CES Open Forum Series
2020-2021
No. 42 - September 10, 2020

Lucile Dreidemy &
Johannes Knierzinger

EU-AFRICA RELATIONS DURING THE RESOURCE CRISES OF THE 1960S/70S AND THE 2000S

Preliminary Results of an Ongoing Study

Minda de Gunzburg
Center for European Studies Harvard

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About the Author

Lucile Dreidemy is an associate professor of German studies at the University of Toulouse II and post-doctoral researcher at the department of contemporary history at the University of Vienna where she carries out a research project on the NGOization of international politics since the 1960s. She was previously a Mellon Visiting Lecturer at the University of Chicago and a Visiting Scholar at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University. Dreidemy is a member of the editorial board of the journals *Zeitgeschichte* and *Austriaca*.

Lucile Dreidemy
Centre de Recherche et d'Études Germaniques (CREG), University of Toulouse II
Maison de la Recherche
5 allées Antonio Machado
31058 Toulouse Cedex 9
France
lucile.dreidemy@univie.ac.at

Johannes Knierzinger is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Development Studies at the University of Vienna. He previously did research about mine closure as a post-doctoral researcher at the Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD) and on European raw material politics as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University's Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies and Weatherhead Initiative on Global History University.

Johannes Knierzinger
Department of Development Studies
University of Vienna
Sensengasse 3/2/2
1090 Vienna
Austria
johannes.knierzinger@univie.ac.at

Abstract

This paper presents and compares the main strategies of EU-Africa relations during the resource crises of the 1960s/70s and the 2000s. Bringing together largely separate discussions from political science and global history, we argue that the parallels between the two crises are not only the result of similar political constellations, but part of long-term political strategies and debates. While the 1970s were still characterized by the leitmotif of a just international division of labor, the 2000s saw growing regime complexity that was increasingly legitimized and obscured by the leitmotif of transparency. Among other things, this led to various certification schemes (such as the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative or the Aluminium Stewardship Initiative), anti-corruption initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and other CSR-related measures such as the European Conflict Minerals Regulation.

Note: Many thanks for the invaluable input of Charles S. Maier, Michael Homberg, Jos van den Akker, Ianna Hawkins Owen, Felipe Alfonso, Timothy Barker, Hans-Otto Frøland, Mats Ingulstad and Ducan Money.

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Introduction

The 2000s witnessed a sharp rise in commodity prices, which was accompanied by considerable political leeway for the elites in capital-poor and resource-rich countries. Around the world, the governments of these countries reviewed mining contracts, formed alliances, threatened with nationalizations (and then mostly established public-private joint ventures) and in some cases invested the additional revenues sustainably in education and social services (see e.g. IMF Direct 2018). These developments can be confirmed for at least 15 African countries.[1] In the 1960s and 1970s, the third wave of decolonization and the "golden age" of capitalism triggered a similar commodity boom (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 Price development of selected base metals (1945=100; Source: USGS 2019)



Both resource crises were triggered by a combination of high demand and a few political decisions (such as the OPEC oil embargo during the Yom Kippur War and the Chinese export restrictions in the 2000s) and both were exacerbated by speculation (Crowson 2008: 361). Although the similarities between the two booms/crises have been repeatedly noted (Buijs 2012: 202; Crowson 2008: 407-10; Humphreys 2013: 40; Taylor 2014: 128), no systematic comparison has yet been made.

[1] Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Liberia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Zambia (Katz-Lavigne 2017, 29), South Africa (Prichard, 2009, 268), Angola (Economic Commission for Africa and African Union 2013: 99), Mauritania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (Knierzinger 2016).

Most recently, China's economic growth in connection with Beijing's decision to restrict its exports of raw materials triggered a so-called "kriegspiel" (République française 2008: 292), a "Second Cold War" (Grillo 2007) or, in Africanist terms, a "New Scramble for Africa" (see e.g. Southall and Melber 2009). China's central position in the commodity boom of the 2000s can be shown by its share of global metal production: in 2000, primary aluminum production in China was just over a tenth of world production, in 2005, it was a quarter, and today China produces more than half (the same applies to most other base metals). In the EU, on the other hand, most raw material reserves were already depleted in the 1970s, foreign direct investment in the mining industry was sharply reduced in the second half of the twentieth century, and the remaining mines and governments have set in place *relatively* effective ecological and social standards. When China curtailed its exports of rare earths and other raw materials, this special dependency became apparent again.

Following commodity-centered approaches (Bair 2010; Dicken et al. 2001; Gereffi 1997; Cattaneo et al. 2010) and their applications in the extractive industry (Bridge 2008; Gendron et al. 2014; Smet and Seiwald 2014; Mayes 2015; Radhuber 2015; Pichler et al. 2016) - which we will connect with current discussions in global history (Maier 2006; Middell and Naumann 2010; Beckert 2017) - we propose to call these two periods "crises of chain governance", leading to the renegotiation of the relationship between commodity producers and consumers and thus to a reassessment of the international division of labor. In the analysis, many parallels emerged between the two periods under investigation, which was partly due to the fact that many plans of the European Commission from the 1970s were reactivated in the 2000s (cf. Buijs 2012: 202; Raffer 2002). Among other things, this also seems to be related to personal continuities. Insofar as the two crises were only about 40 years apart, quite a few actors from the 1960/70s were still active in the 2000s.

A few years ago, a number of economists assumed that rising commodity prices would permanently change the terms of trade between commodity-exporting states and industrialized countries and thus invalidate the empirical backbone of dependence theory (Kaplinsky 2006; Jäger and Leubolt 2011; Humphreys 2013: 11-2). The same was already predicted during the oil crisis in the 1970s. However, the aftermath of 1973 showed the far-reaching consequences of a permanent increase in commodity prices. The peak in commodity prices in the 1970s was heralded and accompanied by the formation of cartels such as CIPEC (*Conseil intergouvernemental des pays exportateurs de cuivre*) and the IBA (International Bauxite Association). These cartels were an attempt to repeat OPEC's success. The reaction of the transnational mining companies was to minimize risk by shifting production to OECD member countries and by complicating and diversifying global production networks. The European Commission reacted with a string of measures that aimed at the maintenance of investment in high-risk regions by financing exploration in the former colonies, signed investment treaties with these countries, developed price and output stabilization schemes, invested in recycling, substitution and stockpiling and strongly instrumentalized development aid to guarantee resource security (see figure 8).

In the 2000s, the Chinese government's decision to restrict its exports of raw materials led to similar reactions that were brought together in European Raw Materials Initiative (mainly along the lines of the German raw materials strategy announced in 2005 - see Custers and Matthysen 2009: 54-5; Küblböck 2014). Among other things, this led to the ban export restrictions in new trade agreements and calls for WTO consultations. The latter first happened in 2009, when the EU, the US and Mexico filed complaints against Chinese export restrictions on nine raw materials, including bauxite, yellow phosphorus and manganese (European Commission 2012; WTO 2013). In 2010, the EU published a report on 14 critical raw materials whose continued access should be ensured through open markets, new mines in Europe and improved resource efficiency (European Commission 2010).

Even though Europeans are particularly dependent on imports of raw materials from Africa, they were by no means the only ones who (again) turned their attention to the continent. At the same time, investments from emerging markets and the USA increased strongly. In 2000, the US Congress passed the "African Growth and Opportunity Act", which within ten years led to a fivefold increase in imports from the African continent (almost exclusively raw materials) and required the participating African countries not to oppose US foreign policy (Mann 2003: 74; cf. Melber 2009: 63-8). In addition, the USA increased its military expenditure in Africa (Abramovici and Stoker 2004: 685). This renewed international competition for African resources is the main reason why many commentators use the term "New Scramble for Africa", referring to the imperialist division of the African continent in the 19th century (e.g. Southall and Melber 2009).[2]

[2] The rise of China in the 2000s shows many parallels to the rise of the USA from a raw material supplier to an industrial power in the 19th century, especially with regard to the impact on the African continent. The first "Scramble for Africa" was triggered by the "American threat" (Beckert 2017) in a similar same way as the "New Scramble for Africa" was triggered by today's "China threat" (Ayers 2013: 228).

Theoretical and methodological approach

This paper is the first result of an ongoing project on the comparison of the commodity booms of the 1970s and 2000s from a European-African perspective. We mainly want to find out (1) how European industry responded to these crises of chain governance by restructuring its supply chains and (2) how the conflicting interests in Europe affected the formulation of new policy initiatives and programs on resource security. Point one includes a mapping of the changing global production networks of major metals. We will focus on the central metals of the so-called *Système de Développement du potentiel minier* (SYSMIN) of Lomé II (see below): aluminum, copper, cobalt, iron and tin. Point two involves a discussion of the respective measures and countermeasures taken by African and European actors and the documentation of the processes (public discussions, consultations, lobbying) that have led to new European regulations and legislation.

An essential preliminary result of the analysis of these processes is the paradox that in both phases there have been efforts to complicate EU-Africa relations and to make them more transparent - and in many cases by the same actors. In the following, we will give a brief overview of the existing scientific literature on the connection between social complexity and hegemony.

Complexification as a power strategy

The topos of complexity is another element of the 1970s (cf. Leenderz 2019) that reappeared in the 2000s (Henning 2019: 26-7; Williams & Browning 2020). In the mid-1970s, at the onset of what is now called the second wave of globalization, influential intellectuals such as John Ruggie (1975) and Samuel P. Huntington (Crozier et al. 1975) warned that ever increasing social complexity would soon lead to the end of "governability" and democratic participation. Similar considerations led to the discussion of "institutional entropy" (Auster 1974; cf. Maier 2019), and some years later this discussion was also taken up by philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas (1985: 144), who spoke of the "Neue Unübersichtlichkeit". However, this discomfort did not seem to have lasted very long, and its disappearance is somewhat puzzling: the historian Ariane Leendertz (2019: 50) shows that the argument of the loss of control was very soon dismissed as outdated positivism and "utopian rationalism". The rise of post-structuralism seems to have played an important role here - although Leendertz does not mention the critique of functionalism that went along with the advent of post-structuralism.

In the 2000s, similar discussions reappeared under the terms "complexity theory" (Byrne 2014 and 2019; Walby 2009) and "regime complexity" (Alter and Meunier 2009), and the topos reemerges in political discourse. For example, in 2016, referring to the election victory of Donald Trump, the conservative historian Niall Ferguson wrote in the Boston Globe: "The biggest danger of all should now be obvious. The more complex our systems become, the more voters yearn for simplifiers."

Academic applications of "complexity theory" mostly draw on scientific complexity studies associated with the Santa Fe Institute and the physicochemist Ilya Prigogine (see Ferguson 2010). The construction of complexity as a political strategy seems to play no role in this literary corpus (cf. Walby 2003). The discussions on "regime complexity" come closer to this idea. In the early 2000s, some scholars working on issues such as international trade, human rights and global environmental regulation argued that increasing regime complexity, understood mainly as an increasing overlap of rules and international fora, undermined the effectiveness of international cooperation (Henning 2019:27) and privileged powerful actors. The political scientist Daniel W. Drezner (2009: 66-7) argued that (1) weaker states struggle with the rising costs of complexity (e.g. experts such as lawyers), (2) the norm-creating function of international regimes is diluted by increasing institutional overlap, and (3) the increase of "focal points" reduces the efficiency of regimes. On this basis, it has been argued that too many overlapping laws paradoxically tend towards a situation of lawlessness or anarchy in which Hobbesian realism regains the upper hand over multilateral decision-making (Drezner 2009: 67).[3]

According to Henning (2019: 26-7), however, this pessimistic interpretation of "regime complexity" has always been a minority viewpoint and was soon replaced by predominantly positive or at least less normative interpretations. Just as in the 1970s, the fear of losing control seems to have soon given way to solicitations to adapt to the new "global condition" (see Grabel 2017; Henning 2019), insisting that increasing complexity is mainly an unavoidable side-effect of globalization and "makes us rich" (see e.g. The Economist in Graeber 2018:158-9).

In this paper, we try to take up the critical discussion of social complexity and question the allegedly inevitable connection between welfare and ever-increasing complexity without drifting into a technocratic functionalism. To this end, we propose the unattractive new word

[3] This description of international relations strongly reminds of the term "sedimentation", which is used to describe increasingly contradictory sets of rules (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) in African societies (Bierschenk 2010; cf. Knierzinger 2018: 134; cf. Maier 2006: 35-8, who compares European feudalism with current forms of territorialization).

"complexification" as a makeshift term. The discussions on "regime complexity" focus almost exclusively on the relationship between states and international organizations. In the following, we will try to show that complexification should be understood much more broadly as a power strategy. The connection between complexification and social inequality is also evident in the rise of the financial industry, globalized production, privatization and "technocratization" of political decision-making in the form of round tables and corporate social responsibility, and several other control and coping strategies of transnational corporations and other actors. By expanding the scope of the analysis, the issue of complexification can be related to current discussions in political geography and global history.

From today's perspective, the fear of losing political control in the 1970s fits well with the narrative of the so-called demise of the nation state, which is accompanied by a declining significance of what James Scott (1998: 3) called "state simplifications". This demise of the state is often associated with the rise of neoliberalism, which, among other things, led to a declining political "readiness to act in society" (Habermas 1985: 144).[4] However, studies in political geography (and other fields) of the last two decades have shown that globalization is not only about "deterritorialization". Rather, concepts such as political "rescaling" (Brenner 1997: 12-13) or "décharge politique" (Hibou 1999: 6-15; Mbembe 2000: 80f.) - one could translate this term with "political outsourcing"[5] - refer to targeted strategies of political and economic elites to extend the arms of capitalist states by building on non-state institutions (or by "up-" and "downscaling" their decision-making processes). Instead of a simple demise of the state, more and more globalization theorists argue that, since the 1970s, an "internationalization of the state" (Brand et al. 2007) can be observed, which plays into the hands of powerful actors (cf. Drezner 2009: 66-7). This means that complexification is not only a side-effect of increasing economic interdependence (and supposedly rising prosperity), but also the result of struggles for hegemonic domination and control; or, in a less conspiratorial

[4] Habermas (1985:144) writes: "The future is seen as something negative; on the threshold of the 21st century the panorama of horror of a worldwide threat to general interests of life is emerging: the spiral of the arms race, the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, the structural impoverishment of developing countries, unemployment and growing social imbalances in developed countries, problems of environmental pollution, catastrophically operating technologies give the keywords that have penetrated the public consciousness via mass media. The answers of intellectuals reflect no less than those of politicians perplexity. It is by no means only realism if a boldly accepted perplexity increasingly replaces future-oriented attempts of orientation. The situation may be objectively confusing. But confusion is also a function of the willingness to act that a society believes it is capable of. It is a matter of Western culture's trust in itself."

[5] Both Hibou and Mbembe refer to Max Weber with the term "décharge politique". However, the quoted passages in Weber's text have little to do with the use of Hibou and Mbembe. They translated two of Weber's terms, "Verpachtung" and "Überweisung" with "décharge politique" (see Weber 1923: 86-108; 1922: 580-623).

reading, coping strategies in a socio-economic system whose promise of permanently rising income materializes for fewer and fewer members.

From the perspective of global history, the complexity debate almost seems inevitable. From the end of the colonial empires in the 1960s and the end of the "golden age" of capitalism in the mid-1970s (cf. Graeber 2018: 179-80), up to financialization and the beginning dominance of global production networks (Plank/ Staritz 2009), a permanent transition from direct - and often directly violent – relations, to indirect - and often no less violent - relations can be observed, facilitating the maintenance or even the further concentration of power (see for instance Nye 1990). From this perspective, it is surprising that the societal construction of complexity has not received more attention so far.

Not least because of the ecological and economic limits to growth, globalization has increasingly become a zero-sum game, both between capital and labor and between North and South (or strong and weak states). Complexification primarily serves particular interests (both in the financial sector and in political decision-making), "accumulates" as a kind of micropolitical arms race - see, for example, the 5,554-page proposal for the (unratified) Transpacific Partnership (Ferguson 2016) - and ultimately leads to technocracy and populism. It could thus be argued that since the 1970s, the historical role of the state as a leveler and simplifier (Scott 1998) has begun to reverse: The second wave of globalization has much to do with the fact that the globally dominant states became agents of complexification (cf. Brenner 1997:16-18). Until now, this "new" approach does not seem to weaken the old industrialized centers (cf. Drezner 2009: 66-7), but one could argue that there are limits to social complexity, for instance concerning democratic decision making, that are beginning to threaten hegemonic formations, for instance in the form of populism and post-factual politics.[6]

[6] Academic explanations for the current rise of populism can be divided into economic and cultural explanations: The former underline growing social inequality and the latter point to a cultural backlash that has slowly but steadily emerged as a response to the ongoing Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s (Gidron and Hall 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2017). Given the strong overlap of discussion about populism and post-factual politics, it is surprising that the "Neue Unübersichtlichkeit" does not seem to play a role in these debates. It could be argued that the fear of the elite in the 1970s of losing control (Leendertz 2019) now seems to be a reality, or, in other words, that four decades of neoliberal globalization have not only led to a reopening of the income gap, but also to an ever-increasing social complexity that increasingly obstructs meaningful political decision-making. This time, however, it seems that it is not only the political elites who are afraid of losing control, but also the voters who are beginning to realize that the elites have actually given up on trying to understand the big picture and that political decision-making has largely been "outsourced" to semi-, supra- and non-governmental institutions which are not directly influenced by elections. Following Harry Frankfurt's (2005:34) definition of bullshit as "indifference to the way things really are" (see Graeber 2018) - which is not quite the same as the stereotypical political "liar" - current populists either seem to have abandoned fact-based policy-making altogether, or they are deliberately trying to "frame" expert knowledge in a more emotional and simplistic way (see, for example, Chantal Mouffe's Agenda and her influence on Podemos). Explicit projects of "state simplification" (Scott 1998: 3), which

(Re-)actions of the raw material exporting countries

For an initial understanding of the very different political power constellations in the two crises, it is useful to compare two key documents of the producers: the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO - New International Economic Order), which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, and the "Africa Mining Vision", which was adopted at the Summit of the African Union in February 2009. While the NIEO Declaration was at its core a declaration of war on the intellectual hegemony of economic liberalism (cf. Cox 1979: 258) and dealt almost exclusively with external "obstacles to development" of the Global South, the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) focused primarily on internal issues. Its signatories pledged to work towards improvements in the areas of transparency, governance and infrastructure, to improve the continent's geological data, to find solutions for the booming small-scale mining industry and to improve the negotiating capacities of African governments (cf. Oxfam 2017:8-10). Only the last point could be directly linked to what many Western observers have described as a new wave of "resource nationalism". Moreover, the implementation of the AMV seems to advance very slowly. According to Oxfam, by 2017, the AMV has only been endorsed at the national level in one country, Lesotho (ibid: 2).

The opposite was the case with the NIEO, which in many aspects only summarized what was already happening. The 1960s and 70s brought about profound political changes, especially with regard to state control of production capacities. In the 1950s, practically every major mine in the "developing countries" was foreign-owned. By 1976, however, practically all of them had been nationalized (Ross 1999: 305; see also Habig 1983: 231-3). The copper sector in particular changed rapidly: Within seven years, from 1967-74, all major copper producers nationalized their mines (Congo-Kinshasa 1967, Zambia 1969, Chile 1971 and Peru 1974). Smaller copper mines in Mauritania and Uganda were also nationalized in the 1970s (Mining Review 2008), and copper production in the Belgian Congo was already 70 percent state-owned before decolonization (Radmann 1978: 28). Chile and Zambia earned about 80 percent of their foreign exchange with copper, Congo-Kinshasa 50 percent and Peru 30 percent (Mingst 1976: 267, 277-8). Bauxite mining and its processing was also predominantly in private hands until the 1970s. In 1971, Guyana fully nationalized its bauxite mines and in 1975, under the headline

directly deal with the new complexity (e.g. financialization, globalized production, rampant bureaucracy etc.) - and thus aim to ensure that the choice of political parties can be at least partially justified on objective grounds - have largely been replaced by "political framing" exercises. As soon as the media have forgotten about the corona virus, the growing division of political parties into territorialists and globalists (cf. Maier 2006: 49-5) could reinforce this tendency to regard economic globalization as an end in itself.

of Democratic Socialism, the Jamaican acquired substantial parts of the country's bauxite mines. The state share in Guinea and Brazil also increased in the 1970s (Crowson 2008: 20-21). Similar trends were to be observed in iron ore mining. In the early 1980s, 40 percent of internationally traded iron came from state-owned mines (Shafer 1986: 937).

This wave of nationalization in the 1960s and 1970s is probably one of the most astonishing events in the history of North-South relations, even if nationalizations as such were nothing new. In addition to the Russian mines that were nationalized after the 1917 revolution, most Western European coalmines were state-owned, the Finnish government nationalized copper mining in 1924, a Swedish iron ore producer was nationalized in 1957, and the British steel industry was fully nationalized in 1964. In the Global South, the first nationalizations of mines took place in Brazil (1942), Indonesia (1950) and Bolivia (1952) (Humphreys 2013: 37-8).

With African decolonization, the idea of "economic independence" quickly gained momentum. In the early 1960s, the governments of non-Communist countries held only 2.5 percent of the total copper capacity. By the early 1980s, this figure had risen to well over 50 percent (Crowson 2008: 22-4). Measured as governments' shares of equity, 55 percent of copper mining was state-owned in 1985, including centrally planned economies (ibid.: 28). This figure would be even higher if every mine with majority state ownership were counted in full. Much of this change took place in Africa and was related to independence movements.

The biggest loser of these nationalizations was clearly Europe. Still in the late 1970s, 70 percent of all African copper exports went to Europe. Almost all the rest went to Japan (European Commission 1979: 30; cf. Crowson and Royal Institute of International Affairs 1977, Ravenhill 1985: 136). The wave of nationalization was accompanied by a number of other measures and strategies of the raw material producing countries (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 Actions of "producers" during the resource crisis of the 1960/70s



These diagrams (see also figures 3, 8 and 9) are an attempt to give an overview of the existing measures and countermeasures. We have mapped them on a two-dimensional "power field", consisting of a horizontal axis ranging from cooperative to coercive measures, and a vertical axis representing the desired degree of interdependence. The position of the individual measures in the field is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. The approach is a heuristic means to get a better overview of the different processes, to discuss them and to connect them with each other.

Current reflections on power (Han 2005: 14-5) tend to approach power as a continuum between the ability to impose one's will on others (the old understanding ascribed to Max Weber) and idea of power as something that can also arise through voluntary "submission" (or, to put it positively: "cooperation") which has been ascribed to Foucault. Power that works by means of orders and power that is based on freedom and self-evidence are not opposed to each other. They have a common structure: power enables Ego to be "with one-self" in the Other (Han 2005:14). It creates a “continuity” of the self. “Self-expansion” instead of “self-continuity” would again mean that the Other is obliterated in the process. This continuity can be achieved both through coercion and through the "use of freedom" (ibid.).

A forced expansion of the self is fragile, whereas "obeying in freedom" (ibid.) is very stable. A practical - but misleading - version of this continuum is the distinction between "soft power" and "hard power" by Joseph Nye (1990). For various conceptual reasons we have chosen the less connoted terms "cooperation" and "coercion" as extremes of the x-axis (for a similar view of EU-Africa relations see Hurt 2003). In this paper, it is not possible to discuss current conceptualizations of power.

From delinking to upgrading

When we began to map the various measures, we realized that many of them aim at expanding one's own scope of action by reducing the dependence on the other. This can amount to delinking attempts, which ultimately means undoing the (power) relation as such. This is of particular interest here because the intensification of global interaction can be seen as the leitmotif of globalization.[7] According to Charles Maier (2006: 37-39), the most recent wave of globalization led to a "crisis of territoriality" and ultimately to a post-territorial order that was accompanied by the demise of "project states" (Maier 2019).[8] While his colleague Sven Beckert seems to see recent developments as signs for a renewed transformation of territoriality regimes, Maier so far rather identifies exceptions than a critical juncture as such.[9] Recently resurfacing delinking attempts, on the part of both producers and consumers, rather point to a renewed transformation of territoriality regimes (see conclusion).

If one now looks at the catalogue of measures adopted by African governments in the 1960s and 1970s, it is striking that they are almost exclusively located in the lower boxes and therefore aimed at delinking. Producer cartels played a particularly important role at that time. In 1967, Chile, Peru, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo founded the *Conseil intergouvernemental des pays exportateurs de cuivre* (CIPEC) and, in 1974, Australia, Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica, Surinam, Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia founded the International Bauxite Association (IBA).

Both cartels were largely seen as failed attemps shortly after their inception. Apart from reactions from the consumer states, this was mainly due to the fact that these cartels were (1) less capable than the OPEC countries to forgo revenues for a certain time span to exert pressure, (2) too heterogeneous - Australia in the IBA and Chile in the CIPEC (Shafer 1986: 935) played ambivalent roles here - and (3) because these raw materials could be substituted much more easily than oil. By calling into question the unconditional access to raw materials from the former colonies, these cartel formations nevertheless exerted great pressure on consumer states in the early years.

[7] In this context, it is probably no coincidence that the last wave of globalization began with a rise in commodity prices and has been increasingly questioned again since the commodity boom of the 2000s - first from "below" (see e.g. the WTO protests in Seattle 1999) and later also from "above" (see Trump's new mercantilism).
[8] Maier refers with this term to Scott 1998.
[9] Beckert (2017: 1170) writes that "[i]n a surprising way, the question of the relationship between capital, territory, and the state that had been at the core of debates on the "American danger" for more than seventy years is again being pondered in newspapers all around the world, signaling that the relatively stable territorial regime of the past decades may be in flux once more."

A further element of this striving for economic independence were public-private partnerships, many of which, through so-called "creeping nationalization" (Crowson and Francis 1977: 6-7), transformed into state-owned enterprises within a few years. In the 1970s, such partnerships were mainly proposed by transnational corporations, trying to prevent complete expropriation of their assets. From this perspective, the International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) and the resulting Lomé Convention were the only straws in a series of European efforts to maintain privileged relations with the African continent, which continued to be actively supported by African governments.

The arrows (<-) in Figures 2, 3, 8 and 9 indicate developments that took place during the respective crises. Negotiations on ICAs began as early as the 1930s and gained momentum from the 1950s to the 1970s, when the old industrialized centers were much more receptive to the demands of their new independent colonies, not least because of the Cold War (see e.g. the Brandt Report of 1980; Humphreys 2013: 42). At the meetings of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), which led to the NIEO Declaration, Third World countries even demanded that commodity prices be linked to the price of industrial goods - a nightmare for most non-Marxist economists, even of that time (Habig 1983: 217).

A forerunner of the ICAs was the International Tin Agreement, which came into force after the First World War, was renewed in 1954 and remained in force until the 1980s. Apart from this agreement, however, proposals to bring producer and consumer countries together in one stabilizing mechanism did not yield results for mineral resources. Apart from tin, there were only two other ICAs, one for cocoa in 1973 and one for rubber in 1979, with a precursor in the 1930s (Rangarajan 1983:590). All other proposals, for example for bauxite or copper, failed.

In 1975, the European Commission (Commission des Communautés européennes 1975; cf. Crowson 2008: 372) proposed an International Copper Agreement based on minimum and maximum prices, which were also to be guaranteed jointly by producers and consumers. Consumers would pay levies to a central fund if prices fell below the lower limit, and producers would contribute if prices rose above the upper limit. These revenues should either be used as direct subsidies to compensate for price fluctuations or to create buffer stocks. Another mechanism for price stabilization, which was not present in this proposal but was used, for example, in the Tin Agreement, was production restrictions as practiced by the OPEC states, with the difference that the output was to be decided jointly by consumers and producers (Crowson 2008: 372-375).

In 1976, these discussions led to the "Integrated Commodity Programme", which was agreed at the UNCTAD IV meeting in Nairobi and was to lead to 18 commodity agreements within two years, including bauxite, copper, iron ore, manganese and phosphate. A central element of this program was the so-called "Common Fund", which was to serve as a financing pool for a wide range of raw materials. Among other things, the price peak of one commodity at a given time was to finance the loss of value of another commodity (Crowson and Royal Institute of International Affairs 1977). The outcome of this highly ambitious program, which also included the abolition of tariffs on processed goods and the promotion of processing in the Global South (Crowson 2008: 349), was disappointing, especially because the participating states were unable to agree on the financing (Rangarajan 1983: 590) and because the political climate abruptly changed by the end of the 1970s.

The Common Fund, which was originally intended as a financing instrument for commodity price stabilization, was not set up until 1989, when the discussion on ICAs was already over. Instead, it became a relatively modest instrument of commodity-centered development aid, focusing primarily on the transfer of technology and know-how to "developing countries". By May 2007, 263 projects had been financed with a total cost of 458.8 million dollars. Only about half of this funding came from the Common Fund itself. Most of this aid was for agriculture, but there were also projects to promote the marketing of copper and tin and a project on mine closure. Since 2000, no project has focused on minerals (Common Fund for Commodities 2020).

The negotiations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the ACP states (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific), which were running simultaneously, led to the first Lomé Convention, which was signed in 1975, when the geopolitical situation had already shifted slightly in favor of the industrialized countries (cf. Elgström 2000: 180; Crowson 2008: 348). Lomé I includes the so-called *Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation* (STABEX), which, with the exception of iron, only covered agricultural commodities. Lomé II, signed in 1979, was already accompanied by a considerable number of concessions to the EEC and included the SYSMIN scheme, which focused on a number of minerals. These two programs were financed solely by the EEC and were thus part of its "development aid". At the same time, however, they can be regarded as the - rather meagre - result of the long discussions about a "fair" exchange of raw materials against consumer goods and about the international division of labor (see "Raw material policy").[10]

In the 2000s, a similar window of opportunity seemed to open up again for capital-poor commodity-exporting states: Most of them reviewed their mining laws (see e.g. Campbell 2004), increased their taxes (e.g. so-called windfall taxes on extraordinary profits in Zambia's copper industry), formed regional and continental alliances and many introduced export quotas (see Figure 3). Calls for further processing and "local content" also appear in the Africa Mining Vision, but have so far led to few concrete projects.

Figure 3 Actions of producer countries during the resource crisis of the 2000s



In Africa of the 2000s, the word socialism was rarely heard, but as in the 1970s the boom was accompanied by strikes (see for example the "Marikana massacre" in South Africa in 2012), social movements and a growing self-confidence of the national elites. The "socialist" experiments of the newly independent African states in the 1960s and 1970s can in this respect be compared with the wave of socialism in Latin America in the 2000s, which was heavily criticized for its "neo-extractivist" approaches (Gudynas 2012). In addition, the global bipolarity of the 1970s was still visible in the 2000s: the strategy of many African countries during the Cold War of oscillating between the blocs in order to expand their scope of

[10] Another result of these discussions is the Compensatory Financing Facility of the International Monetary Fund. It was created as early as 1963, but is of little significance to African states.

negotiation as much as possible became popular again, only with slight modifications with regard to the new dominant actors and the types of cooperation.

Nevertheless, figure 3 shows that the negotiating power of the African countries decreased significantly: The actions of commodity exporters moved in the "field of power" from the bottom right to the top left, i.e. towards less provocative and less "secessionist" measures. Instead of import substitution industrialization, the governments tried to "upgrade" (see Bair 2010: 35) within global value chains. Remnants of the strategy of import substitution industrialization can be found today in so-called "local content" regulations and programs, which are intended to encourage transnational corporations to obtain as many inputs as possible from local suppliers. However, the implementation of these provisions is almost entirely voluntary and is progressing sluggishly, partly because the production standards of transnational corporations are usually too high for local suppliers. For example, in one of the factories we investigated in Guinea, the mining company imports sugar from Austria, cooking oil from Great Britain, canned tomatoes from Italy, soap from Belgium, rice from the USA and sweetened canned milk from Germany (Knierzinger 2018: 160). According to the managers, attempts to obtain supplies in Guinea mainly failed so far because their quality could not be guaranteed.

In the majority of cases, however, *transnational* corporations also have *transnational* procurement networks. From the viewpoint of the company headquarters, the administration of the production network and the elimination of bottlenecks becomes easier if only a limited number of suppliers is globally responsible for each input. As long as transnational corporations are allowed in principle to import inputs and preliminary inputs from abroad, it will be difficult to change this practice (Kragelund 2017: 60-61). Moreover, in practice it is often not so easy to find out what constitutes a "local supplier" (Geenen 2019). "Local content" provisions thus seem to have a similar problem as their precursor, import substitution industrialization: Global production networks are based on free trade and precisely this would have to be restricted in order to enable more "local content" (cf. Kragelund 2017: 64-65).

In general, the change in strategy of the resource-producing countries must be analyzed against the background of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the economic diversification of the Global South (e.g. the rise of the newly industrialized countries). The end of trade preferences for ACP countries under the Cotonou Agreement (and the beginning of negotiations on EPAs) in the 2000s, for example, was called for as early as the 1990s by Latin American states, criticizing that these advantages were granted only to the ACP countries and not to all states of the Global South. Moreover, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the African territorial order was not yet fixed and allowed far more ambitious forms of South-South cooperation. Today, the pan-African agenda is much weaker and national interests are much more developed and urgent - even if a number of projects have recently started to point in the opposite direction again (see Conclusions).

Experiences with nationalizations

Another reason why African governments seem to have taken less advantage of the recent crisis of chain governance is that a considerable number of experiments from the 1960s/70s did not work out very well. Nationalizations, raw material cartels (with the exception of OPEC) and industrialization efforts in general did not produce the desired results. It does not follow, however, that nationalizations or industrialization per se were bad strategies. African governments nationalized mainly mines and refineries, thereby reducing access to raw materials that the former colonial powers had already largely used up within their own territories. With independence, foreign mining declined sharply and European companies increasingly withdrew from mining (cf. Crowson 2008: 16). Apart from mismanagement and corruption, which today are predominantly cited as the only reasons for the failure of nationalization and import substitution industrialization in Africa (cf. Crowson 2008: 26; Radetzki 2010: 174-178), the interests of the consumer countries must be emphasized. In the 1970s, many expatriates in African mines were replaced by Africans, but Europeans and Americans still controlled a large part of the technical know-how as well as end markets and capital goods.

While the Chilean copper industry, for example, succeeded quite early on in operating without external management assistance and with little need for technical advice, the Zambian copper industry was still dependent on a "full-scale management contract with the former foreign owner" (World Bank 1977: 16) ten years after nationalization. In 1969 the Zambian state secured 51 percent of the ownership of the mines, but the original owners retained the management and marketing contracts until 1974 (Kragelund 2017). In Congo-Kinshasa the state created a new marketing organization for its copper, but for at least the first ten years of nationalized production it remained dependent on its former Belgian sales agent (World Bank 1977: 16). In this context, Hönke (2009: 10) mentions a management contract ("concession de gestion"), which granted a subsidiary of the Belgian Société Générale extensive rights for recruitment, production management and commercialization. Both in the case of Congo-Kingshasa and Zambia, it is therefore questionable whether nationalizations have increased the governments' scope of action at all. In the mid-1980s, Shafer concludes that "direct control of copper production has proved a Trojan horse, as Zambia is today subject to amplified versions of the risks of the copper industry with still fewer means of managing them than before." (Shafer 1986: 936)

In 1964, the year of independence, all major mines in Zambia were owned by two American companies (Kragelund 2017: 59), and most of the copper went to Great Britain. As mentioned above, copper mining in Congo-Kinshasa remained under Belgian control long after independence in 1960, and Belgium continued to export Congolese copper to most European countries, particularly Germany.[11] The respective companies did not cease to exist and their management probably reacted to these affronts in a similar way as the Belgian king reacted to Lumumba's political declaration of independence (Witte 2001) or de Gaulle to the Guinean declaration of independence by Sékou Touré (Der Spiegel 1960).

Corruption and mismanagement certainly were important factors for failing industrialization. According to Crowson, a good part of the Congolese Gécamines' revenues were never accounted for. Zambia's ZCCM had one of the highest production costs in the world despite the highest ore grades, partly because of overmanning. This was exacerbated by "rapid Zambianisation of employment and an outflow of expatriate workers" (Crowson 2008: 26). Although the company earned most of the country's foreign exchange, reinvestment, "even to sustain existing operations" (ibid.), was lacking. To this added political developments in Zimbabwe and South Africa, which made it difficult to export Zambian copper (ibid.). In 1992, the World Bank argued that African mining companies adapted much more effectively to the downturn of the 1980s if they were privately managed (World Bank 1992).

Prichard (2009: 242) responded to this publication by arguing that for most African countries, this phase was characterized by a deep economic crisis, which also represented a low point in the quality of governance and political stability on the continent. One could also add that African workers made redundant by private companies were in all likelihood worse off than those who had been retained by public companies until the late 1990s. More generally, the correlation between economic growth and general well-being in the export-dependent African mining countries is very low and was probably even lower during the short recovery periods of

[11] The historian Torben Gülstorff showed in his dissertation that most of the raw materials of Congo-Kinshasa were imported via the former colonial power Belgium. This was the case for copper, cobalt, diamonds and most likely manganese. In 1962, West German companies imported about 9 percent of their copper and 33 percent of their cobalt from the Congo via Belgium (Gülstorff 2012: 348-349). This trade was most likely associated with substantial foreign direct investment by German banks. Gülstorff (2012: 128) found consistent evidence in Congolese and East German archives of a 42percent stake held by the Deutsche Bank in Katanga's then largest company, the *Union Minière du Haut Katanga*.

the period in question. With Radetzki (2010: 174), it can be added that practically all African governments lacked know-how and did not control the end markets (see also "Restructuring of production networks"). Processing was still carried out abroad and thus "out of reach of the nationalization efforts" (ibid.: 180). Nationalizations and import substitution industrialization thus also failed because they were directed against the political and economic interests of the former colonial powers.

This history of failure from the 1960s to the 1990s led to much more cautious approaches during the window of opportunity of the 2000s. While in the 1970s, it was the transnational mining companies that proposed joint ventures with the producer states in order to avoid nationalizations, in the 2000s these were proposed by African governments that had had bad experiences with full nationalizations. This trend towards "public-private partnerships" (PPPs) was thus accompanied by a radical shift from delinking strategies to attempts to become more involved in the global market. Although processing projects continued to be in the focus of attention in the 2000s, they were mostly seen as an instrument of "upgrading" (Bair 2010: 35) within global value chains and no longer as a means of establishing links between different segments of one country's economy, for example between agriculture and industry (e.g. Cox 1979: 294). In the same way, South-South cooperation tended to be replaced by integration into the world market and the attempt to form producer cartels completely disappeared from public discussions. All these developments are ultimately connected with the reduced presence of social movements in the 2000s. Although the rise in commodity prices in the 2000s was accompanied and to a certain extent triggered by social movements, their influence on (inter)national politics remained quite limited until recently.

Reactions of TNCs and governments of consumer countries

In the consumer countries, both commodity booms were accompanied and reinforced by massive lobbying efforts of the mining sector and of downstream industries in Europe. In 2007, for example, Ulrich Grillo, President of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) from 2013 to 2016, began a lecture on the "Expectations of the German industry concerning a Strategic Raw material policy" with the following sentences: "Welcome to the beginning of the Second Cold War! Welcome to the fight for raw wmaterials!" (Grillo 2007). Five years after this speech, Grillo became head of the German RA Rohstoffallianz AG, a new mining company founded by major German industrial companies such as BASF, Bosch, Thyssen-Krupp, BMW and Daimler. The German industry has to import almost all the metallic raw materials it needs (Huy 2013: 22) and was therefore particularly reactive to the raw material crisis, but similar reactions were also seen in other European countries, among other things due to a similarly high dependence on imports of raw materials (see figure 4), especially on African mines (cf. Frøland and Ingulstad 2019: 309). Anne Lauvergeon, then CEO of the state-owned French nuclear power company Areva, declared in 2008 that a "worldwide kriegspiel" for access to reserves, "which is not at all analyzed in Europe", might lead to an "extraordinary consolidation of big global mining groups and incredible financial capacities" and warned that "we will wake up with dramatic consequences for the [European] industrial sector" (République française 2008: 292). In the same year, the EU Commission also warned of the emergence of "resource nationalism", which posed a great danger to the European industry (Mandelson 2009; cf. Frøland and Ingulstad 2019: 302). In 2012, the influential Royal Institute of International Affairs, or Chatham House, began a 200-page report on the commodity boom with the words "the spectre of resource insecurity has come back with a vengeance" (Lee et al. 2012), referring both to the 1970s (it came "back") and to the ideological changes that accompanied it. The word "spectre" inevitably evokes the Communist Manifesto. In 1977, the same Chatham House had established a study group of 13 people whose identity was kept secret (see Chatham House Rule) and who came to very similar conclusions (Crowson and Royal Institute of International Affairs 1977: i).[12] Similarly, a European advisory committee from the 1980s, the Raw Materials Supply Group[13], was reactivated in 2006 and subsequently dealt with the planning and implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative (RMI), which is described in more detail in this section.

[12] The author of the 1977 Chatham House study (Crowson and Royal Institute of International Affairs 1977) was the same Philip Crowson who was still active in the 2000s. In 2008, he published a book entitled "Mining Unearthed" in which he compares the 1970s and 2000s as follows: "The past decade's debate about sustainable development in the minerals industry echoes the international debates about natural resources of the 1960s and 1970s [...]. There is a clear line of decent not just from the Club of Rome's influential report on 'Limits on Growth', but also from the ferment debate that arose from the Declaration of the New International Economic Order of April 1974. [Today] the pendulum is swinging back towards greater control of market forces and governmental interventions (ibid: 407-8)." Crowson observed this development with growing concern and compared the growing distrust of market forces with the rejection of democracy, since both are "often seen as an annoying nuisance that hinders good governance" (ibid: 408). From 1981 to 1996, Crowson was chief economist at Rio Tinto, one of the largest mining companies to date, and also worked for the "NGO" Chatham House. In his 2008 book, he nevertheless portrayed NGOs as "neo-colonialist" actors, in the sense that they "try to impose their own beliefs" and thus undermine the authority of governments, which are "the very embodiment of civil society." Moreover, civil society also consists of companies that "in many cases have greater legitimacy [than NGOs] because their directors are duly appointed by the shareholders" (ibid: 410). The fact that Crowson appears to have been very influential in both periods shows that the parallels between the two crises are neither a mere coincidence nor the result of similar political constellations. They are part of long-term political strategies and debates. Many of today's "architects" of European raw material policy have either been strongly influenced by important actors of the 1970s (e.g. as their students or staff) or they have already been active 40 years ago.

[13] The Raw Materials Supply Group is „ a stakeholder group comprising industry, environmental NGOs, trade unions, Member States, candidate countries and the Commission" (Raw Materials Supply Group 2005).

Figure 4 European Union import dependence (Members of the EU have increased from 10 to 27) (Source: Crowson 2008: 288)



In the mid-1970s, central political figures warned in a similar way of an impending "resource war". US President Gerald Ford, for example, threatened in 1974 that "any attempt by any nation to withhold its resources from the U.S. could lead to war" (Graham 1982:82). During the 1980 presidential election campaign, Ronald Reagan regularly used the term "resource war" to refer to alleged Soviet strategies to block US access to critical raw materials in the "Third World" (see e.g. Gordon 1981; Crowson 2008: 294-5). The same concern, albeit in less alarming terms, was expressed in 1977 by the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1978: 8).

The responses of consumer countries and mining companies to the perceived threats can be divided into three categories: First, the restructuring of production networks; second, "raw material policy" (media campaigns, lobbying, the conditioning of development aid and trade agreements, etc.); and third, the exercise of power in the form of coercion, for example through personal intimidation, assassinations and (proxy) wars. The last category is even harder to assess than the previous ones and will therefore not be part of this contribution, even though it is at least as important, mainly because the industry and the decision-making structures are heavily concentrated and thus few actors - some of whom have a frighteningly limited insight into global contexts (for example, Guinea saw 10 mining ministers in 16 years)[14] - have a great deal of influence and receive comparatively little media attention.[15] We will concentrate on categories one and two: the restructuring of production networks and "raw material policy".

[14] Many ministers were not qualified for this position and were replaced before they even had time to get an overview of their actual area of responsibility. List of mining ministers: 2000 Ibrahima Soumah (Mines, géologie et environnement); 2002 Alpha Mady Soumah (ibid.); 2005 Ahmed Tidiane Souaré (Mines et géologie); 2006 Ousmane Sylla (ibid.); 2007 Ahmed Kante; 2008 Louncény Nabé. 2009 Mahmoud Thiam; 2011 Mahamed Lamine Fofana; 2014 Kerfalla Yansané; since 2016 Abdoulaye Magassouba.

[15] For instance, the first Prime Minister of Congo-Kinshasa, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated by a Belgian-Congolese commando in 1960, a few months after his nomination. The murder was portrayed as a lynching

Restructuring of production networks

We have investigated these changes mainly through research in the digitized archives of the US Geological Survey (USGS) and other online sources. Companies restructured their production networks by (a) relocating production to politically "safe" countries, (b) making their production networks more complex, (c) forming cross-sector alliances (e.g. buyer cartels and mining joint ventures) and (d) insisting on reprivatization. This led to production networks with increasingly scattered production "nodes", which helped mining companies to escape the territorial control of the "host countries" (see Figures 6 and 7). In this paper, we illustrate these strategies mainly with developments in copper and bauxite mining.

Relocation of production

When resource-rich governments began in the 1960s to nationalize their mines, demand higher taxes and set up raw materials cartels based on the OPEC model, the mining companies reacted, among other things, by relocating production. The founding of the IBA in the critical phase of the 1970s led, for example, to a sharp decline of bauxite mining in Jamaica, Surinam, and Guyana, which was replaced by production in Australia and Guinea (see Figure 5).

(Ludermann 2004: 55-59) and his body was buried on the spot along with two other persons. Shortly afterwards, however, the bodies were exhumed by two Belgian police officers. It was not until 40 years later that one of the two policemen stated that they had been commissioned to dismember the corpses and dissolve them in sulphuric acid which they had procured from the *Union Minière du Haut Katanga* (on the supply of the sulphuric acid see Witte 2001:141).

Figure 5 Worldwide bauxite production per country in percent, 1928-2012 (Knierzinger 2018: 7; Source USGS 2019)



Similar reactions can be observed for other raw materials. According to Frøland and Ingulstad (2019: 312), the share of European mining investments in other industrialized countries increased from 60 percent in 1966-67 to 85 percent in the mid-1970s. At the same time, Africa's share of world production of minerals decreased from about one third in 1970 to 10 percent in 1987 (World Bank 1992). Fearing geopolitical loss of ground because of these developments, the European Commission called on mining companies to continue investing in high-risk regions. According to Ravenhill (1985), the mining companies responded promptly with a list of demands, which was immediately included in Lomé II of 1979 (see also the section on "Raw material policy" for more information on the Lomé conventions). The Commission's response included financing exploration in these areas, concluding investment agreements and establishing a European insurance scheme for non-economic risks (Ravenhill 1985: 139-40). With regard to the last point, Ravenhill unfortunately did not refer to the respective documents. According to Frøland and Ingulstad (2019: 318), comprehensive efforts by Europe to insure its companies against political risk are only found in the 2000s, in the course of WTO accession negotiations and in free trade and partnership agreements.

Deterritorialization of production networks

In addition to these shifts of supply chains from one country to another, there was also an increased globalization of production networks. From the 1970s onwards, for example, European and American aluminum companies made sure that no country attained an integrated production of aluminum from bauxite, although several African countries would have been particularly well placed to do so. The bulk of African bauxite is still shipped mainly to the USA and Europe (mainly to Ireland and Spain) and then reimported in the form of alumina. The resulting aluminum is then re-exported (again mainly to Europe) and re-imported in the form of building materials, cars, cans and other finished products. Since 2016, a considerable proportion of African bauxite has also been exported to China, equally without the local processing that had been promised by China and the Guinean government. Thus, since the 1970s, complex production networks have evolved, the extent of which can by far not be explained by economic efficiency. Rather, they seem to be a matter of political risk minimization strategies of the corporations (see Figure 6).

Figure 6 Bauxite and aluminum production on the African continent around 2017 (sources: OEC 2015; USGS 2019)



Given the ownership structure of African aluminum production, Europe's central position in this production network is surprising. Even decades after the decline of the dominant European companies - Pechiney (France), Alusuisse (Switzerland) and VAW (Germany) - refining, smelting, processing and consumption still take place predominantly in Europe. With the exception of a small mine in Awaso, Ghana, and a larger mine in Guinea, which started production in 2016, Chinese companies are still exploring sites and building mines or buying African bauxite. Like other sites, Awaso was abandoned by Western companies before the Chinese company Bosai Minerals Group stepped in.

The copper sector is more difficult to depict, but similar developments have occurred. In 1974, for example, the Selebi-Pikwe Mine, a nickel-copper mine, started operations in Botswana as a public-private joint venture (15 percent state participation). The mine was connected to a smelter that processed the copper ore up to a copper content of 80 percent, but at this stage nickel and copper were not yet separated. Demands by the Botswana government to build the necessary refinery in Botswana were rejected by the private operators for economic and technical reasons. The companies also argued that they could not use a refinery in nearby Zambia because of the different mineral composition there. Furthermore, one of these companies had just bought a refinery in Louisiana. The copper-nickel mixture was therefore first transported to Mozambique, then shipped to the United States for refining and then sent to the Metallgesellschaft in Germany. The Zambian situation at that time was made even more difficult by the fact that British development aid had been greatly reduced during the same period. Although some 2600 jobs had been created with the mine, the government's income was not much higher than before. According to Lanning and Müller (1979: 334-50), Botswana was thus merely exchanging its dependence on the former colonizer Great Britain for a dependence on foreign mining companies. Similar to other public-private joint ventures, the government also began to support the mine operators against the workers in industrial disputes (ibid. 348; see Knierzinger 2018: 84).

In the aluminum sector, too, the involvement of socialist governments in new public-private joint ventures led to lofty economic policy plans and promises by governments and companies, which were almost all disappointed. Nkrumah's plans to create a vertically integrated aluminum industry (from bauxite to finished products), a fishing industry and industrialized agriculture within Ghana's borders based on the Akosombo dam are a good example. Negotiations with the "aluminum sister" Kaiser and the World Bank eventually led to an aluminum smelter which received all inputs from abroad except for electricity from the dam (see figure 6; Lanning and

Mueller 1979: 429-435). The developments in Guinea were very similar (Knierzinger 2018). In 2013, the Guinean government alone reported eight bauxite processing projects, none of which have been implemented to date (Bureau de Presse de la Présidence 2013). There have also been similarly pompous announcements for several Guinean iron ore projects in recent years.

The reasons for this continuous deception of the population have not yet been systematically researched. An important factor are clearly the interests of the powerful actors: Both the mining companies and the governments have to promise processing plans in order to legitimate the conclusion of mining contracts and both sides have an interest in these contracts. Governments benefit (usually very personally) from the levies of the companies and the latter use their mining rights both to export raw materials and to cut off competitors from these deposits. Many reasons have been put forward for the continuous lack of further processing: changes of government in the host countries, restructuring or sale of the companies, technical problems and accusations of corruption are among the most frequently cited. In the case of corporations operating in the Global South, however, as mentioned above, the political risk of territorially integrated production usually seems to outweigh the additional costs of deterritorialized production.

Cross-sector alliances: Joint ventures and buyer cartels

In the heavily concentrated aluminum sector of the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called "Six Sisters"[16], the dominant aluminum companies at the time, were also moving closer together. From 1960 onwards, all new bauxite mines were joint ventures of the dominant companies. The same applied to refineries and smelters outside the countries of origin of the Six Sisters (Bunker, Ciccantell 1995: 59-61; Habig 1983: 235). Table 1 shows the extent to which the Six Sisters cooperated in the new locations:

Table 1 New Joint Ventures of the Six Sisters in the 1960s and 1970s (Source: Bunker and Ciccantell 1995: 59)

	Alcoa	Reynolds	Kaiser	Alcan	Pechiney	Alusuisse
Guinea	x	x		x	x	x
Australia	x	x	x			x
Jamaica	x	x	x	x		

[16] Alcoa, Reynolds, Kaiser (all US), Alcan (Canada), Alusuisse (Switzerland) and Pechiney (France).

Brazil	x	x		x

Around 1979, two thirds of global bauxite production, half of alumina production (Al^2O^3) and one third of primary aluminum production came from joint ventures (Shafer 1986: 931). Economic competition was thus increasingly overshadowed by political competition on the lines of bipolarity and the North-South conflict. This "partnership capitalism" (Carmody 2011: 7) is similarly noticeable in the 2000s in the form of buyer cartels. In this context, reference has already been made to the RA Rohstoffallianz, which brought together major players of the German industry. In the 1970s, the joint ventures mentioned above were also used to co-opt „rebellious“ governments by offering them shares in the mines to be built and even in the processing industry in Europe (Commission of the European Communities 1975: 11; Frøland and Ingulstad 2019: 312), although the latter was only implemented to a very limited extent.[17]

Reprivatization

Under the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) financed by the World Bank and its successors, a large part of the nationalizations of the 1960s and 1970s were undone. This particularly affected the copper mines. The Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines were reprivatized in the mid-1990s (Kragelund 2017). In the early 2000s, the Congolese Gécamines also underwent an SAP, which led to the "voluntary departure" of 10,000 employees with more than 25 years of service (Rubbers 2017: 189). These measures could be pushed through, because after the nationalizations, global copper prices and Africa's share of global copper production had been decreasing at the same time (see Figures 1 and 7).

Figure 7 Global shares of major African copper production in percent (Source: USGS 2019)

	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2000-15
Zambia	58	48	38	54	61	43
Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire)	28	32	40	12	14	45
South Africa	7	13	14	25	17	5
Rest of Africa	6	7	8	10	8	7
Global share of African production	23	20	17	7	5	9

[17] Radetzki mentions shares of the state-owned copper producers ZCCM (Zambia) and Codelco (Chile) in the European downstream sector. Apart from these two exceptions, such linkages are only found in oil production (Radetzki 2010: 180).

The boom of the 1960s and 70s led to the formation of a Zambian middle class, which almost disappeared again in the 1980s and 1990s (Ferguson 1999). After the complete nationalization of Zambian copper in 1973, prices fell sharply and did not recover until after reprivatization in the late 1990s.

The above-mentioned reactions of the transnational corporations lead to the fact that the profits and the control of these global production networks remained mainly in the hands of the old industrialized countries. Despite permanent promises by mining companies and African governments to process African raw materials locally, value added declined from the 1950s to the 1970s and has since stagnated at a very low level (cf. Campbell 2009: 79; Knierzinger 2015: 225; Knierzinger 2017).

Raw material policy

In addition to attempts to become more resource-efficient and to make greater use of their own raw material deposits, the governments of resource-poor countries reacted to the crisis primarily by trying secure access to raw materials for "their" companies. Frøland and Ingulstad (2019: 312) refer in this context to the striking similarities between the central document of the European strategy of the 1970s (Commission of the European Communities 1975) and the Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) of 2008 (European Commission 2008). As early as 1975, a Commission paper entitled "The community's supplies of raw materials" proposed the promotion of substitution and recycling, the extension of product lifetimes and the use of new technologies to open up new mining areas in Europe, including the expansion of the EEC. However, the central position was already then that Europe "cannot engage in autarchical policies" (Commission of the European Communities 1975).

This led, among other things, to the development of a new cooperation system for metals: STABEX of Lomé I, which was limited to agricultural products with the exception of iron ore[18], was followed by SYSMIN, a similar "aid for trade" program for metals under Lomé II, in large parts due to German pressure for access to African copper. Lomé I came into force in 1976, Lomé II in 1981.

[18] The first Commission proposal for STABEX still included copper. However, due to pressure from the ACP countries - primarily Mauritania, which chaired the STABEX negotiations - copper was removed from the list and iron ore was added at the last minute. Mauritania has extensive iron ore deposits, which even today account for almost half of total exports (Ravenhill 1985: 105).

The European Raw Materials Initiative (RMI; European Commission 2008) also came about on the initiative of Germany (European Commission 2010; Küblböck 2014) and led, among other things, to the creation of a list of Critical Raw Materials, which has been continuously expanded since then (from 14 in 2011 to 27 in 2017). Germany already announced a raw materials strategy in 2005 (cf. Custers and Matthysen 2009: 54-5). The EU's RMI was revised in 2011 and has three pillars: first, strategies to secure access to non-energy minerals on the world market, which was "increasingly affected by market distortions" (EC 2008: 2; cf. Küblböck 2014: 91); second, the promotion of mining within European borders; and third, increasing recycling and resource efficiency (EC 2011: 11).

Based on the first pillar, the EU began to take action against export duties, quotas, so-called non-automatic export licenses and restrictive investment legislation by means of "Raw Materials Diplomacy". This concerned, for example, investment protection agreements, free trade agreements, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and complaints at the WTO dispute settlement body - the latter, in turn, in close cooperation with the European, and especially the German industrial lobby. In addition, development policy in general was again increasingly instrumentalized to achieve the domestic policy objective of "resource security", for example through the European Investment Bank or the European Development Fund and within the framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy of 2010, where infrastructure measures in mining areas are promoted in a neo-colonial manner (Frøland and Ingulstad 2019: 317).

Especially in the EPA negotiations, it became clear, that the EU's preference for multilateral agreements did not lead to the desired effects and was continued in the form of bilateral negotiations. From the outset, the European Commission also resorted to threats to raise its own import barriers again (see Frøland and Ingulstad 2019: 316-7; Custers and Matthysen 2009).

Figure 8 Reactions of consumer during the resource crisis of the 1960s/70s



(Lower resource intensity)

(Longer product life)

(Deep sea mining)

More exploration/mining in OECD

Substitution

delinking

Figure 9 Reactions of consumers during the resource crisis of the 2000s



The official reports published so far on the implementation of the RMIs show a strong presence of the Cotonou Agenda, which aims at trade liberalization through the EPAs. In addition, European involvement in both WTO cases against Chinese export restrictions from 2009 to 2014 is highlighted. These complaints eventually forced China to lift its export restrictions. China had justified its policy of export restrictions since the early 2000s with GATT Article 20 on general exemptions, but accepted the negative decision of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (WTO 2013) as early as 2013 and suspended its export restrictions for several years - until the trade dispute with the Trump administration began. Raw materials diplomacy was also applied in the TTIP negotiations between the EU and the USA, which might have allowed non-discriminatory access to raw materials from other countries (Frøland and Ingulstad 2019: 318). In this case, too, the nomination of Trump marked a caesura that seems as abrupt as the beginning of the Reagan era, albeit under completely different circumstances.

Compared to the 1960s/70s, the crisis of the 2000s was accompanied by a growing importance of non-state actors (NGOs as well as companies, e.g. in the form of CSR) and an increase in delinking measures on the part of the industrialized countries. The latter was mainly related to increased ecological concerns, many of which had already been present in the 1960s/70s but were only put into practice in the 2000s, mostly in connection with the EU Circular Economy Action Plan. The EU promoted recycling and lower resource intensity and even funded research on "premature obsolescence" (European Commission 2019). These positive developments are both complemented and offset by technological progress stimulated by high raw material prices (see Buijs 2012: 206-207). An example of the latter is deep-sea mining, which was already the subject of intense debate in the 1960s and 1970s and has recently entered the test phase.

Moreover, the European resource crisis of the 2000s went hand in hand with major efforts to trace back global supply chains, triggered by the increasing number of media reports and campaigns on the relations between violent conflicts and mining in Africa. This led to two competing forms of "transparency": On the one hand, European actors increasingly articulated their raw-material interests explicitly - see for instance the “Security strategy for Germany” of the CDU/CSU in 2008 (CDU/CSU 2008), or the resignation of President Horst Köhler in 2010 after his insistence on the importance of the protection of trade routes by the German military (Spiegel Online 2010). On the other hand, civil society also demanded more transparent supply chains and "decent" working conditions. In the debates on the Congo wars, both developments became visible at the same time: On the one hand, the EU listed both tantalum and cobalt as critical raw materials, the import of which was to be secured; on the other hand, with the so-called "Conflict Minerals Regulation", it drafted a law modelled on Section 1502 of the American Dodd-Frank Act, which contributed to a sharp decline in raw material imports from the DR Congo. The Conflict Minerals Regulation was adopted by the European Parliament in May 2017. Another result of this focus on transparency was a strong European lobby for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which was launched in 2002 on the initiative of Tony Blair and aimed at the disclosure of tax payments of mining companies to governments.

In general, European-African relations became increasingly market-oriented and focused increasingly, though not exclusively, on intra-African problems such as corruption. Discussions on international commodity agreements in the 1950s to 1970s, which were intended to guarantee stable prices in the mutual interest of producer and consumer countries (Custers 2009: 66) and Lomé I (STABEX) in 1975, which also still aimed at stable commodity prices (mainly for agricultural goods), were followed by a phase lasting about three decades in which Europe increasingly asserted its interests in an unequivocal manner. The SYSMIN scheme of 1979 was still presented as an altruistic effort to guarantee stable raw material prices in developing countries, but a closer look reveals that, unlike its predecessor STABEX, it only aimed at ensuring stable raw material production, which was primarily in the interests of the European industry (Ravenhill 1985: 129-32; Frøland and Ingulstad 2019: 314). The Cotonou Agreement in 2000, which replaced Lomé IV, then aimed to completely undo the preferential treatment of the ACP countries. In fact, this preferential treatment by the EU (not to be confused with the Generalised System of Preferences) had never been compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1948. However, it was not until 1993, on the example of the EU's preferences for banana imports that the preferential treatment was found to be incompatible with Article I of the GATT (FAO 2020). As a result, the EU was granted exemptions ("waivers") by the newly established WTO, which it did not extend anymore from 2007 onwards. At the same time, European governments have begun to link market liberalization and privatization with bilateral investment agreements and development cooperation, for example in the context of the World Bank's HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) initiative or the EPAs. In 2018, the European government also amended the so-called "Lesser Duty Rule" (EU Regulation 2018/825), which now treats special forms of export restrictions as dumping.[19]

Results and outlook

The consequences of the boom of the 1970s were devastating for most African states. The debt crisis of the 1980s led - after the Volcker shock[20] - to an increase in the volume of commodity production, which was the main reason for a renewed decline in the terms of trade (Agnew and Grant 1996: 730; Ross 1999: 302). This led to structural adjustment and resulted in the so-called "lost decade". Most regimes were dependent on a few raw materials[21] and lost a considerable part of government revenues when prices fell and mining activities were shifted from politically “problematic” countries to OECD countries (see e.g. Grégoire 2011: 211).[22] This triggered numerous political-ideological turnarounds. After a phase of nationalizations in the 1960s and 1970s, more and more African governments were reprivatized mining companies and rewrote their mining codes. Based on the World Bank's "Strategy for African Mining" (World Bank Group 1992), most African countries liberalized their mining framework without

[19] Interestingly, the discussions in the Foreign Affairs Council (2014) show that Germany and many other rich EU countries were against changing this rule because they did not want to endanger "free market exchange" and feared retaliatory measures by the producers states.

[20] In an interview with Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, Paul Volcker explained that "Africa was not even on my radar screen" (Bond 2008). However, the interviewers underline the importance of the Volcker shock for the rise of neoliberalism and Volcker's intention to "break the morale of labour" (Panitch and Gindin 2013).

[21] In the mid-1990s, 27 African states generated 75 percent of their export earnings from one or two raw materials (Agnew/Grant 1996: 738).

[22] Half of the ten fastest growing states in the 1960s were among the ten slowest in at least one of the following decades (Weeks 2010: 3; see Taylor 2014: 128).

developing broader industrial strategies. This affected, for example, DRC, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe (Knierzinger 2015: 75).

In the early 2000s, this process seemed to enter a new "round", with new commodity price hikes and thus a renewed shift of power towards the commodity-producing countries. However, not least because the consequences of the subprime crisis led to a rather short renegotiation window (roughly from 2004–14), the spatial relationships and economic relations were questioned far less in the 2000s than in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Maier 2006: 49-51; Engel and Middell 2005: 21-9). From the perspective of the producer countries, the 2000s were initially less a historical "critical juncture of globalization" (ibid; Middell and Naumann 2010: 168) than a late onset of “globalization”. One of the reasons why, until the 2000s, the African continent was weakly involved in globalization in the sense of higher cross-border money flows (see triadization; Ohmae 1985), was that the commodity markets were saturated. With the new commodity boom and the rise of the BRICS countries and other emerging countries, (potential) investors and development partners suddenly multiplied. However, the resulting political leeway was only used by a minority of African states, whose state capacity was high enough to resist the deterritorializing effects of this multiplication of economic and political interest. Since most African budgets consist largely of development aid and export revenues from a limited number of raw materials (cf. Agnew and Grant 1996: 738; Talyor 2014: 128), which are mostly controlled by foreign companies, this multiplication of investors tended to lead to further territorial fragmentation, which in turn tended to prevent the coherent development of infrastructure and social services (Jacobs 2012: 36; cf. Taylor 2014: 125-126). From this perspective, hopes for a so-called "African renaissance" (The Economist 2011) or for a "bifurcation" (Magrin 2013: 362), which were very prominent in the media during the commodity boom, will depend strongly on processes of "reterritorialization" (Brenner 1999), i.e. on a renewed convergence of economic and political (or democratic) space (Becker 2003: 67-71; Beckert 2017: 1170; cf. "decision space" and "identity space", Maier 2006: 49-55[23]). Particularly if one takes into account that most of the achievements of the "raw material revolts" of the 1960s/70s were reversed in the 1980s/90s, the current chances for structural change still

[23] Maier's discussion of the growing incongruence of "decision space" and "identity space" aims at the idea of a declining nation state. Starting from this distinction, Maier demonstrates an astonishing foresight with regard to the division of Western democracies into globalists and territorialists, but leaves the reader quite helpless when it comes to the possibilities of reconnecting the two spaces again.

seem to be quite small (see Taylor 2014: 127-31 on recent processes of reprimarization instead of diversification).[24]

This repeatedly overrated African capacity to change the international division of labor is mirrored by a continuity of ideological thought that can be made out in European reactions against the resource crises of the 1970s and the 2000s. The central European strategy paper of the 2000s (European Commission 2008; 2011) entitled " The raw materials initiative — meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe" has much in common with the central strategy paper of the 1970s (Commission of the European Communities 1975; see Buijs 2012: 202). Many measures of the 1970s re-emerged in the 2000s and many plans of the 1970s were only implemented in the 2000s. This applies to dispute settlement (which was vehemently rejected by Latin American countries in the early 1970s; World Bank 1977), the rise of private actors as decision-makers (e.g. legitimized by corporate social responsibility and the professionalization of NGOs), public-private mining joint ventures, privatization (in the 2000s, for example in the context of the HIPC initiative), tax evasion through "financial innovation" (conceived as a reaction to higher taxes of the producer countries), the deterritorialization of production networks and the end of non-reciprocity in the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which according to Raffer (2002) "was a decisive step towards restoring the situation that the EEC had originally wanted when negotiating the first Lomé Convention" (cf. Whiteman 2017: 46).

Conclusion: Transparency obscures complexity

The EU's responses to the crises of chain governance of the 1970s and 2000s successively increased the complexity of EU-Africa relations: the intra-imperial exchange of resources for finished products was replaced by global production networks, the Lomé Conventions gave way to bilateral free trade and economic partnership agreements, higher and more effective taxation of mining was answered by even more investment in "financial innovation", and national decision-making was increasingly outsourced to international financial institutions and private enterprises (CSR).

In the period between the 1930s and 1950s, comparatively consolidated areas such as the British and French Empires placed a strong emphasis on a "policy of imperial self-sufficiency" (Daviron and Ponte 2005: 85). France started this later, but went much further than its rival (ibid.), at least as far as the planning of such an economic area was concerned (cf. Amin 1973:

[24] Cf. with “structural disarticulation”, which, according to Shivy (2009: 59) leads the paradox situation, that “what is produced is not consumed and what is consumed is not produced” (cf. Talyor 2014: 129).

XI). However, after the foundation of the EEC and the African wave of independence in the early 1960s, there was a reorientation towards "aid for trade", which proved to be much more efficient, also in terms of political control. Compared to colonial exploitation, the "oppressors" (cf. Sassen 2014: 10) were now much less visible (ibid.) and control became at the same time much more efficient. Coercion still takes place, but even in the case of physical violence, it is becoming increasingly difficult to identify the responsible actors and their goals.

In the 2000s, much of the discursive legitimation for this complexification was provided by the increasing insistence on "transparency". The powerful normative idea of a "just" international division of labor, which had still been at the center of the demands for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s, was largely replaced by the idea of transparency. In this sense, it could be argued that the same (very heterogeneous) group of actors that increased the complexity of EU-Africa relations in order to stabilize or regain their influence, also pushed for more transparency, both as a means of legitimization and as a pragmatic remedy. To some extent, this development was *deliberately* driven forward by certain actors - for example by the financial sector, whose dominance from the 1980s onwards radically changed the rationales of large mining companies (Larrue 1997: 277). This does not mean, however, that complexification took place only because of this existing intentionality. In the arenas examined here, the transparency paradigm led, among other things, to the rise of sustainability reporting as part of CSR, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the European Conflict Minerals Regulation and to various certification systems (e.g. the Kimberley Process for diamonds, the ITSCI Programme for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains, or the Aluminium Stewardship Initiative). In addition, the transparency of European legislative procedures has made considerable progress in recent years, especially with regard to lobbying. Lobbying has not decreased, but is much more extensively documented and controlled. All these initiatives and instruments have many positive consequences. However, the guiding principle of economic “justice” of the 1970s has become less and less important over the same period, both at national and international scales, and especially in EU-Africa relations.

The ongoing post-Cotonou negotiations fit quite well into this picture. The special relationship between Europe and its former colonies, which led to the creation of the ACP group, has always been inconsistent with the European free trade agenda. The Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020) led to the end of non-reciprocal trade preferences for ACP countries (with the exception of the least developed countries), which were considered incompatible with WTO rules, and strengthened the role of business and other non-state actors - both as members of round tables and as implementers of political programs (cf. Stevens 2007: 1-2).

Only in the last years, the result of this transformation of power relations from imperial rule to complex indirect (neo-imperial) control strategies (involving non-state actors and international organizations) has been questioned again, for instance by political unification movements on the African continent. This happened once again based on negotiations that had already begun in the 1960s/70s.

This concerns, for example, the (1) Mano River Union, an integration project of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, and recently, Ivory Coast, which had been created in 1973 and reactivated in 2004 (and recently announced plans for creating a parliament); (2) the project of the East African Federation, aiming at the merger of six states, proposed in the 1960s and resumed in 2018; and (3) the Agreement on the African Continental Free Trade Area, which entered into force in May 2019. One of the European responses to this was to propose a "Euro-African economic area". The former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt explicitly called for such a free trade area, "to be able to rival with China" (Verhofstadt 2018). From a global-historical perspective, these territorial shifts could be regarded as the first signs of a new transformation of spatial relations, not least because all the mentioned projects refer to initiatives from the 1960s and 1970s aiming at the integration political and economic space (see Maier 2006: 49-55).

The corona pandemic also caused a change in thinking on the part of consumers. The basic economic-liberal assumption that more social complexity leads to more prosperity is increasingly being questioned. One concrete result are current efforts to bring the production of certain drugs back to Europe. It is very likely, however, that this will not be the end of the story. The crisis has also shown in many other areas how dependent the European Union is on production and on workers from non-EU countries. Apart from these security-related arguments, climate change is becoming an increasingly important argument for a proactive and democratic deglobalization of production networks.

A further indicator of changing "regimes of territorialization" (Middell and Nauman 2010) from the perspective of resource politics is the fact that the USA is currently blocking the reappointment of WTO judges, thus de facto impeding dispute settlement. This could lead to a new wave of export restrictions and, consequently, a new wave of "resource nationalism" in the wake of the Sino-American trade war, the containment of which would be far more complicated and costly without a functioning WTO, especially for Europe. The trade war between China and the USA again includes export restrictions on rare earths (on the Chinese side) and thus clearly points in this direction, even if the localization of China in the global power structure is currently a quite difficult endeavor. When the Chinese Central Committee, for example, triggered the 2000s commodity crisis by imposing export restrictions, it very soon had to deal with boomerang effects, which were due precisely to this shifting position in the world system. Indonesia, for instance, followed the example of China by imposing export restrictions on China (Knierzinger 2018: 51).

There are thus increasing signs that China, too, could follow a global historical pattern that has been evident since the 19th century: The more dominant a world power, the more it advocates free trade (cf. Koivu 2017; Frøland and Ingulstad 2019: 319). Even if the "post-territorial" order (Maier 2000), which has been established since the critical juncture of the 1960s/70s, would again be replaced in many parts of the world by more territorialized forms of control, it is still highly uncertain which ideological changes will result from this comeback of national elites, and even more so, how this will affect African living conditions and the political leeway of African governments.

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