The Slánský Trial Reconsidered

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Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series #17

This article reviews and challenges the Soviet-centered interpretation of the 1952 show trial of Czechoslovak Communist party General Secretary Rudolf Slánský and thirteen others. In particular, it examines this interpretation as presented in Karel Kaplan's 1990 *Report on the Murder of the General Secretary*. The Slánsky Trial's organizing principle was anti-Semitism: all but three of the defendants were Jewish, and the trial rhetoric was virulently anti-Semitic. According to the traditional interpretation, the Soviets engineered the trial in order to facilitate a rapprochement with the Arab countries. This article draws on the memoirs of participant and on the secondary literature to argue that such an account of the Soviet role rests on insufficient, and sometimes unreliable, evidence. In conclusion, it suggests that the importance of Czechoslovak domestic factors, including domestic anti-Semitism, has been underestimated.

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The November 1952 "Trial of the Anti-State Conspiratorial Center led by Rudolf Slánský" is one of the most puzzling of the East European show trials. Slánský, the General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, did not fit the usual profile of show-trial victims. He was not a Spanish Civil War veteran, like László Rajk in Hungary; nor a leader of the wartime resistance like Rajk, Władysław Gomułka in Poland, or Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria; nor was he, by any stretch of the imagination, a potential "national Communist."[1] His fall, it seems, can be accounted for only by the fact that he, like all but three of the thirteen men tried with him, was Jewish. (See the Appendix for a list of the defendants.) In the light of this fact, and of the trial's virulent anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic rhetoric, interpretations from the 1950s to the present have depicted the Slánský Trial as first and foremost a Soviet attack on Israel, motivated by changes in the Soviet Union's mid-East policy.

Thus, a 1954 analysis of the trial states:

> The Slánský trial was used to formulate, for the first time, an entire new policy of the Kremlin in the Middle East....[T]he anti-Semitic elements of the trial aimed to signal to the Arab world the definitive divorce of the Kremlin from the cause of the State of Israel.[2]

[1]George H. Hodos, Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954 (New York: Praeger, 1987), 58-61 (for Rajk), 138 (for Gomułka), and 17-18 (for Kostov).

[2]Paul Barton, Prague à l'heure de Moscou: analyse d'une democratie populaire (Paris: Pierre Horay & Cie, 1954), 16.

And a 1990 work by the Czech historian Karel Kaplan, the foremost expert on the Slánský trial, asserts:

> The question concerning the root causes for producing postwar Europe's largest political trial with former Communist officials, and specifically for its anti-Semitic orientation, calls for a consideration of changes in Soviet great-power politics....The campaign against Zionism, which reflected the shift in Soviet policy toward Israel and its efforts to break through the isolation in the Arab world, culminated in the Slánský trial in Czechoslovakia, the country which militarily helped Israel the most.[3]

In this essay, I will examine and evaluate the evidence for the two main elements of this theory: that Moscow selected the victims for the Slánský Trial, and that it did so in order to support its foreign policy in the Middle East.

In discussing the process by which victims were selected, I will rely primarily on Karel Kaplan's Report on the Murder of the General Secretary (cited above), and on the "Piller Report" (The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950-54) prepared during the Prague Spring for the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and later published abroad. (Kaplan was a leading member of the team of Communist historians, lawyers, and economists who prepared the Piller Report.) I will also use accounts by survivors of the trial and by the widows of some of the defendants.

Since the Piller Report and Kaplan's work form the basis for any account of the Slánský Trial, a note on the sources they themselves used is in order. The Piller Report team had access to materials in the archives of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, to some other official documents, and to what they characterized as "incomplete" materials from the Ministry of the Interior.[4] In addition, they relied upon depositions made by some of those involved in staging the trials, including statements made by the principal Czechoslovak interrogators, Vladimir Kohoutek and Bohumil Doubek,

[3]Karel Kaplan, Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, tr. Karel Kovanda (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990), 236 and 242. Similar interpretations occur in Paul Lendvai, Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe (London: Macdonald & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 1972), 246; and Barbara Jancar, "The Great Purges and 'The Prague Spring'," Orbis 15 (Summer 1971), No. 2, 609-24.

[4]Jiří Pelikán, ed., The Czechoslovak Political Trials 1950-1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 35-6.

after they were arrested in 1955.[5] Kaplan's work (begun in the late 1970s in West Germany) uses these sources, as well as further archival documents that he succeeded in bringing out of Czechoslovakia.[6] In particular, he uses interrogation and prison records to present an extremely detailed, sometimes hour-by-hour, account of the process by which Slánský and others were broken physically and psychologically. As impressive - and indeed indispensable - as his book is, it has one major drawback. Some of his most important statements lack footnotes; and some of his footnotes identify documents only by their archive location and number, with no indication as to date, author, or nature (e.g., deposition, minutes, letter). Therefore, as the discussion below will demonstrate, it is hard to evaluate certain claims that are crucial to Kaplan's argument.

The sources available for the Slánský Trial present three general problems. The first, a universal difficulty in the use of memoirs, is the possibility of mistakes in accounts given long after the events they describe. For example, the memoirs of Slánský Trial defendant Eugene Loebl include a vivid description of a conversation between Loebl and his interrogator about a Rudé Pravo article congratulating Slánský on his fiftieth birthday (on July 31, 1951). Loebl recalls that the article referred to Slánský as "Deputy Prime Minister," and that the interrogator explained to him that this change in title meant that - in spite of the article's laudatory tone - Slánský's fall was certain.[7] But in fact, Slánský's transfer from the office of General Secretary to that of Deputy Prime Minister did not take place until early September of 1951.

More important than innocent error due to failures of memory, or conflations of memories from different occasions, is the possibility of self-serving bias. In the Slánský

[5]Pelikán, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 160-61 and 182-3.

[6]Josef Skvorecky, "The Theater of Cruelty" [review of Karel Kaplan's Report on the Murder of the General Secretary], New York Review of Books, August 16, 1990, 41-44, 41. See also Kaplan, Report on the Murder, xvi.

[7]Eugene Loebl, My Mind on Trial (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 163. (I have used the Anglicized version of Evžen Löbl's name throughout, in conformity with his English-language publications.) See Josefá Slánská, Report on My Husband, tr. Edith Pargeter (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1969), 6-10, for a reprint of the Rudé Pravo article congratulating Slánský.

Trial, such bias must be suspected in the claims, put forward by many Czechoslovak participants, that the Soviets were responsible for almost everything that happened. For instance, the account of the role played by the Soviet security advisers rests at crucial points on the testimony of the Czechoslovak interrogators: their testimony, however, was given when they were under arrest, charged with individual responsibility for the entire process, and had an obvious motive for laying as much blame as possible on the Soviet advisers.[8] The testimony of Party functionaries who achieved top positions at the time of Slánský's fall (in particular that of Alexej Čepička, discussed below) is open to the same doubt.

Finally, one must note the almost complete lack of evidence from the Soviet side, apart from a few important letters from Stalin to Gottwald. The lack of Soviet materials raises particular difficulties because of the decisive role that the the traditional explanation of the trial accords not only to Soviet relations with Czechoslovakia, but also to the interaction of Soviet foreign and domestic policies, and sometimes to conflicts between Stalin and Beria. For all these reasons, the account given below must be considered conditional in some respects.

In the following pages, Kaplan's account of the genesis of the Slánský Trial will be reviewed in some detail, as a precondition for evaluating his argument that the Soviet role was primary.[9] Regardless of whether this interpretation is accepted, Kaplan's work remains the most authoritative account of an extremely intricate chain of events. The Slánský Trial was a long time in the making: the first defendant (Eugene Loebl) was arrested in November of 1949, and the last (André Simone) in June of 1952.[10] Moreover, the "concept" behind the arrests changed a few times before the great reversal in the spring of 1951, when a conspiracy against Slánský was suddenly transformed into a conspiracy

[8]See Note 5 above for the circumstances.

[9]In this section I will frequently summarize Kaplan's narrative, or pull together statements from different parts of it; for this reason, I have most often footnoted extended passages rather than individual statements. Other sources have been used mainly to provide biographical context lacking in Kaplan's account, which focuses mainly on the security apparatus, arrests, and interrogations.

[10]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 59 and 197.

headed by him. This means that the reasons many of the defendants were arrested were quite different from the reasons they were included in the trial. People arrested long before the trial in its final form was envisaged were "cast" for parts in it because they were suitable to the scenario (or simply because they were articulate); the staging of the trial then gave the group an artificial unity.[11] A corollary is that many of those arrested along with Slánský Trial defendants were not tried with them: some were to be sentenced in the "follow-up trials" of alleged branches of the Antistate Center in 1953 and 1954.[12]

Preparations for the trial of László Rajk (held in Budapest in September of 1949) provided the starting point for what would become the Slánský case. In June of 1949, Hungarian CP General Secretary Mátyás Rákosi visited Prague, and presented to President Klement Gottwald a list of about sixty Czechoslovak officials whose names, he said, had been given by those under interrogation in the Rajk case. Among those under interrogation was a Slovak Communist, Gejza Pavlík, who had been handed over to the Hungarians at their request in May of 1949. Pavlík's "crime" consisted of some contacts during the war with Noel Field, at that time the European Director of the Unitarian Service Committee in Switzerland. Field, like Pavlík, was delivered to the Hungarians by the Czechoslovaks in May of 1949; he and his brother Hermann were to figure in person or by name in every show trial in Eastern Europe before being rehabilitated and released in 1954.[13] On Rákosi's list were five future Slánský Trial defendants: Foreign Minister Vladimir Clementis; Deputy Foreign Ministers Vavro Hajdů and Artur London; Deputy Trade Minister Eugene Loebl; and Party Secretary for Brno Otto Šling. Also on the list was the diplomat Richard Slánský, Rudolf's brother (who would be arrested on the same day as Rudolf).[14] Another significant name was that of Interior Minister Václav Nosek, a

[11]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 200.
[12]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 235.
[13]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 40-42. For more on the Field brothers, see Hodos, Show Trials, 25-32 and 88.
[14]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 42-3; Pelikán, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 108 (for Richard Slánský's arrest).

good friend of both Loebl and Šling.[15] (Nosek, interestingly, would be transferred to the less-sensitive post of Labor Minister, but not purged.[16]) Finally, the list included a number of Slovak politicians, among them Gustav Husák. The people on the list were linked by having spent the war in the resistance (for the Slovaks); or in the West, whether free or in concentration camps.[17] Clementis, Hajdů, Loebl, Nosek, and Šling had all been in England; London in Mauthausen.[18]

While the initiative for the first arrests came from Budapest, it is clear that Czechoslovak officials played an active role. In the first place, while Loebl was arrested in November of 1949, the next arrest of a future Slánský Trial defendant on Rákosi's list (Otto Šling) did not happen until October of 1950. This indicates that the Czechoslovak security forces were not blindly following Hungarian instructions. And when Pavlík recanted his incriminating "confessions" after his return to Czechoslovakia, explaining that under torture he had named people he thought would be above suspicion, the methods used by the Czechoslovak security forces (apparently with the approval of Slánský and Gottwald) to make him repeat his earlier testimony were no different from those originally used by the Hungarians to obtain it.[19]

Both the composition of the list and its initial results - the arrest of Eugene Loebl, and the spring 1950 demotion of Vladimir Clementis from the post of Foreign Minister - seemed to indicate that the process begun by the Rajk trial was leading towards a purge of Slovaks.[20] (Eugene Loebl, though his Jewish origin would be emphasized later, fitted into the Slovak pattern. He was from Slovakia; Clementis had brought him into the Party; and

[15]Loebl, My Mind on Trial, 37; and Marian Šlingova, Truth Will Prevail (London: Merlin Press, 1968), 28-9.

[16]J. W. Brügel, "Die Dunklen Jahre der Tschechoslowakei: Der 'Piller-Bericht' Über Schauprozesse und Justizmorde," Osteuropa 21 (1971), No. 2, 98-106, 99.

[17]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 43.

[18]For the wartime locations of Loebl, Nosek, and Šling, see Note 15 above. For Clementis, see Loebl, My Mind on Trial, 78-9. For Artur London, see his work On Trial (London: Macdonald and Company, 1970), 30. For Hajdů, see Pelikán, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 333.

[19]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 44-6.

[20]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 65-73.

Gustav Husák was his former student and a close friend.[21]) What were the reasons for this orientation? Interrogator Doubek would later say that the campaign against Slovak bourgeois nationalism had been launched because it was thought that Slovakia, being closest to Hungary, was most likely to yield the "Czechoslovak Rajk."[22]

Moreover, the attack on "bourgeois nationalists" played into the rivalry between two groups of Slovak Communists - the leaders of the unsuccessful uprising against the Germans in 1944, who after the war were mainly in the Slovak leadership; and those who had not been in the uprising or had been in subordinate positions, who after the war were mainly in the national leadership. The phrase "Slovak bourgeois nationalism" was first used publicly by one of the latter, Viliam Široký, in a speech to the Slovak CC of September 1948. According to Gustav Husák (speaking in 1963), it was Široký who arranged for the "Slovak nationalists" to be named in the Rajk interrogations; the Hungarians held Husák and Clementis responsible for post-war attempts to expel ethnic Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. (Široký was himself of ethnic Hungarian origin on his father's side.)[23] Bad feeling between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Parties about the Czechoslovak treatment of ethnic Hungarians predated the Rajk Trial: at the Cominform founding meeting in September 1947, the Hungarian delegation had accused the Czechoslovaks of persecuting their Hungarian minority, including Communists.[24]

Whatever the Hungarian motives, their prodding continued. In a letter to Gottwald of September 3, 1949, Rákosi insisted on the need to arrest those Czechoslovaks who would be named in the Rajk trial before the trial began. A week later, he urged the Czechoslovaks to seek Soviet advisers. They did so in mid-September, and two Soviet

[21]Loebl, My Mind on Trial, 47, 207, and 233.

[22]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 69.

[23]See Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 66, for the rivalry between the two Slovak groups; Pelikán, Czechoslovak Political Trials, 87, for Široký's speech; and Branko Lazitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, 2nd ed. rev. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 431, for Široký's Hungarian origin.

[24]Milovan Djilas, Rise and Fall (San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 136-7.

security officers who had worked on the Rajk trial - Likhachev and Makarov - arrived in Prague in early October. (They would be replaced in the spring of 1950 by a group headed by Vladimir Boyarski.) And in October, a special State Security unit for investigating Party members was created: it was headed by future Slánský Trial defendant Karel Šváb, who was given an office in the Interior Ministry but continued to be responsible directly to the Party leadership. Expanded in late 1949 and early 1950, the special unit included divisions for investigating Trotskyites, Spanish veterans, and bourgeois nationalists (meaning, at this point, Slovaks). When Šváb became Deputy Minister in the new Ministry of National Security in May of 1950, he would retain responsibility for the unit.[25]

Soon after the creation of the special State Security unit, part of the staff of the Party Control Commission (which had been set up in 1948) was redirected from checking work performance to searching for enemies within the Party, using security methods such as wiretaps. Rivalry and suspicions between the two staffs were endemic - in late 1950, the Party Control Commission even planted spies in Šváb's State Security division.[26] Commenting on this rivalry, the Piller Report says:

> It is easy to understand how in the early 1950s, when both organizations took a hand in preparing and carrying through the political cases and the trials, there were often sudden switches, with the hunter becoming the hunted, the prosecutor the accused, and the interrogator the interrogated.[27]

Such "sudden switches" were to be crucial to the Slánský Trial.

Given these intra-security rivalries, it is perhaps not surprising that the reasons for the turn away from Slovak bourgeois nationalism as the main target of the investigations are even murkier than the reasons for the turn towards it. (The concept was not entirely abandoned, of course: although Clementis was included in the Slánský Trial, a separate trial of "Slovak Bourgeois Nationalists," including Husák, was held in April of 1954.[28])

[25]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 53-60.
[26]Pelikán, Czechoslovak Political Trials, 66 and 84.
[27]Pelikán, Czechoslovak Political Trials, 85.
[28]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 290.

Kaplan attributes the rejection of the Slovak bourgeois nationalist "concept" to the Soviets, saying:

> First, the political framework was too localized: the issue was Slovak, anti-Czech nationalism, not an anti-Soviet conspiracy. A trial would not have had nearly the international impact that Rajk's trial did. Second, Soviet advisers rotated again. The new ones wanted to develop a show trial of truly national and international significance, with a group of party officials centered directly in the Prague leadership.[29]

As Kaplan gives no source for this claim, it is difficult to evaluate his argument for a primary Soviet role. That the investigation changed its course in the summer of 1950, however, is beyond doubt. The second of the future Slánský Trial defendants to be arrested was Otto Šling, the Party Secretary for Brno. A Party investigation of Šling began in the summer of 1950: he won the first round, but before a second investigation could be completed he was arrested, on October 6, 1950.[30] Šling's arrest led straight to the highest levels of the Party and the security apparatus, for he was a close associate of CC Secretary Marie Švermová, the widow of Jan Šverma (a prewar Party leader who had died of exposure during the Slovak uprising, and whose death would later be laid to Rudolf Slánský's account). And Švermová was the sister of Karel Šváb, the head of the special State Security section described above. As a Spanish veteran and a member of the "London" group, Šling was a natural suspect in the aftermath of the Rajk trial; he was also a Jew.[31] Finally, it should be noted that Antonín Novotný, who was to be one of the clear "winners" of the Slánský Trial, had an interest in Šling's fall. Novotný's performance as Party Secretary for Prague was under criticism and after the favorable conclusion of the first Party investigation of Šling, the Secretariat had considered giving Šling Novotný's job.[32]

In January and February of 1951, over fifty officials were arrested. Many of them were people Šling had named as his working contacts. Marie Švermová was among them:

[29]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 73.
[30]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 80-84.
[31]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 86, 104.
[32]Pelikán, Czechoslovak Political Trials, 92.

she would be a witness at the Slánský Trial before being tried herself in January of 1954.[33] The security apparatus was hard-hit: besides Šváb, the arrests in its ranks included a group of high-ranking Spanish Civil War veterans. (Šváb's replacement, Andrej Keppert, was known for his "rabid anti-Semitism." Kaplan states that his appointment, and the concomitant establishment of a division for Zionists within the security unit focused on "enemies in the Party," were recommended by the Soviet advisers.[34]) Future Slánský Trial defendants arrested at this time included: Šváb; Reicin, who as Deputy Defense Minister for Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence had been responsible for many of the earlier arrests; former Foreign Minister Vladimir Clementis; and Deputy Foreign Minister Artur London, another Spanish Civil War veteran. (One more future defendant, Deputy Foreign Minister Vavro Hajdů, was also arrested in 1951.[35] While none of the sources consulted gives a date for his arrest, it seems probable that he was arrested at the same time as his colleague Artur London.) Members of the "Slovak nationalist group," and some others who had first appeared on Rákosi's list of June 1949, were also arrested at this time.[36]

At this point, half of the men who would later be tried with Slánský had been arrested. But the thread that would bind them all - the concept of a Zionist conspiracy with Slánský at its head - had not yet been found. This concept, as Kaplan convincingly demonstrates, emerged out of a conflict between two factions among the interrogators. One faction was the Náchod group (named after the hometown of one of its leaders), made up of people who were at odds with both Šváb, and the Spanish veterans within Security. The other was the group around Bohumil Doubek, who was himself one of Šváb's men. In March of 1951, a delegation associated with the Náchod group (whose position appeared to

[33]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 97-112 and 290. For Švermová's appearance as a witness at the Slánský Trial, see Proceedings of the Trials of Slánský et. al., in Prague, Czechoslovakia, November 20-27, 1952 as broadcast by the Czechoslovak Home Service. [Publisher, place of publication, and date of publication not stated], ii.

[34]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 135.

[35]Pelikán, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 333.

[36]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 104-108. For London's Spanish Civil War background, see Barton, Prague a l'heure de Moscou, 20.

have improved with the arrest of Šváb and of the Spanish veterans) went to Slánský to demand a security probe of Doubek and other interrogators whom they held responsible for the lack of progress in the investigation. (Šling and Švermová were being accused of a conspiracy to take over the Party by replacing Slánský with Švermová, among other measures. The path to a show trial was blocked, however, because Šling kept retracting the admissions forced from him, and Švermová, while acknowledging some political mistakes, refused to admit any criminal responsibility or any conspiracy.) Slánský passed the interrogators' complaint to Gottwald; and the conflict was resolved in favor of Doubek's group by Ladislav Kopřiva, the Minister of National Security. It was the losers in this confrontation - the "dissident" group of interrogators - who began, in the spring of 1951, to orient the interrogations of the prisoners under their control toward Slánský, disregarding a ban by Kopřiva and Doubek on naming "prominent personalities."[37]

By early summer, the group had amassed a considerable dossier of statements incriminating Slánský and also Geminder, a former Comintern official who had spent most of his career in Moscow.[38] (Loebl and London have given vivid accounts of how such statements were obtained.[39]) In early July, the dossier thus compiled was passed to Gottwald; the information was also sent to Stalin. Stalin's response, in a letter to Gottwald dated July 20, included the sentences: "We have received incriminating evidence about comrades Slánský and Geminder. We consider this evidence insufficient and believe there are no reasons for charging them." Stalin also warned against trusting statements from "known offenders," and announced that he was dissatisfied with the work of chief adviser Boyarski, and intended to recall him. Gottwald's response shows his relief. Answering on the day he received Stalin's letter, he wrote:

> I fully agree with you that based on materials from the investigation one cannot bring charges against the comrades in question, let alone draw any

[37]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 113-15, 121-2.
[38]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 124-5. For Geminder's background, see Lazitch, Biographical Dictionary, 135.
[39]Artur London, On Trial, 204-12; Eugene Loebl, My Mind on Trial, 150-55.

> conclusions....This has been my opinion from the very first moment when I learned about the matter.

Gottwald asked, however, that Boyarski not be recalled, citing his "valuable assistance."[40]

Stalin's reply to this communication was a suggestion that Gottwald come to Moscow to discuss the situation. Gottwald sent his son-in-law, Minister of Defense Alexej Čepička in his stead; and Čepička, after attending a meeting of the Politburo, returned with a letter from Stalin advising Slánský's removal as General Secretary. The contrast between Gottwald's draft response to this letter, and the one he actually sent, offers clear proof that he had neither anticipated nor desired Slánský's downfall. In the draft, he expressed his belief in Slánský's "political and personal honesty" and said that he himself was not "blameless and free of responsibility for certain mistakes." The letter that he actually sent simply acquiesced in the decision to remove Slánský from his Party post, and asked for Stalin's approval to have Slánský "continue in a responsible position, albeit in a different sphere."[41]

No immediate action was taken against Slánský, although it was noted that Moscow did not send a congratulatory message for his fiftieth birthday, on July 31. (Slánský had also been treated coldly during a visit to Moscow in January: that is, before the investigation turned against him.[42]) Presumably believing that their dossier had not had the desired effect, the dissident interrogators arranged to have a packet of materials incriminating Slánský delivered directly to the Soviet embassy. But this, like their earlier delegation to Slánský, misfired: the Embassy reported them to Kopřiva, who transferred and otherwise penalized members of the group.[43]

At the September 6, 1951, session of the Central Committee, the office of General Secretary was abolished, and Slánský performed a self-criticism for his "erroneous personnel policies." Nevertheless, he was not yet in complete disgrace. He was given a

[40]See Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 125, for all the statements quoted.
[41]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 125-9.
[42]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 118.
[43]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 130-31.

government post as Deputy Prime Minister, and kept his seat on the seven-member Political Secretariat.[44] This Central Committee session was marked not only by Slánský's demotion, but also by official endorsement of the anti-Semitic themes that would later appear in the trial. After Gottwald broached the subject by referring to the many arrested Communists who "did not grow from the roots of our country and our party," Party ideologue Václav Kopecký delivered a diatribe, proclaiming that "cosmopolitans should in principle not be posted in leadership positions," and denouncing Israel for links with Anglo-American imperialism, and Jews for turning against the working class.[45]

The occasion for Slánský's arrest was provided in November, with the notorious "Great Crossing-Sweeper" letter. This letter was supposedly sent by a Western intelligence service to offer Slánský refuge in the West. Kaplan argues that it was probably a joint product of the Soviet and Czechoslovak security services.[46] Soon after the letter was produced, Soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan came to Prague. According to Čepička, he informed Gottwald that Stalin recommended Slánský's arrest. When Gottwald hesitated, Mikoyan telephoned Stalin, and then reiterated the order, saying that Gottwald would be held responsible if Slánský fled the country. On November 23, Gottwald ordered Slánský's arrest; it was carried out the same night.[47]

The way was now clear for the staging of a "Zionist conspiracy" headed by Rudolf Slánský. A wave of arrests suitable to the new concept followed: Otto Fischl, Deputy Finance Minister; Josef Frank, Deputy General Secretary; Ludvík Frejka, Chief of the Economic Department of the President's Cabinet; Bedřich Geminder, Chief of the International Department of the Party Secretariat; Rudolf Margolius, Deputy Trade Minister; and André Simone, Rudé Pravo Foreign Editor.[48] Except for Frank, whose

[44]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 133.
[45]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 136-7.
[46]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 139-42.
[47]Kaplan, Report on the Murder,139-146. There is some uncertainty on the date of Mikoyan's visit; Kaplan argues (143) that he arrived in Prague on November 11, which means that there was a significant delay in carrying out Stalin's order.
[48]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 147 and 196-7.

arrest should presumably be attributed to his position as Slánský's deputy, all were Jews. Margolius, who had joined in the Party in 1945 and been recommended for the position of Deputy Trade Minister by Eugene Loebl, was the only one who was not a veteran Party member.[49] Over the course of the next year, the defendants, as well as "witnesses" for the trial, were subjected to physical and mental torture. Those who had been arrested before Slánský had to change their confessions: from conspirators against Slánský, they became his collaborators. Once their resistance had been broken down, and they were prepared to admit whatever was required of them, they memorized their scripts for the trial. The trial itself, which took place on November 20-27, 1952, ended with death sentences for eleven of the defendants, and life imprisonment for three (Hajdů, Loebl, and London).

What does Kaplan's account of the events leading up to the Slánský Trial, and especially of the turn against Slánský in the spring of 1951, allow us to conclude about the Soviet role? Kaplan himself contends that it was the Soviet advisers who engineered the turn against Slánský: the interrogators who focused on Slánský, he says, were those who "had close ties with the advisers."[50] This hypothesis raises two questions. First, why did Stalin reject the first dossier incriminating Slánský, and in fact use it as an occasion to recall Boyarski? Second, why did the Soviet embassy report the approach by the dissident interrogators to Kopřiva, rather than forwarding their materials to Moscow?

Kaplan accounts for these discrepancies by arguing that the advisers did target Slánský, but that in so doing they were following the instructions not of Stalin, but of the "Moscow security center" (presumably Beria, although his name is not mentioned).[51] The mission of the dissident interrogators and of the advisers, then, was to convince not only Gottwald, but also Stalin, of the necessity for Slánský's arrest. According to this

[49]Heda Margolius Kovaly, Under A Cruel Star: A Life in Prague 1941-1968 (Cambridge, MA: Plunkett Lake Press, 1986), 59; and Loebl, My Mind on Trial, 200.

[50]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 121. It must be noted that many documents cited in this section are identified only by archive number; fully-described documents include statements made by Doubek in 1955, and Kopřiva in 1963. See 304-6, Notes 1-71.

[51]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 121-2.

interpretation, Stalin's initial response to the dossier was a setback for Soviet security:

> Stalin's opinion had entirely different consequences from what the Moscow security center and the Soviet advisers had intended. Stalin not only did not order Slánský's arrest, but he actually sharply criticized the advisers and, indirectly, their Moscow bosses.[52]

And in speaking of the dissident interrogators' attempt to seek the intervention of the Soviet Embassy (described in the Piller report as a move made "behind the backs of the Ministry of National Security and the Soviet advisers"[53]), Kaplan asserts:

> It appeared as though they mistrusted the advisers as well; but in reality, the advisers were clued in and actually instigated this move. They wanted Moscow to receive "evidence" directly from the interrogators, not from the advisers.[54]

As Kaplan offers no documentation for these statements, his hypothesis of an independent role for Beria must be considered unproven. Where Stalin's role is in question, Kaplan's argument is vulnerable from another direction: it relies very heavily on the testimony of Alexej Čepička. Čepička was the only Czechoslovak participant in the crucial July meeting in Moscow after which Stalin decided that Slánský should be removed from the office of General Secretary. Moreover, his is the only account available not only for that meeting, but also for Mikoyan's visit to Prague just before Slánský's arrest.[55] Is it safe to assume that his accounts of these events, and especially of his own role in them, are impartial? Kaplan dismisses the possibility that Čepička's presentation to Stalin at the July meeting could have been deliberately prejudicial to Slánský, saying: "...Čepička would not have dared to intentionally color or bias anything, once he realized how well Stalin was informed about the investigation."[56] And yet, it was after the meeting with Čepička that Stalin reversed his earlier decision, and recommended Slánský's removal from the post of

[52]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 129.
[53]Pelikán, Czechoslovak Political Trials, 102.
[54]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 131.
[55]The Piller Report cites Cepička as its only source on the meeting (Pelikan, Czechoslovak Political Trials, 106; see also 21). Kaplan cites an unidentified archival document; as his information on the course of the meeting does not go beyond that in the Piller Report, it seems most likely that the document is Cepička's testimony. See Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 305 (n. 53).
[56]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 126.

General Secretary. Čepička was raised to the Presidium at the same CC meeting that deposed Slánský from his post as General Secretary (on September 6, 1951). He was to be expelled from the Party in 1963 for his part in the political trials of 1950-54 (among other functions, he had served on the Political Commission in charge of the Slánský Trial).[57] All this suggests that an account based so heavily on his testimony must be considered uncertain.

Thus, while Kaplan's expertise on the trial must command serious consideration for any argument he advances, the evidence he presents does not explain his certainty that the line taken by the dissident interrogators was instigated by someone in Moscow - whether Stalin or Beria - rather than by one of Slánský's domestic rivals (who, as Kaplan points out, included Prime Minister Antonín Zápotocký, Kopecký, Čepička, and others).[58] The undoubted anti-Semitism of the Soviet advisers is often cited in defense of the first hypothesis.[59] And yet, it is open to question whether the equally undoubted anti-Semitism of the Czechoslovak interrogators was inspired by the Soviets, or homegrown.[60]

If Moscow did select Slánský to head the trial, why did it do so? On any considerations of actual or potential opposition to the Stalinist line, Gottwald would have been a far more plausible target. Several sources depict Gottwald's early attempts to retain some independence of the Soviets, and his later resentment of domination by them.[61] Moreover, far from having a dangerous degree of personal popularity, Slánský seems to have been respected - or even feared - rather than liked.[62] Finally, the battle between "home" and "Moscow" Communists that was played out elsewhere in Eastern Europe after

[57]For Čepička's biographical data, see Pelikán, Czechoslovak Political Trials, 270-1 and 326-7; and Kaplan, 287-8.

[58]Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 117.

[59]For examples of the advisers' anti-Semitism see, e.g., Kaplan, Report on the Murder, 54-5; and Loebl, My Mind on Trial, 62.

[60]See, e.g., Loebl, My Mind on Trial, 46.

[61]Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961), 98-106; Djilas, Rise and Fall, 123; Jancar, "The Great Purges and 'The Prague Spring'," 611; Loebl, My Mind on Trial, 23.

[62]Loebl, My Mind on Trial, 152 and 168; Kovaly, Under A Cruel Star, 103; London, On Trial, 246.

the war cannot explain the Slánský Trial. Slánský himself had been a "Moscow" Communist until 1944, when he was sent to Slovakia. Frank, Šváb, Margolius, and London had all been interned by the Nazis - but so had many Czechoslovak Communists who held prominent positions throughout this period, including Deputy Prime Minister Jaromír Dolanský, and, of the officials already mentioned, Zápotocký, Čepička, Široký, Novotný, and Kopřiva.[63]

Whatever Stalin's role in Slánský's fall, he must at the very least have acquiesced in the trial's anti-Semitic line. The fact that the 1952 purge of Jews in Czechoslovakia was paralleled in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the bloc suggests that he did more than acquiesce.[64] What were his motives? As noted above, the classic interpretation holds that the Soviets, disappointed by their failure to win influence in Israel, decided to wipe out the memory of their 1947-48 support for it, and open communications with the Arab countries, by attacking Jews at home ("home" including the satellites). Czechoslovakia, says this argument, was chosen for the show trial because it had given the most support to Israel in 1948. It had supplied large quantities of arms to the Haganah, and an International Brigade made up mainly of Czech Jews, with some Hungarians and Romanians, had trained in Czechoslovakia and gone over to Israel near the end of the first Arab-Israeli war.[65]

This interpretation assumes that the Slánský Trial and the announcement of the Doctor's Plot in January of 1953 were both the effects of a single cause, whether that cause should be sought in the Soviet Union's Middle Eastern interests, or in Stalin's increasing

[63]See London, On Trial, 30; Kovaly, Under A Cruel Star, 141; Barton, Prague à l'heure de Moscou, 82-3 (for Frank); and Pelikán, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 326 (for Cepička) and 356 (for Švab.) For the other leaders, see Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48 (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1975), 130-131; and Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960, 107-112.

[64]See, e.g., Hodos, Show Trials, 66, and Yaacov Ro'i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947-1954 (New Brunswick, N.J. and London: Transaction Books, 1980), 372.

[65]Czechoslovakia's arms sales to Israel, and the formation of the Czechoslovak Brigade, are described in detail in Arnold Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947-53 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 52-122.

hostility to Jews towards the end of his life.[66] It should be noted, however, that the evidence of Mordekhai Oren - a Knesset delegate of the socialist Mapam party and one of two Israelis arrested to serve as witnesses in the trial - runs counter to this argument. He relates that in March of 1953, after his appearance at the Slánský Trial, he was suddenly ordered to confess that he had organized a conspiratorial Zionist group in the Soviet Union (where he had never been). This line of attack was dropped just as suddenly, presumably - Oren's account leaves the date uncertain - after Stalin's death and the April 4 rehabilitation of the accused doctors. Such a sequence of events suggests a clumsy impromptu reaction by the Czechoslovak security officers, rather than a deep-laid design linking the two cases.[67]

Proponents of the Soviet-driven theory usually argue that Czechoslovak anti-Semitism was negligible, so that the reasons for the trial's anti-Semitic orientation must be sought outside. A typical account says:

> It is only now [in the light of Prague Spring revelations about the Soviet role] that it has become possible to understand the sudden emergence of violent political anti-Semitism in the one country in Central and Eastern Europe that had deep democratic traditions and where the "Jewish Question" was never a real problem.[68]

The situation of Jews in Czechoslovakia, however, was more complicated than this statement suggests. First, it should be noted that by the time of the Slánský Trial, there were very few left of the approximately 360,000 Jews who had lived in Czechoslovakia before the war. The great majority had perished in the Holocaust, and of those who survived up to three-quarters emigrated, with the largest number leaving in 1949. Fourteen to eighteen thousand Jews - or 1.5 per 1,000 population - remained.[69] It is reasonable to conclude that after this exodus most of the Jews who remained in Czechoslovakia must

[66]See, e.g., Lendvai, Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 246.
[67]Mordekhai Oren, Prisonnier Politique à Prague, tr. [from Hebrew] by Erwin Spatz (Paris: Rene Julliard, 1960), 305-18.
[68]Lendvai, Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 246.
[69]Peter Meyer et. al., The Jews in the Soviet Satellites (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1953), 147-52.

have had friends or relatives in the West or in Israel - which in itself exposed them to the regime's suspicions.

Anti-Semitism in Czechoslovakia was not of the racial variety: rather, it condemned Jews as "Germanizers" and "Magyarizers" who had identified with and spoken the language of these formerly dominant groups, rather than the Czechs and Slovaks. (After the war, some Jewish survivors - those who had declared themselves as "Germans" in the 1930 census - were even interned and otherwise penalized together with non-Jewish Germans.[70]) And the war itself added a new source of hostility: survivors were unwelcome when they returned to claim their property. Both these roots of anti-Jewish sentiment were more pronounced in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. First, Slovak Jews had been less assimilated than Czech ones before the war. Second, while in the Czech lands much of the property taken from Jews had initially been given to Germans, and later nationalized, in Slovakia those who profited from the dispossession of the Jews were mostly Slovaks. The property question was the most important cause of the anti-Jewish riots that took place in Slovakia after the war.[71]

Popular anti-Semitism, then, was not absent from Czechoslovakia. And much of the Slánský Trial rhetoric was designed to appeal to it. While the accusations were supposedly directed against "Zionists" rather than Jews, even this thin veil of pretense sometimes slipped. For instance, one part of the indictment quotes an "American spy" as calling Slánský "the great hope of the Jews in the Communist Party."[72] A prominent theme in the trial - second only to espionage - was economic sabotage: the defendants confessed that they had caused the country untold losses by allowing Jewish emigrants to take their wealth with them and by making disadvantageous trade agreements with Israel, among many other

[70]Meyer et. al., The Jews in the Soviet Satellites, 79.
[71]Meyer et. al., The Jews in the Soviet Satellites, 52, 101-5. Kovaly, Under A Cruel Star, 45-7, gives a vivid personal account of the hostility shown to Jewish survivors.
[72]Barton, Prague à l'heure de Moscou, 97.

measures.[73] Such statements, and of course the constantly-reiterated emphasis on the Jewish background of eleven of the fourteen defendants, provided a familiar scapegoat for a populace angered by the regime's economic failures.[74] Moreover, the defendants "admitted" that while pursuing their sabotage they had fought accusations of wrongdoing with counter-accusations of anti-Semitism. Such admissions obviously implied that anti-Semitic acts would not be penalized in future. And, finally, the defendants' confessions that they had "abused" the restitution laws for the benefit of Zionism would reassure those who had appropriated the property of Jews.[75]

Within the Party, the attack on Jews served other interests. The Slánský Trial was accompanied by a purge of Jews from responsible positions. We do not know how thorough that purge was: contemporary Western accounts suggest that all or most of the Jewish diplomats (whose disappearance could be observed from abroad) were purged, but are less definite about those in domestic positions.[76] But whether or not the purge of Jews was total, it served to promote cadres who were working-class rather than intellectual, Red rather than expert. The trial rhetoric reflects this: Slánský and Frejka were accused of filling positions with "Jewish bourgeois nationalists, cosmopolitans, and bourgeois so-called experts."[77] As early as June of 1949, a correspondent of the American Jewish Committee had written:

> There is an antisemitic movement in the central organ of the Communist Party and it is considered that the Jewish intellectuals will not keep their influence for long. They will be replaced gradually by factory workers....These workers will replace the earlier generation of intellectuals who, although they are reliable party members, think far too much, and incidentally are sometimes Jews. Thus, an unfailing popular gesture will be made by quietly removing Jews from party posts, and simultaneously a new generation of workers will assume the power.[78]

[73]Proceedings of the Trials of Slánský et. al. See especially 186-92 (from the testimony of Rudolf Margolius) and 196-9 (from the testimony of Otto Fischl.)

[74]J. W. Brügel "Gedanken zum Slánský-Prozess - Zwanzig Jahre Danach," Osteuropa 22 (1972), No. 12, 916-920, 917.

[75]See Proceedings of the Trial, 25 for anti-Semitism, and 55 for restitution.

[76]Meyer et. al., The Jews in the Soviet Satellites, 158-9.

[77]Proceedings of the Trial, 144.

[78]Meyer, Jews in the Soviet Satellites, 148.

While, as noted above, we lack the data to document the purge of Jews and intellectuals at lower levels, events at the top are consistent with this interpretation. Zápotocký and Gottwald, who maintained their power during this period, and Novotný, who joined the leadership during it, were all men of working-class origin with little education.[79]

It seems that in the domestic context the anti-Semitism within and around the trial served at least two functions: the trial's rhetoric, by appealing to popular anti-Semitism, deflected dissatisfaction and hostility from the regime; and the purge of Jews within the Party furthered the aims of working-class, as opposed to intellectual, Communists. What about the international context?

The argument that Soviet foreign policy was the driving force behind the anti-Semitic phenomena associated with the trial rests on the assumption that the Soviet Union's policy toward Israel determined its (and its satellites') domestic policy towards Jews: that in this domain foreign policy was primary. This causal claim has been seriously challenged. The Israeli scholar Yaacov Ro'i, in his 1980 work titled Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947-1954 rejects Kaplan's explanation of the Slánský Trial on precisely these grounds.[80] Ro'i makes a convincing argument that the Soviet Union's reversal of its initial support of Israel was more the effect of its anti-Zionist domestic policy, than its cause. After its wartime and immediate post-war attempts to use Soviet Jews to promote world sympathy for the Soviet cause - even at the price of some domestic concessions - the Soviet regime began to suppress Yiddish culture and Jewish identity in 1947 and early 1948, at precisely the time that it was actively supporting the establishment of the State of Israel. The proximate cause for these domestic measures, Ro'i argues, was the renewed isolationism that came with the deepening of the Cold War: ties between Soviet and American Jews, in particular, were no longer to be encouraged.

[79]Skilling, H. Gordon. Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 29.

[80]Yaacov Ro'i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947-1954, 361-2. In this work, Ro'i is responding to Kaplan's argument as set out in a series of articles published in 1968: see Ro'i, 390, n. 29.

This trend was strengthened by two events of 1948: the rift with Yugoslavia in June, which led to a crackdown on all groups with actual or potential links to the world outside the bloc; and the Soviet Jews' enthusiastic response to the new state of Israel (most evident in demonstrations at the Moscow synagogue on the High Holy Days in the fall of 1948), which the regime perceived as a threat.[81]

Ro'i's own account of the Soviet motive for the Slánský Trial, however, is less convincing than his rebuttal of Kaplan's. He asserts that if a Jewish head for the conspiracy had been the only requirement, there was no need to select Slánský: Otto Šling would have done as well. Slánský was chosen, Ro'i thinks, because of:

> the Soviet directive that the Czechoslovak conspiracy was to be the largest one, and...the subsequent rationale of assigning the role of head conspirator to the most important Jew in the party, especially given the mounting anti-Semitism and the fact that so many of the prisoners were Jews: the Jewish origin of most of the accused would provide the requisite common denominator for including all the prisoners in a single plot.[82]

The difficulty with this interpretation (other than the need to establish that such a Soviet directive existed) is that it treats the overwhelming predominance of Jews among the defendants as an independent factor. But in fact, as was shown above, that predominance was arranged after Slánský himself was arrested.

Quite apart from Ro'i's thesis about the causal direction of Soviet policy on Zionism, there is another difficulty in the classic argument that the trial was intended to notify the Arab countries of a reversal of policy. The trial did, of course, give abundant proof of hostility to Israel. As if vituperative anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli rhetoric were not

[81]Ro'i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice, 195-6. and 310-328. For another treatment of the subject, see Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship. Krammer, like Ro'i, gives primacy to domestic anti-Zionism in the Soviet Union's 1948-9 policy and argues (127) that for some time the Soviets combined an anti-Zionist domestic program with "a relatively pro-Israel outlook." He also believes, however, that the Slánský Trial was deliberately "calculated to impress the Arabs" (189). Leonard Schapiro, in "The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and Phases of Soviet Anti-Semitic Policy during and after World War II," in Bela Vago and George L. Mosse, eds., Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe, 1918-1945 (New York and Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 283-300, argues that the question of the causal relation between Soviet policy on Israel and domestic anti-Zionism must be left open (294-5).

[82]Ro'i, Soviet Decision Making, 362.

enough, the Czechoslovak authorities arrested (at the end of 1951) two Israeli citizens - Simon Ornstein, the former Israeli Commercial Attache in Prague, and Mordekhai Oren, the Knesset delegate mentioned above - forced them to appear as witnesses in the trial, and later sentenced them to long prison terms.[83] None of this, however, marked a reversal of policy: it was rather an extreme development of the existing one. The 1947-48 policy of support for Israel had been abandoned long before Slánský was arrested, let alone tried. The Czech press, following its Soviet model, had taken a harsh tone against Israel from the beginning of 1949. The Joint Distribution Committee (the American philanthropic organization whose supposed espionage activities were given a prominent role in the trial) had been expelled in January of 1950, and the Jewish Agency had closed its Prague and Bratislava offices in the fall of 1950 (after the authorities stopped permitting large-scale emigration).[84]

If the trial was meant to signal a break with the previous policy of support for Israel, its victims were oddly selected. It is hardly necessary to state that none of the defendants were Zionists. A few of them (Loebl, Clementis, Reicin, and Margolius) had been involved, in their official capacities, in either the 1948 arms sales to Israel or trade with the new state. But Slánský and Geminder had opposed aid to Israel; and Otto Fischl - who confessed in the trial that he had impoverished Czechoslovakia by allowing Jewish emigrants to take out huge quantities of property - had in fact been so severe in enforcing the rules against export of property that the Haganah called him "the Jewish Himmler."[85] Moreover, although the last "official" Zionists in Czechoslovakia were arrested at about the same time as Slánský - as we know from the account of Mordekhai Oren, who was himself arrested after trying to intervene on their behalf, and who later met two of them in prison - they were not included in the Slánský Trial.[86]

[83]Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship, 187-8. Mordekhai Oren, Prisonnier Politique à Prague, 353.
[84]Meyer, The Jews in the Soviet Satellites, 129-33.
[85]Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship, 68-9.
[86]Mordekhai Oren, Prisonnier Politique à Prague, 23 and 359-60.

This essay has raised doubts about the central elements of the classic interpretation of the Slánský Trial. It has contended that neither the Soviet selection of Slánský, nor the foreign-policy motive usually assigned for it, have been convincingly demonstrated. In conclusion, though, it should be emphasized that none of the arguments advanced above are intended to suggest that either the Slánský Trial itself, or the broader anti-Semitic measures that accompanied it, happened independently of events elsewhere in the bloc, or in the Soviet Union. Stalin's power is not in doubt: indeed, it was demonstrated in his ability to order Slánský's demotion, and later his arrest, in spite of Gottwald's reluctance. But his power was not always exerted in the form of specific orders: it also functioned by setting the limits within which bloc Communists could maneuver, and the directions that would be most advantageous to them. The Czechoslovak leaders were actors seeking their own self-interested goals within the framework set up by the Soviets, rather than marionettes. And yet, any rationalist explanation - whether based on the interests of Soviet or Czechoslovak leaders - must ultimately fail to explain the orgies of show trial violence. The best single explanation of what happened, in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, is contained in a single sentence from the Piller Report: "The political system was incapable of preventing any external or internal impulses from being absorbed into the machinery that churned out the trials."[87]

[87]Pelikán, Czechoslovak Political Trials, 130.

APPENDIX

DEFENDANTS IN THE TRIAL OF THE "ANTI-STATE CONSPIRATORIAL CENTER"

NAME	TITLE	YEAR/MONTH ARRESTED
Vladimír Clementis	Foreign Minister	1951: January
Otto Fischl	Deputy Finance Minister	1952: January
Josef Frank	Deputy Secretary General of the Communist Party	1952: May
Ludvík Frejka	Chief of the Economic Department of the President's Cabinet	1952: January
Bedřich Geminder	Chief of the International Division of the Party Secretariat	1951: November
Vavro Hajdů	Deputy Foreign Minister	1951: Month N/A
Eugene Loebl [Evžen Löbl]	Deputy Trade Minister	1949: November
Artur London	Deputy Foreign Minister	1951: January
Bedřich Reicin	Deputy Defense Minister	1951: Jan or Feb
Rudolf Margolius	Deputy Trade Minister	1952: January
André Simone	Foreign Editor, Rudé Pravo	1952: June
Rudolf Slánský	General Secretary of the Communist Party	1951: November
Otto Šling	First Party Secretary for Brno	1950: October
Karel Šváb	Deputy Minister of National Security	1951: February

All the defendants except Josef Frank, Karel Šváb, and Vladimir Clementis were listed in the indictment as being "of Jewish origin."

All the defendants except Eugene Loebl, Vavro Hajdu, and Artur London were sentenced to death and executed.

This Appendix uses information from a variety of sources, of which the most important are the Piller Report, and Karel Kaplan's Report on the Murder of the General Secretary.

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