2018 Summit on the Future of Europe
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Executive Summary
OVERVIEW

The Summit on the Future of Europe is an initiative of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies (CES) at Harvard University. Since 2014, this annual conference has convened scholars and public leaders to debate critical challenges facing Europe.

The 2018 Summit convened at Harvard on November 7, 2018 and was a partnership of CES, the Harvard Kennedy School’s Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, the diaNEOsis Research and Policy Institute, the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Central European University (CEU), and Real Colegio Complutense (RCC) at.

SUMMIT AGENDA

Panel 1: The Transatlantic Freeze

Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations and Faculty Chair, Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Harvard Kennedy School

Karen Donfried, President, German Marshall Fund of the United States; CES Senior Fellow, Harvard University

Daniela Schwarzer, Director, German Council on Foreign Relations

Chair: Mary Elise Sarotte, Marie-Josée and Henry R. Kravis Distinguished Professor of Historical Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; CES Research Associate, Harvard University

Panel 2: Authoritarianism in the EU

Grzegorz Ekiert, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Government and CES Director, Harvard University

Michael Ignatieff, President, Central European University; CES Senior Fellow, Harvard University (via video)

Monica Macovei, Member of the European Parliament, European Conservatives and Reformists, Romania

John Shattuck, Professor of Practice in Diplomacy, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Chair: Ayşe Kadıoğlu, Professor of Political Science, Sabancı University; CES Visiting Scholar (2017-2018 & 2018-2019), Harvard University

Keynote Address

Sigmar Gabriel, Member of the Bundestag and Vice Chancellor of Germany (2013-2018); John F. Kennedy Memorial Policy Fellow, CES, Harvard University

Chair: Grzegorz Ekiert, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Government and CES Director, Harvard University

Panel 3: Challenges of European Integration and Disintegration

John Dalhuisen, Senior Fellow, European Stability Initiative (ESI)

Kyriakos Pierrakakis, Director of Research, diaNEOsis Research and Policy Institute

Vivien Schmidt, Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration and Professor of International Relations and Political Science, Boston University; CES Local Affiliate, Harvard University

Chair: José María Beneyto, Jean Monnet Professor of International and European Law and International Relations, University Institute for European Studies
Panel 4: The Current State of Europe: Views from the News Room

Steven Erlanger, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for Europe, The New York Times

Stefan Kornelius, Foreign Editor, Süddeutsche Zeitung

Eleni Varvitsiotis, EU Correspondent, Kathimerini

Chair: James Geary, Deputy Curator, Nieman Foundation, Harvard University

The following document summarizes the discussions that took place during the Summit’s sessions. The views expressed in this document are the speakers’ and participants’ and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies (CES), its faculty, staff, associates or event co-sponsors. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract or photo is used, the author(s)/speaker(s) and CES should be credited, clearly stating the date of the publication or details of the event. The summary of the presentations and speeches may differ from delivery.

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Panel 1: The Transatlantic Freeze

by Seth A. Johnston, Major in the United States Army and CES Visiting Scholar (2018-2019), Harvard University

The first panel of the 2018 Summit on the Future of Europe featured chilling but vigorous discussion on the state of transatlantic relations. Panelists generally agreed that transatlantic relations are at a historic low as a result of both specific policy disagreements, as well as a fundamental shift in the global order and worldview of leading actors on both sides of the Atlantic. They also saw potential for improvement in several important areas and articulated specific proposals for warming the relationship again. The session was chaired by Mary Elise Sarotte, Marie-Josée and Henry R. Kravis Distinguished Professor of Historical Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and CES Research Associate, Harvard University.

Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations and Faculty Chair of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Harvard Kennedy School, described transatlantic relations as the most expressively divided since the 1956 Suez Crisis and more structurally fractured than at any time since the 1940s. Divisive issues include climate change, international agreements, trade, secondary U.S. sanctions following withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, and the historically “ambivalent” attitude of the U.S. president toward NATO and the EU. He offered a further critique of declining faith in democracy, low prioritization of human rights, and active undermining of democratic norms in the United States and European countries. Altogether, Burns assessed active U.S. leadership in Europe to be at a “weak” point not seen since before World War II. However, Burns saw cause for optimism in bipartisan support for NATO in the U.S. Senate and other parts of government. At the same time, he defended President Trump’s criticism of Europe on defense spending and called for Europe to take “strategic responsibility” within the existing security architecture. Burns concluded by calling attention to unresolved and future challenges, including the status of the Afghanistan conflict and the revolution in artificial intelligence and other technologies with strategic implications.

The panel turned next to Karen Donfried, President of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and CES Senior Fellow, Harvard University. Donfried reflected on the panel’s title of “freeze” with an assessment that today’s transatlantic troubles are not about specific policy events such as the Suez Crisis or the Iraq War, but rather a more significant and fundamental problem of the world order: the United States is no longer the status quo power. Europe, argued Donfried, is now warden of the order largely created and formerly sustained by the United States; but Europe must grapple with many of the same political dynamics that gave rise to Donald Trump’s presidency, including a popular sense of economic loss, migration and its challenges to national identity, and appeals to autocratic forms of governance. Europe’s other challenges include the stability of the euro, Brexit’s
outcome, concerns over refugees and migration, terrorism and internal security. Donfried warned that European unity on sanctions toward Russia may be eroding and that a common approach to China may prove illusive as Chinese economic investments translate into political influence in certain European countries. In dealing with the United States, Donfried identified three main strategic approaches – patience, autonomy, and embrace – and clear differences among leading European states over their preferred approach. Donfried concluded that the EU can be most effective by leveraging its “powerhouse” status as a trade bloc, highlighting the potential for retaliatory tariffs against the United States, extending the liberal trading order through other agreements like those with Japan and Canada, and reforming the global trade order to address intellectual property and other challenges.

Daniela Schwarzer, Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, offered a European perspective. She explained that Europeans were unprepared for the Trump presidency and hence slow and uncoordinated in their response. Schwarzer argued that while no common narrative exists in Europe on the United States, countries like Germany are now finally adjusting their strategies for dealing with it. Such strategies must, on the one hand, avoid unnecessarily alienating the United States or deepening the transatlantic freeze, while, on the other hand, taking a stronger stand in negotiations with the United States and developing European capabilities. In addition to increased investment in defense and greater multilateral diplomacy, Schwarzer identified a number of institutional reforms required to improve EU decision-making on foreign policy and governance of the Eurozone. She expressed skepticism that consensus to implement such reforms could be reached.

The panelists’ remarks gave way to a discussion with audience members focusing on additional proposals for improving the transatlantic relationship. Several speakers suggested ways of reducing the role of the U.S. president in the relationship by concentrating on other influencers, including Congress, state and local government, and civil society. Notwithstanding the potential development of increased European/EU autonomy or capability, participants generally agreed that NATO will remain the main institutional link between North America and Europe. China and Russia present different kinds of challenges to transatlantic allies that ought to be dealt with accordingly.
Panel 2: Authoritarianism in the EU

By Ayşe Kadioğlu, Professor of Political Science, Sabancı University and CES Visiting Scholar (2017-2018 & 2018-2019), Harvard University

At the opening of the panel, its chair Ayşe Kadioğlu, Professor of Political Science at Sabancı University and CES Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, underscored that today the values of the European Union (EU) such as the rule of law, human rights, and democracy are in danger of being replaced by the glorification of nativist identities. All panelists commented on the loss of such values along with the rise of populist, nationalist, and illiberal regimes in Europe.

Grzegorz Ekiert, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Government at Harvard University and CES Director, described two such regimes that paradoxically went through the most successful post-communist transitions, namely Hungary and Poland. Ekiert illustrated how, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian government created an oligarchic economic structure through the use of EU funds. Moreover, the field of elections has become uneven and disturbingly predictable, while the Hungarian opposition has fallen into disarray. In Poland, in contrast, the Law and Justice party, led by Jarosław Kaczyński, did not have the advantage of a big majority to take control of the Constitution. As a result, the government has deliberately undermined the fundamental values of the EU by violating the Polish Constitution, existing laws, and parliamentary procedures. While the Polish opposition has been demonized and labeled as traitors by the government, a new historical bloc of chauvinist nationalist and extremely religious Catholic groups have begun to adopt discourses that speak against both Brussels and Moscow.

Ekiert underscored that the regimes in Hungary and Poland, notwithstanding their significant differences, were not born over night. He stated that democracy is being destroyed in both countries through “salami tactics” – a term coined by a former Stalinist leader in Hungary, to describe the gradual reduction of the powers of state administrations, the judiciary, and the media. While maintaining that there are many analyses that explain the rise of such regimes in Europe, such as the rebellion of the economic losers, lack of popular acceptance of EU values and democracy, and a cultural backlash against globalization and migration, Ekiert reminded the audience that populist and illiberal parties have been working on their offensive strategies for the past twenty years.

Monica Macovei, Member of the European Parliament of Romania’s European Conservatives and Reformists party, echoed Ekiert’s emphasis on the offensive strategies of populist and illiberal political parties. She underlined how Viktor Orbán used the discourse of defending the borders against intruders even when migration was not constituting a real threat. She pointed to the increasingly
racist, discriminatory language employed by government officials in Hungary, Romania, and Italy to target migrants and the Roma people. Macovei emphasized that the main challenge facing the EU today was that the issue of migration is making all other issues, such as the rule of law, values, and justice, secondary. The problem was not only the numbers of migrants, but also how the fears, fostered by the issue of migration, were used in order to appeal to people’s insecurities. Macovei highlighted the case of Romania, where an anti-migrant discourse has found a following even though the country has hosted very few migrants. Such developments signaled an underlying anti-EU sentiment because Romanians did not want the EU to meddle in their national affairs by dictating to their government how many migrants to accept into the country.

John Shattuck, Professor of Practice at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Professor Emeritus of Central European University (CEU), stated that populist reactions were triggered by economic and social factors, such as the financial crises and migration. He also agreed with Ekiert and Macovei that attention must be paid to the offensive strategies employed by nationalist and populist political parties. He identified Orbán’s Hungary not as an illiberal democracy but rather an “Orwellian hypocrisy” for using democratic processes and EU funds to undermine democracy and EU values, respectively. Shattuck highlighted three forms of populism: first, economic populism springing from those left behind and suffering from inequality; second, cultural populism in reaction to migration; and third, security-based populism in response to rising terrorist attacks. All these forms of populism were fostered and utilized by nationalist and populist leaders and constituted the pretext for attacking fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.

The panel also addressed the challenges facing Central European University, which recently announced that it could no longer operate in Hungary and would move its U.S. degree programs to Vienna. In a video-taped message, Michael Ignatieff, CEU President and CES Senior Fellow, described the challenges that the university has been facing under the pressures of Orbán’s government. Shattuck, as CEU’s former Rector, and Macovei, a current Board Member, both referred to breaches in academic freedom and the university’s struggles to fend off the assault of the Hungarian government.

Answering the question of “where do we go from here?” Shattuck pointed to corruption as one of the key vulnerabilities of nationalist and populist regimes. He reminded the panel about the protests that were held in Romania against corruption. He also said that these illiberal regimes could be a wake up call for stimulating reform while not dismissing the three important issues that the EU still has to reckon with: first, the reality of populism and the need for both right- and left-wing political actors to address the real issue of inequality; second, the need to acknowledge cultural insecurities and make national identity and community as much a part of liberal democracy as diversity and civil rights; and third, the need for the EU to sharpen its tools to enforce its values in order to protect them.

The panel concluded with further questions of analysis. In his final remarks, Ekiert reminded the audience that although populism has been studied from various angles in academic conferences, more research is needed on how it may end. Does an overarching populism need to end with wars and violence or is it possible to end it non-violently?
The highlight of the Summit on the Future of Europe was the keynote address by Sigmar Gabriel. Speaking to a large audience at the Harvard Faculty Club, the former German Vice Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs presented his ideas on the future role of the European Union in the age of what he called the “new world order 3.0.” “Little is moving me as much as the future of Europe,” Gabriel began his remarks. Gabriel, who served as a John F. Kennedy Memorial Policy Fellow at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies (CES) at Harvard this fall, noted that Europe’s impotence at facing big challenges, such as high youth unemployment in Southern Europe, an unwieldy bureaucracy in Brussels and effective solutions to the migration question, are fuelling the rise of populists and anti-Europeanists. “It’s not about more Europe, but a better Europe,” said Gabriel. “Europe is more than a common market. Europe should always put itself first in the shoes of the weakest member of the Union.” According to Gabriel, Europe can only survive if its member states want it. The European Union was likely to fall apart as long as it was only an elitist project. In the global competition between liberal democracies and the authoritarian alternative, there was a need to build not only a free but also a fair world economy.

In this context, the former leader of Germany’s Social Democratic Party called for a more active role for his own country. The German government should show more initiative when it comes to the future of Europe, “because Germany is too big and too centrally located in Europe and economically and politically too important to deal only with itself.” Gabriel emphasized that Europe, in general, and Germany, specifically, could not follow the model of Switzerland to be economically potent but politically abstinent: “We are the last vegetarians in a world full of carnivores. I don’t want to be a carnivore again, but a flexitarian,” he said about Germany’s foreign and defense policy. Against this backdrop Europe should not only debate about values. “We are world champions in debating values,” he said, and argued that Europe should aim to define and debate its interests.

Gabriel also commented on the transatlantic relationship and the role of the United States: “We cannot live with...
Donald Trump, but we cannot live without the United States,” he remarked. International relations should not be considered a zero-sum game, where the winner takes all: “Bowling alone is not only a very unpleasant life in private terms, but also in international terms,” he said. Instead, Gabriel proposed that Europe come to terms with the United States regarding NATO expenditures. In the case of Germany, Gabriel suggested that his country consider distributing a higher defense budget by investing, for example, 1.5 percent of its GDP in the German army and 0.5 percent into a common European defence alliance, especially in favor of Eastern Europe.

In a lively discussion, moderated by Grzegorz Ekiert, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Government at Harvard and CES Director, Gabriel was asked about the role of Russia in this new world order. Questioned about Europe’s dependency on Russian gas supplies, Gabriel defended the liberalization of the gas market to be in Europe’s economic interest. He emphasized that it is not Europe that is dependent on Russia but that “Russia is dependent on us buying their gas.” Gabriel also addressed environmental questions and stated that Europe’s mission in the 21st century was to find ways to have both economic success and a sustainable climate policy. Given all these challenges, Gabriel concluded that during the next decade Europe’s development will most likely be shaped by the governments of EU member states and not the European Parliament: “It will be an...
Panel 3: Challenges of European Integration and Disintegration

By Christopher Wratil, John F. Kennedy Memorial Policy Fellow (2018-2019), CES, Harvard University

At the opening of the panel, Vivien Schmidt, Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration at Boston University and CES Local Affiliate, presented a long list of crises to illustrate the immense challenges facing the European Union: the euro crisis, the refugee and migration crisis, Brexit, uncertainties in trade and security partnerships, a hollowing out of democracy in Eastern Europe, and a general crisis of legitimacy of the EU. The panelist focused on two case studies and offered effective institutional responses.

John Dalhuisen, Senior Fellow with the European Stability Initiative (ESI), presented the first case study by focusing on migration. He stressed that of all the crises, the migration crisis, has the biggest potential to lead to institutional paralysis in the event that right-wing populists and extremists manage to win 25-30% of the seats after the European Parliament elections in 2019. Dalhuisen argued that the central story of radical right politicians on migration is along the lines of: “Europe is facing a barbarian invasion, and I am the only person ruthless enough to stop it.” This story is pervasive, Dalhuisen argued, because Europe’s political mainstream, especially on the left, follows four fallacies instead of offering a compelling alternative story: 1) Mainstream politicians do not challenge the idea of a migrant “invasion” and do not stress enough that even at the height of the Syrian refugee crisis, the numbers of refugees coming into Europe never justified speaking of an “invasion.” 2) They claim that “controlling migration” is not possible, even though politicians like Viktor Orbán and Matteo Salvini have demonstrated that they have effective – if inhumane – ways of keeping migrants away from their countries. 3) They erroneously believe that economic insecurity is at the root of voters’ migration concerns, while all evidence shows that there is no relationship at all. 4) Reducing the number of migrants is not enough to stop electoral realignment towards right-wing populists, since it does not immediately challenge their story. Dalhuisen recommended that mainstream parties refute these fallacies and shift their story to demonstrate that migration is a manageable challenge in Europe and that European borders can be controlled while employing humane measures. This can only be advanced by a “coalition of the willing” and would necessitate a dramatic speeding-up of asylum decisions; more returns of illegitimate applicants; more effective return agreements with countries of origin; and a voluntary European relocation system with financial incentives for those who take in refugees.
Kyriakos Pierrakakis, Director of Research at diaNEOsis Research and Policy Institute, presented the second case study that focused on the post-euro crisis situation in Greece. He stated that recent public opinion polls indicated that Greeks have again become more pro-European in the aftermath of the crisis. While this may be a sign of hope, Pierrakakis stressed that this trend may be shortlived because Greek society is facing two major challenges. First, Pierrakakis pointed to a demographic challenge, which he termed a “youth challenge.” On the one hand, the number of young people is projected to shrink dramatically in Greece over the next three decades, which will make it increasingly hard for the Greek economy to meet the growth targets set by public debt refinancing guidelines. This is amplified by the fact that Greece is the only EU country where the primary source of income for youth under the age of 35 is not work but family support. This is emblematic of the generational economic decline in Greece. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the United Kingdom, young people in Greece are the most Euroskeptic of all generations. Second, Pierrakakis stressed a challenge of “social cohesion” citing various public opinion polls that showcase record-low levels of institutional and social trust in Greek society. Survey data indicates that while Greeks place most trust in family, the police and the army, they do not trust fellow citizens, political parties and the parliament. These figures might suggest that Greek pro-European attitudes may change in the future as trust in public institutions deteriorates further.

Schmidt reminded the audience that the large number of crises ultimately contributes to the EU’s crisis of legitimacy. This legitimacy crisis is not only fueled by other crises, but also is entrenched in the institutional architecture, including a lack of accountability and transparency of the EU institutions. She mentioned the paradox that attempts to increase legitimacy, for instance, when leaders such as Angela Merkel become more responsive to national publics, provoke delegitimizing interactions of blame and gridlock at the EU level. Schmidt outlined a potentially viable grand institutional response for the EU to somehow muddle-through the multitude of crises. She suggested that the EU should consider a revised model – a “differentiated integration 3.0.” The EU must embrace differentiation and replace the rigid concept of a “two-speed Europe” with more flexible conceptions of integration and disintegration, which she called a “soft core Europe.” This EU would not be defined by “one set menu,” but rather by a set of different “dishes” that countries can opt in or out of, with the single market as the “main dish.” Under this vision, there is not one or two or three EUs, but a multitude of overlapping policy communities. Schmidt concluded that the EU could be “a dinner table everyone can potentially join, choose dishes from, and only vote on dishes chosen.”
Panel 4: The Current State of Europe: Views from the Newsroom

By: Alina Bârgăoanu, Dean of the College of Communication and Public Relations and Jean Monnet Chair at the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, and Visiting Scholar (2018-2019), CES, Harvard University

The final panel of the 2018 Summit on the Future of Europe brought together journalists who report from major European capitals. The panel’s Chair James Geary, Deputy Curator of the Nieman Foundation at Harvard University, opened the discussion by asking if there are reasons for optimism, or whether Europe is entering a period of more dramatic uncertainty.

Eleni Varvitsiotis, EU Correspondent of the Greek daily newspaper Kathimerini, gave a detailed personal account of her experience as a Brussels correspondent. She described what she witnessed up-close during the bitter fight between the Syriza government and EU leaders over a potential Grexit during the summer of 2015. Varvitsiotis admitted that this experience made her more cynical about how the EU works. She shared her account of the way that key decisions were made during the height of the Greek crisis by “three leaders in the room” (German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French Prime Minister François Hollande, and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras), with “two deciding” on a plan of action while the remaining EU leaders were merely “waiting to sign off on the deal.” However, Varvitsiotis explained that, despite this bleak picture, without the EU, dramatic decisions would not be made by a handful of people in conference rooms but “on the battlefield.” Moreover, she added that for countries such as Greece membership in the EU is also a geopolitical imperative.

Steven Erlanger, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent Europe of The New York Times, started with a sobering remark: “Europe is under tremendous strain and is sleepwalking” at a moment of anti-elitist populism throughout the transatlantic world. He argued that transatlantic anti-elitist populism “started with the global economic crisis and the death of the middle class.” In Europe, it was compounded by “deep technocratic arrogance” at the EU level and the “pomposity of a bureaucracy without a demos.” The popular “take back control” narrative has been convincing and resonates on both sides of the Atlantic. Erlanger also discussed Brexit and attributed several factors to its passage: a powerful narrative of regaining “control” juxtaposed with David Cameron’s weak “Remain” campaign; the implosion of the UK’s political center; and
the cultural shock created by migration within the EU that originated from Central and Eastern Europe.

**Stefan Kornelius**, Foreign Policy Editor of the German daily newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and author of the biography “Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and her World,” shared his insights into Merkel’s decision to relinquish her role as head of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party while retaining Germany’s chancellorship position. Kornelius described what significant impact her decision could have on the future of the EU. He stated that “there is no ideal candidate to replace Angela Merkel” and “no guarantee that this change will not lead to major destabilization,” especially since the whole region has been dealing with “a changing political landscape.” At the same time, Kornelius acknowledged that Angela Merkel’s decision created some room to breathe and that the CDU “rejoiced in the idea of having a new leader.” He suggested preparing for some uncertainty, but overall predicted “an orderly exit,” which Germans, and probably many Europeans, value in the German chancellor.

Commenting on the future of populism in Europe, panelists were divided about its lasting impact. “The populist wave peaked with Matteo Salvini,” Erlanger predicted, but the “nationalist wave is not going away.” He stated that the Central and Eastern European region is “a laboratory for a new kind of politics.” Kornelius underlined that if populists across Europe unify around the anti-EU stance, then “we have a big story coming” during the forthcoming European elections.

In the question and answer period, Karl Kaiser, Senior Associate of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School and CES Local Affiliate, summed up the discussion by saying to “fasten your seat belt!” Panelists agreed that Europe is facing a multitude of challenges including uncertainty over developments in Central and Eastern Europe; the rise of populism and nationalism across Europe; Italy’s negotiations with the EU; Germany’s new government; and the future of the leadership at the European Central Bank.

The panelists concluded that consumers of news have become more cynical about journalists. In response, panelists offered their suggestions on how journalism can become a positive force of empathy by reflecting to readers what people are feeling and thinking.
ABOUT CES

The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies (CES) was founded in 1969 at Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences to promote the interdisciplinary understanding of European history, politics, economy and societies. Its mission is to:

- Foster the study of and innovative research on Europe among Harvard faculty as well as graduate and undergraduate students.

- Facilitate the training of new generations of scholars and experts in European Studies.

- Serve as a forum for vibrant discussions on European history and contemporary affairs which nurture the exchange of ideas across disciplines, sectors, generations, and across the Atlantic.