who wished to see the federation maintained, argued that a breakup of the federation would decrease the likelihood that Czechoslovakia or its successor states would be admitted to the EC. For many other Slovak leaders, however, the prospect of eventually entering the European Community fueled the desire to see Slovakia enter Europe on its own. As former Prime Minister Jan Čarnogurský commented in October 1991 with reference to a pre-1989 discussion in which he had argued that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would be "beggars," should they enter Europe, "Now, paradoxically, it seems to me that we are still coming to Europe as beggars, but our great contribution to the treasure of European culture is the revival of the national idea. Under the influence of

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events in Central and Eastern Europe, its revival can be seen in West Europe, too...."[49] Although he supported the maintenance of a common state with the Czechs for the near future, Čarnogurský also called for Slovakia to enter Europe on its own chair.[50]

Leadership and Popular Attitudes

The continued inability of Czech and Slovak leaders to agree on the division of powers between the federal and republic governments prior to the June 1992 elections despite the fact that most citizens did not want to see the state to break up led many outside commentators to see the on-going political crisis as largely an affair of political elites. As an article in The Economist in November 1991 put it, Czechoslovakia appeared to be headed toward a "divorce that was occurring by accident."[51] A similar view of the situation was reflected in then President Havel's call for a referendum to resolve the issue of the future of the state and in the effort he made to mobilize the public to pressure members of the federal legislature and republic governments to reach a compromise in November 1991.[52] Numerous public opinion polls concerning relations between the two groups and the form of state also at first glance support this view. Nonetheless, the situation in fact is more complicated. For while citizens in both parts of the country continued to oppose a break-up of the state even as it was being negotiated, the political values and preferences of Czechs and Slovaks differ in many respects.

As noted earlier, in contrast to the situation in what was Yugoslavia and in many areas of the former Soviet Union, disagreements between Czechs and Slovaks over political and economic issues have not been conditioned by either a history of armed conflict against each other or atrocities by one or both sides.

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Nor have they been reflected in a marked deterioration of personal relationships between the two groups. Although rates of intermarriage and the number of members each ethnic group who resided in the other republic remained at low levels throughout the communist period,[53] many Czechs and Slovaks have had a fair degree of contact with members of the other ethnic group. A 1991 study conducted by the Institute for Social Analysis at Comenius University in Bratislava, for example, found that 31 percent of Slovaks had relatives and 57 percent friends in the Czech Lands.[54] Nonetheless, sizeable proportions of each nation held the other responsible for the country's ills, and substantial numbers felt that the other group benefitted more from the federation. Thus, one percent of those surveyed in the Czech Republic in January 1992 felt that the federation benefitted Czechs at the expense of Slovaks; forty-one percent felt that it benefitted Slovaks at the expense of Czechs. Three percent of Slovaks agreed, but a majority (52 percent) felt that the federation benefitted Czechs at Slovak expense.[55] A survey conducted by the Association for Independent Social Analysis in April 1992 found that 73 percent of respondents in Slovakia, and 16 percent in the Czech Lands, felt that the federal system favored the Czech Republic.[56]

Survey results also document a substantial degree of misunderstanding between the two groups, as well as different perspectives on how each group is treated by the other. Sixty-eight percent of respondents in Slovakia surveyed by AISA in April 1992, for example, felt that Czechs often treated Slovaks as an underdeveloped nation. Eighty-four percent of Czechs, on the other hand, disagreed.[57]

Sizeable portions of both Czechs and Slovaks also ascribe negative traits to members of the other group. Forty-one percent of Czechs surveyed by the

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Center for Social Analysis in Bratislava in October 1990 attributed only negative characteristics to Slovaks. Slovaks were somewhat less likely to see Czechs in a negative light, but nearly a third (31 percent) did so. As the authors of this study note, "...in the background of these reproaches there is...a feeling of having been underestimated and wronged; distrust and suspicion of the Czechs; excessive self-confidence or even self-admiration; a negative attitude towards the communist past and future, and stressing the independent actions of the Slovak nation regardless of the value message."[58] The authors note that the Slovak stereotype of Czechs includes the view that a Czech is "a self-interested and sly egoist who prefers useless sophistry to an honest piece of work, and who feels...superior to the Slovak." The negative Czech stereotype, on the other hand, is of a nationally excitable Slovak suffering from an inferiority complex; combined with a rather skeptical interpretation of the behavior of the Slovak nation in history."[59] Slovak perceptions of being treated unfairly increased between October 1990 and May 1991 as did levels of distrust between the two peoples.[60] However, as late as May 1992, the majority (64 percent) of respondents in the Czech Lands characterized their relationship to Slovaks as good. Slightly higher proportions (72 percent) of Slovaks felt they had good relationships with Czechs.[61] These proportions were higher than those obtained in October 1991.[62]

Surveys conducted after the June 1992 elections also found a fair degree of dissent from the positions articulated by the dominant political leaders in both parts of the country. Thus, although a quarter of those surveyed in the Czech Republic agreed strongly with the viewpoint of Václav Klaus regarding the form of the state and another 40 percent more or less supported his position approximately 27 percent did not agree or strongly disagreed with his position.

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Approximately equal proportions of those surveyed in Slovakia either agreed (31 percent) or strongly agreed (37 percent) with those positions articulated by Vladimír Mečiar; 27 percent either disagreed (16 percent), or strongly disagreed (11 percent).[63] Many Czechs and Slovaks traced the break-up of the federation directly to political leaders. Over three-quarters of respondents in the Czech Lands, and 40 percent in Slovakia, for example, identified the person of Vladimír Mečiar as a reason for the difficulties of the federation after the 1992 elections. Thirty-nine percent of those in the Czech Lands, and 48 percent of those in Slovakia traced these difficulties to Václav Klaus, and 33 percent in the Czech Lands, and 40 percent in Slovakia, to Václav Havel. These results suggest that many citizens in Czechoslovakia share the view that political leaders are primarily responsible for the growth of ethnic tensions and the difficulties that arose over the form of the state. Seventy-one percent of respondents in the Czech Lands and 65 in Slovakia surveyed in late 1991 for Radio Free Europe agreed or strongly agreed that politicians were using nationalism for their own purposes. Far smaller numbers (13 percent in the Czech Lands, and 10 percent in Slovakia) disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.[64] An April 1992 survey carried out by AISA for the National Endowment for Democracy found higher levels of support for the view that politicians were using national differences for their own aims in both the Czech Lands (81 percent), and Slovakia (87 percent).[65]

There is thus ample support for the view that political leaders, particularly in Slovakia, played a key role in mobilizing the population around ethnic issues in order to increase their own support prior to the June 1992 elections. Similar criticism was levelled against Václav Klaus and other Czech leaders for their refusal to consider Slovak proposals for a confederation of two independent states

and their role in pushing for a rapid dissolution of the common state after the June 1992 elections. However, the situation is considerable more complex than it appears at first glance. As Table III illustrates, most citizens continued to prefer a common state even as political leaders negotiated the end of the federation; but, as the numerous public opinion polls conducted since the end of communist rule document, there are important and growing differences in the attitudes and political preferences of Czechs and Slovaks in many areas.

Attitudes toward the holding of a referendum to determine the country's future are illustrative. Most citizens of the country supported the holding of a referendum, as called for by President Havel in 1991. For example, seventy-four percent of the total population, including eighty percent in the Czech Lands and 69 percent in Slovakia favored such a referendum in November 1991. Eighty-nine percent indicated that they would participate in a referendum, and 64 percent that they would vote to preserve a common state.[66] Somewhat higher proportions of respondents in the Czech Lands (90 percent) and in Slovakia (80 percent) surveyed in October 1991 by the Center for Empirical Research of the Sociological Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science (STEM), indicated that they would participate in a referendum. Of these, approximately eight percent in the Czech lands and 23.8 percent in Slovakia indicated that they would vote to divide the state.[67]

Popular support for preserving a common state remained high throughout 1991 and early 1992. In December 1991, for example, 68 percent of those surveyed by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Prague expressed their support for maintaining a common state. Thirteen percent wanted to see the state divided. (See Table III.) However, these figures mask significant differences in the attitudes of Czechs and Slovaks. Thus, while 70 percent of inhabitants of the

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Czech Lands surveyed in October 1991 indicated that they would vote to remain in a common state, this proportion dropped to 52 percent in Slovakia. Only 18 percent of Slovakia's inhabitants (and nine percent of those of the Czech Lands) favored separation of the two parts of the country at that time. But, nearly a third (31 percent), of the inhabitants of Slovakia indicated that they would abstain or were undecided about how they would vote on such an issue.[68] A similarly large proportion of citizens in Slovakia in December 1991 were undecided or planned to abstain.

Table III Position if a referendum were held on state arrangements (in percentages)							
Would vote to:	October 1991		December 1991			July 1992	
	ČR	SR	ČSFR	ČR	SR	ČR	SR
Maintain a common state	70	52	68	73	58	53	42
Divide the state	9	18	13	12	16	24	32
Don't know	31		12	9	16	20	23
Would abstain			7	6	20		

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent because those who indicated they would not participate in a referendum are excluded.

Source: Information from the Institute for Public Opinion Research, "Názory čs. veřejnosti," Prague, January 31, 1992. pp. 12-13.

Most citizens in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia continued to support the holding of a referendum to decide the future of the state even after the June 1992 elections. In July 1992, when the Institute for Public Opinion Research next asked citizens the same question about a referendum, similarly high proportions (85 and 83 percent) of citizens in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia indicated that they would participate in such a referendum. Eighty-two percent of respondents in the Czech Lands and 84 percent in Slovakia agreed that the

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further existence of the state should be determined not by politicians but only by citizens in a referendum. As Table III illustrates, support for dividing the state nearly doubled in both parts of the country between December 1991 and July 1992. However, in neither case was the proportion of citizens who supported this option sufficient under the terms of the existing law concerning the referendum to bring about a change in the composition of the state.[69]

At the same time, inhabitants of the Czech Lands and Slovakia clearly have different preferences in regard to the form of the state. These became evident early in the Post-Communist period. Almost half (42 percent) of those surveyed in the Czech Lands in June 1990, for example, preferred a common state with a strong central or unitary government; an additional 30 percent supported a common state with strong republic governments. Inhabitants of Slovakia, on the other hand, were far more supportive of a common state with considerable powers for republic level governments (41 percent) and also favored confederation in substantial numbers (30 percent). Support for two independent states was also slightly higher in Slovakia (eight percent) than in the Czech Republic (five percent) at this time.[70] A poll conducted in January 1991 found similar results.[71]

Differences in the views of inhabitants of the Czech Republic and Slovakia on this issue increased in the course of 1991 and 1992.

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Table IV : Preferred State Arrangements, 1991 and 1992								
Type of State Arrangement	November 1991		December 1991		January 1992		March 1992	
	ČR	SR	ČR	SR	ČR	SR	ČR	SR
Unitary State	39	20	36	17	38	17	34	13
Federation	30	26	27	31	32	33	27	24
Lands based republic	20	6	24	4	15	5	18	9
Confederation	4	27	4	30	4	30	6	32
Independent States	5	14	6	11	5	12	11	17
Don't know	2	7	3	7	6	3	4	5

Table IV : Preferred State Arrangements, 1991 and 1992 continued						
Type of State Arrangement	May 1992		June 1992		July 1992	
	ČR	SR	ČR	SR	ČR	SR
Unitary State	34	12	29	11	38	14
Federation	28	·33	28	26	19	27
Lands based republic	22	6	21	6	18	8
Confederation	6	31	5	31	3	30
Independent States	6	11	13	18	16	16
Don't know	4	7	4	8	6	5

Sources: Institute for Public Opinion Research, "Názory čs. veřenosti na státoprávní uspořádání a na konání referenda," November 15, 1991; information from a survey of 1,006 people conducted by the Institute for Public Research, December 4-11, 1991; and "Názory čs. veřejnosti na státoprávní uspořádání a na referendum," July 1992.

As Table IV illustrates, most of the inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia favored

either a unitary state or a federation in late 1991 and in the first half of 1992. A sizeable portion, particularly in Moravia, favored a land-based republic. In Slovakia, on the other hand, approximately equal numbers of citizens preferred a confederation or a federation. One of the most significant differences in the results of polls conducted in 1990 and 1991-1992 is the decrease in support for a federal arrangement in Slovakia. Thus, while 41 percent of those surveyed in Slovakia in June 1990 and 43 percent in January 1991 preferred this type of state arrangement, by November 1991, this proportion had decreased to 26 percent. More striking evidence of the degree of dissatisfaction with the federal system in Slovakia prior to the June 1992 elections is reflected in the result of a study conducted in October 1991 by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Bratislava which found that only eight percent of respondents were satisfied with the nature of the federation at that time.[72]

As Table IV illustrates, support for a common state among citizens in the Czech Lands also declined significantly in the course of 1991. While the proportion of respondents in Slovakia who saw two independent states as preferable remained at approximately the same level between November 1991 and July 1992, the proportion of respondents in the Czech republic who supported this option increased by three times during this period (see Table IV).[73]

Citizens in both parts of the country agreed in mid-1992 that separation would have negative economic consequences. Although more respondents in Slovakia (34 percent) than in the Czech Lands (21 percent) surveyed by AISA in April 1992 thought that people would be better off if a split would occur, a sizeable majority of respondents in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia (75 percent and 61 percent) felt that the standard of living would not be better if the country separated.[74] Just under a majority of citizens in the Czech Republic (49

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percent) and forty percent of those in Slovakia surveyed in early July 1992 felt

that the break-up of the federation would lead to a temporary worsening of the

situation in the Czech Republic. Twenty three percent of respondents in the

Czech Lands and 15 of those in Slovakia felt that it would make rapid economic

and political progress easier to attain. Views concerning the consequences for

Slovakia were more differentiated by republic, as 17 percent of respondents in

Slovakia, but only one percent in the Czech Lands felt that a split would make

rapid economic and political progress easier in Slovakia. Forty percent of those

in Slovakia, and 19 percent in the Czech Lands expected a temporary worsening of

the economic situation. Fifty percent of respondents in the Czech Lands and 26

in Slovakia anticipated a long-term worsening of the situation. Nearly 20 percent

of respondents in the Czech Lands, but only seven percent in Slovakia, thought

that separation would lead to the complete loss of the opportunity to continue

development toward democracy and economic prosperity in Slovakia.[75]

Czechs and Slovaks differ in their evaluations of the pace and value of the

economic and political changes that occurred after the end of communist rule.

Expectations of the state and political preferences also differ in the two

republics. These differences, which became evident very early after the fall of

the communist system,[76] increased in the course of 1991 and 1992.

In the economic realm, citizen perceptions concerning the desirability of

the shift to the market have been colored by the different impact of the economic

reform in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. Surveys conducted in 1990 for example,

found that a much larger proportion of respondents in Slovakia (47 percent) than

in the Czech Lands (32 percent) wanted the state to retain responsibility for

ensuring employment for all citizens. Inhabitants of Slovakia were also less

supportive of a radical and rapid move to the market (51 percent compared to 60

33

percent in the Czech Lands), and far more likely to agree that unemployment should be avoided, even at the cost of significantly hindering or suspending the economic reform (34 percent, compared to 9 percent in the Czech Lands). Respondents in Slovakia were less willing to accept the loss of their current jobs, more fearful about a decline in the standard of living, and more likely than those in the Czech Lands to indicate that they would strike if there would be major increases in the cost of essential goods. Relatively small differences existed between the two republics levels of interest in becoming independent entrepreneurs or working for private enterprises.[77]

Support for the recreation of a market economy continued to be lower in Slovakia in 1992. Fewer respondents in Slovakia (39 percent) than in the Czech Republic (52 percent), for example, favored a market economy in April 1992. Respondents in Slovakia favored a mixed market and socialist economy to a greater extent than those in the Czech lands (43 percent, compared to 33 percent). Opinions regarding the likelihood that economic developments were moving in the direction of prosperity and a higher standard of living were also more negative in Slovakia, where forty percent of respondents held negative opinions and an additional 14 percent strongly negative opinions. In the Czech Lands, by way of contrast, the majority of respondents either agreed (48 percent) or strongly agreed (17 percent) that developments were moving in that direction.[78] Those surveyed in Slovakia were also considerably less optimistic about the long term effects of the shift to the market. Seventy-four percent of those surveyed in Slovakia, compared to 58 percent of those in the Czech Republic, for example, felt that the move to the market would in the long run enrich only a small number of people.[79]

An October 1991 survey conducted by the Center for Empirical Research

(STEM) of the Sociological Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences found similar differences in the attitudes of respondents in the Czech republic and Slovakia on a range of questions related to economic changes, including privatization, restitution, the influx of foreign capital,and greater wage differentiation.[80] A study conducted by the Center for Social Analysis in Bratislava in January 1992 further documents the generally negative attitude toward privatization that prevails in Slovakia. As the authors note, "In Slovakia, privatization is taking place in an atmosphere of marked lack of trust in the federal and republic government, as well as in the economic reform."[81] Slovaks were more favorable to small privatization than to large scale privatization. However, even in this area, expectations were more positive among respondents in the Czech Lands. Whereas 43 percent of those questioned in the Czech Lands wanted to see privatization extended, compared to 17 percent who wanted to see less privatization, in Slovakia 25 percent supported more privatization, while 35 percent wanted to see less.[82] Surveys conducted ECOMA/Gallup Social Surveys Ltd in January 1991 and by AISA in November 1991 found less acceptance among Slovaks than Czechs of the possibility that some people would get rich as the result of the economic changes; they also documented continued differences in views concerning the sale of all state enterprises.[83]

These results are paralleled by those of surveys conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Prague in the first five months of 1992. Thus, 50 percent of respondents in the Czech Lands felt either that the economic reform should be implemented more quickly, or that it was going well. Twenty three percent of Slovaks shared these views, but a large majority of Slovaks (77 percent) felt that the reform should either be changed or stopped. Differences between the two regions remained substantial throughout the spring of 1992. In

May, 28 percent of respondents in Slovakia, compared to 49 percent of those in the Czech Lands held positive attitudes toward the economic reform. Seventy-two percent of those surveyed in Slovakia, compared to 51 percent in the Czech Lands, held negative views. Support for ending the reform was much stronger among those who had reservations about the reform in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands, where most of those who did not support the reform wanted to see it modified rather than ended.[84] Citizens in Slovakia were also more concerned with problems related to unemployment and the decrease in the living standard than those in the Czech republic in the first six months of 1992.[85]

These differences in attitudes were reflected in the partisan preferences of Czechs and Slovaks. As the results of the June 1992 parliamentary elections illustrate, the voting preferences of citizens in both parts of the country differ significantly. The level of support for left of center successors to the communist party in Slovakia (the Party of the Democratic Left) and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Lands was approximately the same. However, the most popular party in the Czech Lands and the victor in the June 1992 elections, the Civic Democratic Party led by Václav Klaus, has a center right orientation and advocates a continuation of the move to a free market economy and a limited role for the state. The right of center Christian Democratic Union led by the People's Party, and the extreme right party, the Republicans, also won enough votes to seat deputies in the federal as well as republic legislature in the Czech Lands. Neither of the two other parties that emerged from the former Civic Movement, the Civic Democratic Alliance and the Civic Movement, won enough votes to enter the federal assembly, although the right of center Civic Democratic Alliance, with 5.9 percent of the vote, is represented in the Czech National Council. The left of center Liberal Social Union and ethnic based Movement for

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Self-Governing Democracy, Association for Moravia and Silesia also are represented in the Czech National Council. (See Table V.)

In Slovakia, by way of contrast, the left of center Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko, HZDS) led by Vladimír Mečiar emerged as the strongest party. Support for Mečiar's party, which challenged the government's economic program and also advocated greater autonomy for Slovakia during 1991 and prior to the June 1992 elections, fluctuated somewhat in 1991 and in 1992, but the HZDS was consistently the most popular party in Slovakia. Its leader, Vladimir Mečiar, now Prime Minister of Slovakia, also was one of the two most popular and trusted politicians in Slovakia. Surveys conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in October 1991, for example, found that 47.2 percent of respondents trusted Mečiar. Alexander Dubček, with 25.8 percent was second. Peter Weiss, head of the Party of the Democratic Left, ranked fourth after Václav Havel with 12 percent support in October 1991, and third, with 22 percent in January 1992.[86] Mečiar was also ranked as one of the two most popular politicians in Slovakia according to the results of polls conducted according by a somewhat different method by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Prague. Thus, he was trusted by 68 percent of respondents in September 1991, second only to Alexander Dubček who was trusted by 75 percent.[87] Trust in Mečiar decreased somewhat to 64 percent in March 1992 but increased to 73 percent, compared to 69 percent in Alexander Dubček, by May 1992 and 73 percent, second to Peter Weiss, at 75 percent, in July 1992.[88] Other politicians, including President Havel and Slovak Premier Ján Čarnogurský received far less support (17.1 and nine percent respectively).[89]

Support for the Slovak National Party, which pushed the discussion of

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Slovakia's future in a more radical direction, ranged from 15 to 12 percent in the last half of 1991 and the first half of 1992. The Party, whose leaders also called for radical change in the economic reforms, won approximately nine percent of the vote in both houses of the federal parliament and eight percent to the Slovak National Council.[90] The parties that formed the coalition that governed Slovakia from the June 1990 to June 1992 elections did poorly in the 1992 elections. The Christian Democratic Movement led by Ján Čarnogurský received approximately nine percent of the vote to both the federal and republic legislatures. The Civic Democratic Union (Občianská demokratická únia, ODU), which was formed by members of the former Public against Violence who opposed Mečiar, did not receive enough votes to seat deputies in either legislature. (See Table V). '

Table V: Results of the 1992 Parliamentary Elections in Czechoslovakia			
Czech Lands	House of the People	House of Nations	Czech National Council
Civic Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Party	% / seats 33.9 (48)	% / seats 33.4 (37)	% / seats 29.7 (76)
Left Bloc (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, DLCSFR)	14.3 (19)	14.5 (15)	14.1 (35)
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party	7.7 (10)	6.8 (6)	6.5 (16)
Republican Party	6.5 (8)	6.4 (6)	6.3 (15)
Christian Democratic Union-People's Party	5.8 (7)	6.1 (5)	6.3 (16)
Liberal Social Union	5.9 (7)	6.1 (5)	6.5 (16)
Civic Democratic Alliance	4.98 --	4.8 --	5.9 (14)
Association for Moravia-Silesia	4.9 --	4.2 --	5.9 (14)
Civic Movement	4.4 --	4.7 --	4.6 --

Slovakia	House of the People	House of Nations	Slovak National Council
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	33.5 (24)	33.9 (33)	37.3 (74)
Party of the Democratic Left	14.4 (10)	14.0 (13)	14.7 (39)
Slovak National Party	9.4 (6)	9.4 (6)	7.9 (15)
Christian Democratic Movement	9.0 (6)	8.8 (8)	8.9 (18)
Coexistence/Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement	-- --	-- --	7.42 (14)
Coexistence/Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement/Hungarian People's Party	7.4 (5)	7.4 (7)	-- --
Social Democratic Party	-- --	6.1 (5)	-- --
Civic Democratic Party	4.0 --	4.0 --	4.0 --
Hungarian Civic Party	2.3 --	2.4 --	2.3 --
Democratic Party-Civic Democratic Union	3.7 --	3.4 --	2.3 --

Source: Jiří Pehe, "Czechoslovakia's Political Balance Sheet, 1990-1992," RFE/RL Research Reports, vol. 1, no. 25, June 19, 1992, p. 29; and "Volby 1992," Respekt, June 8-14, 1992.

Conclusion

As the surveys discussed above illustrate, then, the values and orientations of citizens of the Czech and Slovak republics differ in many important ways. These differences, which are not limited to views concerning the organization of the state, reflect the influence of each people's history, levels of economic development, and the legacy of the communist period. They also reflect the different impact of the transition to the market in the two regions.

The threat to the continued existence of a common state was also heightened by the features of transitional politics discussed earlier. As the result of the June 1992 elections, Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar, neither of

whose parties won a majority of the popular vote in their region, have negotiated what appears to be the end of the federation. Popular opinion in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia continued to be against the break-up of the state in July 1992, but the main political forces supporting the continuation of a common state did poorly in the June elections in both regions, and most Czechs and Slovaks see little hope that the break-up of the state can be avoided.[91] As the difference in the number of citizens in Slovakia who supported separation of the country into two states and who voted for Mečiar indicates, voting preferences in the June elections depended on other factors, such as attitudes toward the economic reforms, in addition to voters' preferences in regards to the future form of the state. But, although the majority of Slovaks appear to want to see some form of a common state preserved, the most popular political parties in Slovakia support Slovak independence.

The increase in the political salience of ethnicity that occurred after the ouster of the communist system in Czechoslovakia resulted in part from the ability of political leaders to channel the dissatisfaction and uncertainty that inevitably accompany large scale economic and political changes into support for ethnic aims. The still relatively uninstitutionalized party system and the degree of flux still evident in many other elements of the political system facilitated such actions. However, as is the case in many other situations in which ethnic issues have come to dominate political life, the ability of ethnic leaders to use such circumstances to their own advantage derived in part from the fact that there are important differences in objectives and perspective between the two groups involved.

The momentum toward separation created by the impasses and the failed negotiations during the first two years after the end of communist rule also contributed to the current situation. Although most citizens in 1991 and the first

half of 1992 did not support a break-up of the state, the situation had reached

the stage in which most political actors saw the breakup of the state as, if not a

desirable, at least a possible outcome of the current political and economic

situation. This sentiment was well-captured by a headline in a daily Prague

newspaper in late November 1991: "It's time for a divorce!"[92] As most marriage

counselors know, the very act of seriously considering divorce can imperil a

shaky marriage and is frequently a sign that the marriage is already over.

Relations between Czechs and Slovaks clearly had reached that point by mid-

1992. Although most citizens continued to oppose a break-up of the state, most

saw separation as the most likely outcome.

1. Sharon Wolchik. Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: Pinter Press, 1991), p. 52; and Sharon Wolchik, "The Re-emergence of the Political Right in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia," paper presented at the Conference on the Political Right in Post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, Rutgers University, April 1992.

2. See Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 94-95, 180-195 for an analysis of the activities of these groups in the early Post-Communist period.

3. The 1990 census indicates that there are 115,000 gypsies in Czechoslovakia. Dr. Peter Hunčik, advisor to President Havel, estimates that there are approximately 400,00 gypsies. See "Obyvatelstvo ČSFR podle národností a náboženského vyznání," Dokumentační přehled ČTK, 32 (1991): p. H-1; see Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 182-183 for a discussion of varying estimates of the gypsy population.

4. See Fedor Gál, "Problém česko-slovenských vzťahov po novembri 1989 cez prizmu politiky," in Fedor Gál et al., Dnešní krize česko-slovenských vztahů, (Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství, 1992), pp. 20-39 for an analysis by the former head of Public Against Violence and sociologist. See also Milada Polišenská, "Chronologie vývoje státoprávní problematiky od jmenování vlády národního porozumění 10.12.1989 do konce května 1992," manuscript, Institute of International Relations, Prague, 1992, for a chronology of

significant events from November 1989 to May 1992.

5.   See Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, Chapter 2 for further discussion.

6.   See "Slova ke každému," <u>Svobodné slovo</u>, November 18, 1991, pp. 2-3 for the text of Havel's speech.   See Nel, "Rozhodne to parlament," <u>Lidové noviny</u>, November 19, 1991, pp. 1 and 12, and "Odsouzené k záhubě?" <u>Lidové noviny</u>, November 19, 1991, pp. 1 and 12, for reactions to Havel's speech.   See Jiří Pehe, "Czech and Slovak Leaders Deadlocked Over Country's Future," <u>Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe</u>, 2, 48 (29 November 1991) for a brief discussion of this crisis.

7.   See Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, pp. 50-58, 161-217, for a discussion of these events.

8.   Petr Pithart, news conference, November 13, 1991, as reported in "Pithart Meets Press on 11-12 Nov. Federation Talks, "FBIS-EEU-91-220, 14 November 1991, p. 10.

9.   See Peter Martin, "Economic Reforms and Slovakia," <u>Report on Eastern Europe</u>, 2, 27, (5 July 1991) for an overview.   See also interview with Slovak Prime Minister Ján Čarnogurský on May 14, 1991, as reported in "Čarnogurský Interviewed on Slovak Economy," Foreign Broadcast Information Service--East European Report-91-095, (16 May 1991), pp. 13-14.

10.   See Archie Brown and Gordon Wightman, "Czechoslovakia: Revival and Retreat," in <u>Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States</u>, edited by Archie Brown and Jack Grey, (London and New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979); Pavol Frič, Zora Bútorová, and Tatiana Rosová, "Relations Between Czechs and Slovaks in the Mirror of Research," Bratislava, 1991; Centrum pre výzkum spoločenských problémov, and Marian Timoracký, "<u>Aktuálne problémy Česko-Slovenska</u> (Bratislava, November 1990); Zora Bútorová and Martin Bútora, "Ostražitosť vôči Židom," <u>Přítomnost</u>, no. 4, 1992, pp. 10-11, and ASIA, "Výzkum politických postojů 15.-24. dubna 1992," (Prague, 1992).

11.   See Josef Alan, "Česko-slovenské vztahy po pádu komunistického panství," in Gál et al., <u>Dnešní krize</u>, pp. 8-17 for a recent overview of these differences.

12. See Owen Johnson, <u>Slovakia, 1918-1938: Education and the Making of a Nation</u>, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), Chapter 1; Hugh Agnew, "Enlightenment and National Consciousness: Three Czech 'Popular Awakeners'," <u>Nation and Ideology: Essays in Honor of Wayne S. Vucinich</u>, eds. Ivo Banac, John G. Ackerman, and Roman Szporluk (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1981) and "Czechs, Slovaks, and the Slovak Linguistic Separatism of the 19th Century" <u>The Czech and Slovak Experience</u>, (London: Macmillian,

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1991); Robert J. Kerner, <u>Czechoslovakia</u> (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1949); Samuel Harrision Thomson, <u>Czechoslovakia in European History</u>, 2nd. ed., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953); Peter Brock and H. Gordon Skilling, eds., <u>The Czech Renascence of the Nineteenth Century</u>, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); F. Gregory Campbell, <u>Confrontation in Central Europe: Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia</u>, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 1-12; Karen J. Freeze, "The Young Progressives: The Czech Student Movement, 1887-1897," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1974); and Bruce M. Garver, <u>The Young Czech Party, 1874-1901, and the Emergence of a Multiparty System</u>, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978); Sharon Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, pp. 6-15 for a more detailed overview of these differences.

13. See Sharon Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, pp. 112-13 for references to studies that illustrate these trends. See also Archie Brown and Gordon Wightman. "Czechoslovakia: Revival and Retreat;" and Archie Brown and Jack Grey, eds. <u>Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States</u>. See also H. Gordon Skilling, "Czechoslovak Political Culture: Pluralism in an International Context,"in <u>Political Culture and Communist States</u>, edited by Archie Brown (London: Macmillan, 1984); David W. Paul. "Czechoslovakia's Political Culture Reconsidered," in <u>Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States</u>, edited by Archie Brown and Jack Grey, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979).

14. See Václav L. Beneš, "Czechoslovak Democracy and Its Problems," <u>A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948</u>, Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža, eds., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 43; Owen Johnson, <u>Slovakia, 1918-1938</u>, p. 77; and Sharon Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, pp. 7-8.

15. See Zora P.Pryor, "Czechoslovak Economic Development in the Interwar Period," <u>A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948</u>, Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža, eds., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 188-215; and Alice Teichová, <u>The Czechoslovak Economy 1918-1980</u>, (London and New York: Routeledge, 1988), pp. 17-86.

16. Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, pp. 12-17. See also Owen Johnson <u>Slovakia, 1918-1938</u>; Joseph Rothschild, <u>East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars</u>, (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1974), pp. 117-21; Josef Korbel, <u>Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of Its History</u>, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 105-106, 153-56; Yeshayahu Jelinek, <u>The Parish Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party</u>, (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1976); and Thomson, 416-19.

17. See Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, pp. 212-216 for a more detailed discussion; see also Pedro Ramet, "Christianity and National Heritage Among the Czech and Slovaks," <u>Religion and</u>

Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, Pedro Ramet, ed., 2nd. ed., (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).

18. "Obyvatelstvo ČSFR podle národností a náboženského vyznání," Dokumentační prehled, no. 32, 1991, p. H-1).

19. See Sharon Wolchik, "Regional Inequalities in Czechoslovakia," in Communism and the Politics of Inequalities, ed. Daniel J. Nelson, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 249-70; and Czechoslovakia in Transition pp. 186-195.

20. See Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Vladimir V. Kusin, Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1973). Wolchik, "Regional Inequalities in Czechoslovakia," and Czechoslovakia in Transition.

21. See H. Gordon Skilling, "Czechoslovak Political Culture: Pluralism in an International Context," pp. 115-133. H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); and H. Gordon Skilling, "Stalinism and Czechoslovak Political Culture," in Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation, edited by Robert C. Tucker, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1977).

22. See Matuška, 1989, for a summary of these discussions.

23. See Josef Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981) for an analysis that highlights the importance of these factors.

24. See "Už takmer štvrť milióna, Práca, Nov 16, 1991, p. 30; hor, "Čísla o nezaměstnanosti," Občanský deník, Nov. 11, 1991, p. 2.

25. Zuzana Alnerová, "How Well Off We Are," Národná obroda, November 4, 1991, pp. 1-2, as reported in "Report Summarizes Wage, Price Developments," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East European Report-91-215, AU0511160791, November 6, 1991, pp. 16-17.

26. "Štyri poschodia pyramídy," Národná obroda, September 2, 1991, p. 23; Marek Boguszak, "Trh domu," Hospodarské noviny, no. 167, August 29, 1991, p. 1, 2.

27. Antonia Vymazalová and Martin Krno, "Busy Legislative Scene," Pravda, Bratislava, 9 October 1991, pp. 1-2 as reported in "SNR Presidium Views Constitutional Issues," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Eastern European Report-91-1991, 15 October 1991, p. 15; Alžbeta Ivaničková and Daniel Kordík, "Zahraničné investicie na Slovensku," Ekonom, May 15-21, 1992.

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28. See Lucie Štaudová, "Nebrzdit privatizaci," <u>Telegraf</u>, June 24, 1992 and Erhard Stacke, "No Yugoslavia Is Imminent Here," <u>Der Standard</u>, 17-18 June 1992, p. 2, as reported in "Mečiar Denies Provoking Breakup of Federation," FBIS-EEU-119, 19 June p. 4.

29. Interview with Ján Čarnogurský, May 14, 1991, as reported in "Čarnogurský Interviewed on Slovak Economy," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East European Report-91-095, 16 May 1991, pp. 13-14; see also Peter Martin, "Economic reform and Slovakia," <u>Report on Eastern Europe</u>, vol. 2, no. 27, July 5, 1991, pp. 6-11; and "Statement on the Current Economic Situation and the Situation Regarding the Control Arrangement," <u>Slovenský denník</u>, December 2, 1991, pp. 1-2, as reported in "KDH Ministers Object to Government Proposals," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East European Report-91-233, 4 December 1991, pp. 18-19.

30. See Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, and "Czechoslovakia in Transition," in <u>Instability in Eastern Europe in the Post-Communist Era</u>, edited by Trond Gilberg, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming), for further discussions of these trends.

31. See Samuel H. Barnes, Peter McDonough, and Antonio Lopez Pina, "The Development of Partisanship in New Democracies: The Case of Spain," <u>American Journal of Political Science</u> 29:4 (November 1985): 695-720.

32. "Občan pomaly chladne " Nový čas, Oct 23, 1991, p. 30.

33. "Koho bychom volili," <u>Lidové noviny</u>, 20 Nov. 1991, p. 2.

34. From information from Institute for Public Opinion Research, Prague (Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění), April 24, 1992, Tables I and II.

35. Jan Obrman, "The Czechoslovak Elections," <u>RFE/RL Research Report</u>, vol. 1, no. 26, June 26, 1992, pp. 12-19.

36. Stanislava Dufková, "Conversations at Lány," Interview with President Václav Havel recorded at the president's cottage in Hrádeček on 2 November, 1991, broadcast on Prague, Československý Rozhlas Radio Network in Czech 1315 GMT 3 Nov. 1991, as reported in "Havel on Bratislava Events, 3 Nov. Hrádeček Talks," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East European Report-91-213, LD031184491, 4 November 1991, pp. 9-11.

37. See Sharon Wolchik, "The Crisis of Socialism in Central and Eastern Europe and Its Future," in <u>The Crisis of Socialism in Europe</u>, edited by Christine Lemke and Gary Marks, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 1, 2.

38. Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, 1990, pp. 2-3; see also Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, pp. 116-120.

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39. Ivan Gabal, director of the Presidential Office for Political Analysis, as reported in "Poll Views Czech, Slovak Attitudes on Issues," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East European Report-91-185, Sept. 24, 1991, pp. 13-14.

40. Public opinion polls conducted in October 1991, for example, found that 50 percent of the population in Slovakia indicated that they were dissatisfied with the current situation and 32 percent were very dissatisfied. Results were similar in November 1991, when 60 percent of the total population, including 54 percent in the Czech Lands and 78 percent in Slovakia, were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. "Čo hovoria statistiky," Verejnost', 10/1 0/91,p.2. "Nespokojeno 69 procent," Lidové noviny, November 1, 1991, p. 2.

41. Information from representative sample of 1320 persons surveyed by the Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, January 2-9, 1992.

42. Information from Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, May 1992.

43. Information from representative sample of 1320 persons surveyed by Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, January 2-9, 1992.

44. See Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 119-26.

45. Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, "K pocitům národnostní nevraživosti v. r. 1991, " Prague, 1992.

46. See Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 67, 76, 91, 92, 96, 109-112 passim, 115, 142, 147-8, 156, 157-8, 193, 199, 206 for information on earlier surveys.

47. Tomek and First, 1991.

48. Gabal, "Poll Views Czech, Slovak Attitudes," p. 14.

49. "Karel Kříž and Petr Husák, "Two Hundred Years with Lucifer," Lidové noviny, October 23, 1991, p. 11 as reported in "Čarnogurský Discusses Liberalism, Slovak Issues," FBIS-EEU-91-211, 31 October 1991, p. 15.

50. See fa, sla, "Are We Going to Stay at the Platform?" Mladá fronta dnes, October 10, 1991, p. 2 as reported in "Pithart: Slovak Position Endangers EC Agreement," FBIS-EEU-910200, 16 October 1991, p. 9.

51. "Ready for a Divorce," The Economist, November 2-8, 1991, Vol. 321, no. 7731, p. 46.

52.   See "Prezident žádá občany o pomoc," <u>Mladá fronta dnes</u>, November 18, 1991, pp. 1-2; "Ofenzíva Hradu," <u>Lidové noviny</u>, November 18, 1991, pp. 1,8; jlk, nel, "Prezident v parlamentu," <u>Lidové noviny</u>, November 22, 1991, pp. 1, 16.

53.   See Wolchik, <u>Czechoslovakia in Transition</u>, pp. 161-164, 180-205.

54.   "Dnešná tvár Slovenska," <u>Lidové noviny</u>, September 19, 1991, p. 3.

55.   "Vztahy ČR-SR," <u>Hospodářské noviny</u>, no. 34, February 18, 1992, p. 1.

56.   Jindřich Beránek, "Jako bychom se míjeli," Právo lidu, June 12, 1992.   An AISA poll conducted in late 1992 found similar results.   Sixty-seven percent of respondents in Slovakia and 12 percent the Czech Lands thought the federation benefitted the Czechs.   (Michael J. Dees, "A Study of Nationalism in Czechoslovakia," <u>RFE/RL Research Report</u>, January 31, 1992, p. 11.)

57.   Beránek, "Jako bychom se míjeli."

58.   Pavol Frič, Zora Bútorová, Tatiana Rosová, "Relations Between Czechs and Slovaks in the Mirror of Research," manuscript, 1991, Bratislava.   See also Marian Timoracký, "Verejná mienka česko-slovenských vzťahoch," in Gál et al., <u>Dnešní krize</u>, pp. 68-90.

59.   Frič, Bútorová, and Rossová, p. 6.

60.   Ibid, p. 8.

61.   Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, "Dnešní situace ve vztazích Čechů a Slováků je blízká stavu v červnu," 1990, Prague, May 1992, p. 2.

62.   Češi a Slováci," <u>Hospodářské noviny</u>, June 5, 1992.

63.   Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, "Názory čs. veřejnosti na státoprávní uspořádání a na referendum," July 28, 1992, p. 5.

64.   Michael J. Deis, "A Study of Nationalism in Czechoslovakia," <u>RFE/RL Research Report</u>, 31 January 1992, p. 12.

65.   Beránek, "Jako bychom se míjeli."

66.   "Nespokojeno 69 procent," <u>Lidové noviny</u>, November 1, 1991, p. 2.

67.   Milan Tuček, "Jaké by byly výsledky referenda ke státoprávnímu uspořádání?" <u>Data & Fakta</u>, February 1992, p. 3.

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68.   See "Poll: Sixty-four percent Support Federation," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East European Report-91-212, LD 0111044191 Prague ČSTK in English 1911 GMT 31 October 1991, 1 Nov. 91, p. 5.

69.   Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, "Názory čs. veřejnosti," p. 13.

70.   See Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, for a more detailed discussion of earlier polls on this question.

71.   See L. Beneš, "Daňová reforma-ale kdy?" Hospodářské noviny, August 29, 1990, p. 1; and Sharon Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 124-125 for further details.

72.   "Federace a dvě ústavy," Lidové noviny, October 24, 1991, p. 2.

73.   The results of an effort by researchers at Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění in July 1992 to ascertain the preferences of citizens by describing several different resolutions without using the labels commonly used to describe these patterns found similar results.   Thus, the majority of respondents (62 percent) in the Czech lands identified a federation as the most appropriate model; 22 percent chose separation.   In Slovakia, approximately equal proportions chose federation (38 percent) and confederation (35 percent);   20 percent chose separation.   Approximately equal proportions identified separation as the option they preferred least in the Czech Lands (46 percent) and Slovakia (47 percent). However, 38 percent of respondents in Slovakia identified the model corresponding to a federation as the option they preferred least. (Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, "Názory čs. veřejnosti," p. 3.)

74.   Beránek, "Jako by bychom se míjeli."

75.   Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, "Názory čs. veřejnosti," p. 11.

76.   See Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, chapter 4 on economy and chapter 2 for a discussion of these differences in the early Post-Communist period.

77.   Marek Boguszak and Vladimír Rak, "Czechoslovakia-May 1990 Survey Report." Prague: AISA, 1990 Table 1; see also Sharon Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 122-24.

78.   AISA, "Výzkum politickych postojů," 15.-24. dubna 1992 (Prague, AISA, May 1992), p. 8.

79.   AISA, "Výzkum," p. 9.

80. See Jan Hartl, "Nad výsledky našich výzkumů," Prague, STEM.

81. Ibid.

82. V. Krivý and I. Radičová, "Atmosféra dôvery a atmosféra nedôvery?" Sociologicke aktuality, no. 2, 1992, pp. 12 and 13.

83. Michael Deis and Jill Chin, "Czech and Slovak Views on Economic Reform," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, no. 23, 5 June 1992, pp. 68-69.

84. From information from Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, Prague, 1992.

85. Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, "Jaké problémy dnes lidé považují za naléhavé?" Prague, June 30, 1992.

86. "Komu věří Slováci," Lidové noviny, Oct 25, 1991, p. 2; and "By Wire," Verejnost, January 31, 1992, p. 2 as reported in "Meciar 'Most Trusted' Politician in Slovakia," FBIS-EEU-92-025, 6 February 1992, p. 5.

87. České a moravskoslezské zemědělské noviny, 27 September 1991, p. 1 as reported in "Havel Tops List of Most Popular Politicians," FBIS-EEU-91-191, 2 October 1991, p. 10.

88. Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, "Popularita politiků," Prague, March 1992; "Žebříček popularity politiků, " Prague, May 1992; and "Žebříček popularity politiků," July 1992.

89. "Komu věří Slováci," Lidové noviny, October 25, 1991, p. 2.

90. Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, Prague, January, March, May and June 1992.

91. See Institut pro výzkum veřejného mínění, "Názory čs. veřejnosti, p. 8.

92. "Je čas pro rozvod!" Večerní Praha, November 1991.

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